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Generations of constitutional scholars have obsessed over
the Supreme Court's unique power of review, reiterating the
anti-democratic perils that attend judicial scrutiny of majori-
tarian legislation. To some, 'judicial review is a deviant institu-
tion in the American democracy,, 2 allowing unelected members
of a politically insular, life-long fraternity to second-guess the
policy choices of the people or their elected representatives.
Others seem less disturbed by the countermajoritarian nature of
judicial review, noting that although "[d]emocracy does not in-
sist on judges having the last word, ... it does not insist that they
must not have it."3 As such, the focus of the countermajoritarian
difficulty might be narrowed to the ensuing reaction or "dia-
logue" between the judicial and political branches. This dia-
logue is not unlike interpersonal communication, with one
party (usually the legislative branch) suggesting a solution to a
given problem and the other party (usually the judicial branch)
critiquing the solution against important background principles
(the Constitution, for instance). Whether the dialogue contin-
ues is the true difficulty of countermajoritarianism: Can law-
* Associate Professor, University of Utah College of Law. Many thanks to Ronald
Boyce, Paul Cassell, Boyd Dyer, Karen Engle, John Flynn, Lionel Frankel, Mitchel
Lasser, John Martinez, Scott Matheson, Michael McConnell, Alexander Skibine, Rob-
ert Weisberg, and workshop participants at the University of Utah College of Law for
their thoughtful comments, and to Albert Alschuler and Tracey Meares for reviewing
an earlier draft. Thanks also toJon Shuman for his diligent research assistance.
' See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334-39 (1998) (reviewing "the
countermajoritarian obsession").
2 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
ThE BAR OF POLMCS 18 (1962).
3 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 7 (1996) (emphasis added).
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makers or law enforcers affirmatively respond to a judicial deci-
sion and, if so, what form can the reaction take?
These questions are, in fact, part and parcel of a related
academic debate-increasing interbranch dialogue. For dec-
ades, some of the most respected legal scholars have sought to
enhance the discourse of judges and politicians-particularly
between the Supreme Court4 and lawmakers--suggesting that
the lack of communication coupled with obstinate decisionmak-
ing resulted in inferior legislation or judicial imperialism. Bet-
ter government, these commentators argued, requires an
ongoing conversation among the branches of government on
the fundamental principles in a constitutional democracy. Yet
no advocate of interbranch dialogue takes lightly the Court's
authority to invalidate majoritarian decisionmaking. When
striking down legislation pursuant to the Constitution, the Jus-
tices not only void a particular law but may also stifle future leg-
islation. By its constitutional pedigree, a decision can dissuade
further debate and political action, as lawmakers seldom rally
around a law that will be dead on arrival at the Supreme Court.
In the course of striking down legislation, however, the
Court can also spur political discourse and lawmaking through
the crafting of opinions. It is true, of course, that the Justices
rarely speak solo voce. Instead, nine separate individuals offer
their views, often in voting blocks, without a prefabricated
"game plan" of vote distribution and opinion content to achieve
' Although the dialogue between the lower courts (both state and federal) and
political actors is exceptionally rich and important, this article will focus solely on the
interaction between the U.S. Supreme Court and legislative bodies.
There are important distinctions between federal and state statutes, and even
between state and local legislation. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472
(1980) ("When we are required to pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress,
we assume 'the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to per-
form."') (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of Holmes,
J.)); Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 152 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 1998) ("enactments
by home rule cities... are usurped when the state legislature has 'expressly or im-
pliedly restricted the municipality's power over these matters"') (internal citation
omitted). But for the purposes of this article, I will not distinguish among federal,
state, and local legislation.
6 See Part III, infra (discussing the dialogic theories of Cardozo, Bickel, Sunstein,
and Calabresi).
But see notes 272-73, infra (noting Congress' enactment of child labor laws and a
flag desecration statute despite prior adverse rulings by the Supreme Court).
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optimal interbranch dialogue.8 But the Court's nature as a
group of distinct jurists rather than a monolithic entity does not
prevent it from being anthropomorphized by the political
branches and the public. To legislators, the written decision is a
holistic instrument of a single "being"-the United States Su-
preme Court-that either allows or prohibits a political reac-
tion. And although the Court does not have human will,
opinions demonstrate a type of "intent" or mens legis that can in-
form the actions of lawmakers. In particular, an opinion can:
(1) actively encourage political dialogue; (2) actively discourage
such dialogue; or (3) have no dialogic aspirations whatsoever.
While the second option largely precludes normal lawmaking,9
the first option (and possibly the third) leaves the door open for
a legislative response.
Among the more radical forms of post-invalidation encour-
agement is what I call a "constitutional road map." Under this
judicial strategy, the Supreme Court strikes down the law in
question but then suggests legislative alternatives consistent with
the Constitution. In other words, the opinion offers a "road
map" for lawmakers to follow in creating a constitutional stat-
For example, it is pretty hard to imagine the ChiefJustice saying the following at
conference:
Okay, it sounds like a majority of us believe that this statute must fall. But if I hear you cor-
rectly, we don't want to stifle legislative reform on [insert yourfavorite social issue] either. So
I think this should be a 5-4 decision, demonstrating how close a call this was for us. San-
dra, why don't you concur in the judgment and offer some possible alternatives-you
know, kind of a road map for legislators to follow in enacting a constitutional statute. And
Nino, I want you to write a biting dissent; that should give a little encouragement to law-
makers.
Although group dynamics and strategic behavior play a part in any voting system, in-
cluding that of the Court, see, e.g., Youngsik Lim, An EmpiricalAnalysis of Supreme Court
Justices'Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (2000); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., So-
phisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549
(1999); Joan Biskupic, The Art of 'Holding Five' in Peak Season, WASH. POsr, June 7,
1999, at A17; this level of collusion among the Justices on vote distribution and opin-
ion content seems unlikely (or at least rare). But throughout the article, I will assume
that the Court "intends" an opinion's dialogic message as perceived by political actors,
commentators, and the general public. I will therefore refer to the Court's "intent"
or "goals" as a rhetorical tool for exploring the political consequences ofjudicial de-
cisionmaking and opinion writing.
" The constitutional amendment process always remains open, see U.S. CONST. art.
V, although the difficulty of this option is evidenced by the relative infrequency of its
occurrence. In the more than two centuries since its adoption, the U.S. Constitution
has been amended only 27 times; this number drops to 14 if the Bill of Rights and the
Reconstruction amendments are excluded.
ute. Although not unprecedented in First Amendment doc-
trine, for example, 0 the strategy was foreign to criminal proce-
dure jurisprudence. This changed, however, with the Court's
recent decision in City of Chicago v. Morales." At issue was the
constitutionality of Chicago's gang-loitering law,12 a statute that
empowered law enforcement to prevent public congregation of
gang members and their associates; and in a splintered opinion,
the Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due proc-
ess. Yet the most significant portion of Morales was not the
judgment or its rationale but the concurrence of Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor. Despite agreeing that the gang-loitering ordi-
nance was unconstitutional, O'Connor suggested that Chicago
had lawful alternatives at its disposal. Her concurrence then
sketched out potential statutory provisions that would survive
judicial scrutiny,8 offering a constitutional road map for law-
makers to follow in reenacting the ordinance.
Just this past term, the Supreme Court had another oppor-
tunity to employ the road mapping strategy in a criminal proce-
dure case. In Dickerson v. United States,'4 the Court addressed for
the first time a 32-year-old federal law 5 purporting to overrule
Miranda v. Arizonal and its consequences for custodial interro-
gation. For any number of reasons, both legal and pragmatic,
this statute had real difficulty withstanding judicial review. But
even if the Justices felt compelled to invalidate the law, they
could have encouraged further political dialogue and possibly
offered a road map toward constitutional legislation. The Court
did not choose this path and instead struck down the statute
without offering encouragement, let alone guidance, for any po-
litical response.
Was the road mapping strategy appropriate in Morales and
should it have been employed in Dickerson? The answer de-
pends on, among other things, the ability of less aggressive judi-
cial techniques to encourage political responses, the Court's
10 See text and notes 332-54, infra (giving examples of constitutional road maps).
527 U.S. 41 (1999).
12 CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 84-015 (added June 17, 1992; repealed Feb. 16,
2000).
" Morales, 527 U.S. at 67-68 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
14 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
,s 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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past experience with the road mapping strategy, and the bal-
ance of arguments for and against constitutional road maps
both in the abstract and in particular cases. The goal of this Ar-
ticle, then, is to explore the concepts of interbranch dialogue
and judge-made road maps in light of the Supreme Court's
opinions in Morales and Dickerson. Part I details the background
of Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance, the noteworthy aspects
of Morales, the law's reenactment pursuant to the O'Connor
road map, and the likely court challenges to the new ordinance.
Part II describes the Court's seminal decision on custodial inter-
rogation, Congress' attempt to abrogate Miranda by statute, the
intervening three decades of relative desuetude, the invalida-
tion of the federal confession law in Dickerson, and the improb-
ability of congressional reenactment in its wake. Part III
considers leading dialogic theories, their limited application to
the criminal process, and the prospects of road mapping as an
alternative judicial technique. Finally, Part IV presents the
likely arguments for and against constitutional road maps and
offers a framework for analyzing the propriety of this judicial
strategy in specific disputes. This Part then applies the frame-
work to Supreme Court cases and, in particular, Morales and
Dickerson.
I. STREET GANGS, VAGRANCY-TYPE LAWS, AND MORALES
The history of vagrancy-type laws17 is long and complex, dat-
ing back to the decline of feudalism and the economic devasta-
tion that accompanied the Black Plague.8 As a surrogate for
serfdom, vagrancy tied workers to their jobs by criminalizing
both able-bodied idleness and migration for higher wages,
thereby buttressing a European caste system against the threat
of class instability and social disorder.0 The concept of va-
grancy was carried over to the British colonies and remained a
,7 By "vagrancy-type laws," I am referring to statutory schemes that criminaiize an
individual's status (such as being a gang-member), activities that are inextricably
connected to one's status (such as the homeless sleeping in public places), and/or
otherwise innocuous conduct (such as loitering).
'a See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603,
615-16 (1956).
'9 Id. at 615.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HIsTORY 103
(1993).
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tool of government after the American Revolution.2 ' Although
primarily aimed at vagabonds,22 vagrancy-type laws were also
used to harass prostitutes and gamblers and to arrest suspicious
characters without proof of crime. Vagrancy was part of the
"Black Codes" as well, offering the antebellum South another
means of racial subjugation in the absence of slavery.24
Scholars and activists of the mid-twentieth century chal-
lenged the continued validity of vagrancy-type laws under mod-
em notions of due process. The Supreme Court eventually
agreed that the Constitution does not allow unduly vague stat-
utes used to sweep the streets of undesirables or detain suspi-
cious individuals. It was also aware that vagrancy weighed
heavily on minority communities and served as a blunt instru-
ment against civil rights activists.2 Over two decades, the Court
28
struck down pure vagrancy and loitering laws, anti-
congregation bans,2 and statutes requiring, on demand, proof
of identification and a valid purpose.
21 See id.; Foote, supra note 18, at 616.
2 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 102.
' See id. at 104. See generally William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion,
70YALEL.J. 1 (1960).
24 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 94; LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERIcAN LAW 505 (2d ed. 1995); Gary Stewart, Black Codes
and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107
YALE L.J. 2249, 2258-62 (1998). See also Harvey Grossman, The Failed Policy of Street
Sweeps, Cm. TRIm., July 1, 1999, at 23 ("Enforcement of [vagrancy-type] laws first was
used to maintain racial divisions between neighborhoods. The practice involved dis-
couraging young men of color from being on the streets of 'white' communities by
taking them into police custody for loitering. In the eyes of the police these men had
no appropriate purpose in being outside their neighborhood.").
" See, e.g., Foote, supra note 18; Douglas, supra note 23; Rollin M. Perkins, The Va-
grancy Concept 9 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1958); Arthur H. Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and
Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CAL L. REv. 557 (1960).
2 See Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1965) (For-
tasJ., concurring).
' Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156 n.1 (striking down ordinance criminalizing a vari-
ety of disreputable conduct and shady characters); Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 88 (strik-
ing down ordinance making it "unlawful for any person or any number of persons to
so stand, loiter or walk upon any street or sidewalk in the city as to obstruct free pas-
sage over, on or along said street or sidewalk ... (or] to stand or loiter upon any
street or sidewalk of the city after having been requested by any police officer to move
on").
" Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 n.1 (1971) (striking down city or-
dinance making it "unlawful for three or more persons to assemble... on any of the
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Against this background, the entire Morales affair can be
seen as a series of interactions between Chicago's local govern-
ment and the judiciary on the fitness of specialized loitering
laws. This section describes the initial three rounds of this ex-
change-ordinance enactment, adjudication, and reenact-
ment-as well as the possible hurdles facing the new law in the
next round of adjudication.
A. ROUND 1-ENACTMENT
Like most metropolitan cities, Chicago has a gang problem.
Many of its urban neighborhoods are dominated by street gangs
and their tactics-staking out turf, selling drugs, and command-
ing authority through violence. Even stalwarts of the city are in-
timidated by the hostile environment created by gangland
activity, while law-abiding citizens become prisoners in their
own homes.3' More police officers on the streets-as well as
employment opportunities, job training, and community out-
reach programs for at-risk youth-would obviously be a move in
the right direction, but the electorate and its chosen officials
provided insufficient resources toward these ends."
sidewalks, street comers, vacant lots, or mouths of alleys, and there conduct them-
selves in a manner annoying to persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent build-
ings").
so Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (striking down law requiring loiterers
to provide on demand credible identification and account for their presence).
' According to one long-time resident:
I have never had the terror that I feel everyday when I walk down the streets of Chicago...
• I have had my windows broken out. I have had guns pulled on me. I have been threat-
ened. I get intimidated on a daily basis, and it's come to the point where I say, well, do I go
out today. Do I put my ax in my briefcase. Do I walk around dressed like a bum so I am
not looking rich or got any money or anything like that.
Transcript of Proceedings before the City Council of Chicago, Committee on Police
and Fire 124-25 (May 15, 1997).
" See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or
Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. L.F. 215, 218,
n.19 (noting minority community frustration with "the lack of adequate police pro-
tection in their neighborhoods"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and
the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89J. CRIM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 775, 823
(1999) (similar); David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the
New CriminalJustice Scholarship, 87 GEo. LJ. 1059, 1088 (1999) ("In the best of all pos-
sible worlds, inner-city residents might well prefer increased investments in job train-
ing, public schools, economic development, and afterschool programs to an
expansion of police discretion and aggressive quality-of-life policing. But if the larger
community is unwilling to provide the former investment,... residents will have less
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It is unsurprising, then, that Chicago sought an alternative
means of fighting street gangs. Rather than putting more cops
on the beat, it decided to give greater discretionary powers to
the existing force. After extensive debate and deliberation, the
Chicago City Council enacted a loitering ordinance targeting
gang members and preventing them from public congrega-
tion. Pursuant to this law, police officers were empowered to
order suspected gangsters and their associates to "move along";
failure to comply with an order was grounds for arrest and pun-
ishable by up to six-months incarceration."
On first blush, Chicago's ordinance appeared to revive the
vagrancy laws of past generationss with an implicit call for po-
lice to sweep the streets of undesirables. But some legal schol-
ars argued that the statute was part of a larger trend in police
science, variously referred to as "broken windows," order-
maintenance, or community policing. Visible signs of disorder
than a free hand in striking the appropriate balance."); Editorial, Loiter of the Law,
Prrr. POST-GAzETTE, June 19, 1999, at A18 ("A beefed-up police presence on the
street not only provides a window on 'hanging out' that is a prelude to drug-dealing
or the harassment of passersby; it also has a deterrent effect on such behavior. But it
is expensive-more expensive than enacting a law that gives vast discretion to fewer
police but runs afoul of the rights of innocent people."). See also Pratt v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 796 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("Many tenants within CHA hous-
ing, apparently convinced by sad experience that the larger community will not pro-
vide normal law enforcement services to them, are prepared to forgo their own
constitutional rights.").
'3 The Chicago City Counsel included a number of findings in the preamble to
the ordinance. SeeAppendix A.
' CHICAGO, ILL MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (added June 17, 1992; repealed Feb. 16,
2000). See Appendix A for the full text of the ordinance. During the three years of
active enforcement, "police broke up some 89,000 public gatherings and arrested
42,000 people who didn't move fast enough or far enough to suit the cops." Steven
Chapman, Court Upholds America s Right to Hang Out, Ck. TRiB., June 13, 1999, at 19.
See also Gary Marx & Terry Wilson, Anti-Gang Law's Loss Won't Have Big Impact, CHI.
TaB., June 13, 1999, at 1 ("Chicago police records show that 41,741 people were ar-
rested under the Gang Congregation Ordinance between 1992, when the City Coun-
sel approved it, and 1995, when an Illinois Appellate Court ruled the ordinance
unconstitutional and the city stopped enforcing it.").
" See notes 28-30, supra;, note 74, infra.
'6 These terms are used in an interchangeable and somewhat indiscriminate
manner. Broken windows or order-maintenance policing "involves the use of law en-
forcement resources to attack visible signs of disorder." Tracey L. Meares & Dan M.
Kahan, Law and (Norms oj) Order in the Inner City, 32 L. & Soc'Y REv. 805, 822 (1998).
In contrast, community policing seeks working relationships between police and
community members so that the latter has "a greater voice in setting local police pri-
orities and involv[es] them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their
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have a malignant meaning-"a signal that no one cares" -- and
a criminogenic influence on impressionable individuals. By
suppressing the cues of rampant criminality such as gang con-
gregation, law can alter the social meaning of gang membership
and the influence of gang norms. Chicago's loitering ordi-
nance, these scholars suggested, was not a tool of oppression
but a moderate strategy to counter the harmful effects of gang-
related activityss
The effect of the ordinance in particular and order-
maintenance policing in general, however, were exceptionally
controversial. A number of academics criticized the social
meaning theory and its alleged legal justification as ill-informed
and imprudent.3 9 Bernard Harcourt, for instance, reevaluated
neighborhoods." ROBERT TROJANOWICZ & BONNIE BUCQUEROUX, COMMUNITY
POLICING 5 (1990). See also HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1990)
(articulating a policing methodology directed at solving specific problems in the
community).
37 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANnC MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, at 29, 31.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1163-65 (1998); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan,
The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking- A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U.
Cm. L.F. 197, 210, 213; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black, White and Gray: A
Reply to Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U. Cm. L.F. 245, 259. See also Meares & Kahan,
Law and (Norms oJ) Orden supra note 36; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When
Rights are Wrong, in The New Democracy Forum, BOSTON REv., Apr./May 1999. See also
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 76-167 (1998); Debra Livingston, Police
Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 551 (1997); Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in
City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE LJ. 1165
(1996); Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Com-
ment, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1255, 1256 (1994).
'" See, e.g., Roberts, Foreword, supra note 32; Cole, supra note 32; Alschuler &
Schulhofer, supra note 32; Bernard E. Harcourt, Rejecting on the Subject: A Critique of
the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICIH. L. REv. 291 (1998). Ironically, Professor
Randall Kennedy, a noted proponent of protecting minority communities through
greater police discretion, split ranks with the leading advocates of the "new commu-
nity policing," Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, on the issue of Chicago's
gang-loitering ordinance. See Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et
al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, City of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 WL
642555 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1998) (No. 97-1121) (Profs. Randall L. Kennedy, Stephen J.
Schulhofer & Randolph N. Stone, attorneys for amici curiae); Brief of Chicago
Neighborhood Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, City of Chi-
cago v. Morales, 1998 WL 328366 (U.S.June 19, 1998) (No. 97-1121) (Profs. Dan M.
Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, attorneys for amicus curiae).
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one study claiming a connection between order-maintenance
policing and crime reduction;40 with a more disceming analysis,
he found that the alleged correlation evaporated.41 Professor
Harcourt also refuted the obtuse cause-and-effect rhetoric that
associated the decline in crime with a broken windows-style ap-
proach to law enforcement.
42
B. ROUND 2-ADJUDICATION
After a series of trial court proceedings, a state appellate
court held that the gang-loitering ordinance was unconstitu-
tional43 and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.44 The U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and, in a splintered opinion,
held that Chicago's ordinance was inconsistent with principles
of due process.
1. Stevens' Opinion
Justice John Paul Stevens, speaking for either a six-person
majority or a three-member plurality, offered a handful of fun-
damental flaws in the gang-loitering law. Joined by Justices
David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stevens suggested that
"the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the 'lib-
erty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
To the consternation of Kahan and Meares, Kennedy signed on to a brief opposing the Chi-
cago anti-gang ordinance. "I was definitely surprised and a little disappointed by that," says
Kahan. "I mean, he's the person who inspired this whole new conception of how criminal
law and policing and race relate to each other." Kennedy, who is largely sympathetic to
quality-of-life policing initiatives ("I think laws against littering and spitting and jumping
through turnstiles do make people feel they can use the streets"), says he can understand
Kahan's disappointment. "A good number of people wrote and e-mailed me to say, 'Gee, I
read your book, I thought you'd be on the other side,'" he says. But Kennedy stands by his
position. "Do the police have to have discretion--of course they do. The question is, Do
they need that authority augmented I think, to the contrary, we need to make sure they are
doing what they're supposed to do." Kahan and Meares, he adds, "seem to think political
power has changed so much that racial minorities don't have to worry about the police as
armies of occupation. I think they are much too sanguine on that."
Eyal Press, The Color Tes4 LINGUA FRANCA, Oct. 2000, at 58.
40 WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990).
4' Harcourt, supra note 39, at 309-329.
42 Id. at 331-39.
City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34 (IM. App. Ct. 1995).
City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997).
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999).
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Amendment.",6 There is, in other words, a basic right to peace-
fully stand on the comer, sit on a park bench, or stroll down the
street.47
Justice Stevens, however, saw no need to decide whether the
ordinance sufficiently infringed on constitutionally protected
liberty.8 Instead, he found that the statutory scheme was so
permeated with ambiguities as to render it unenforceable con-
sistent with the Constitution. Specifically, he articulated two in-
dependent reasons that doomed the ordinance under the
doctrinal rubric of void-for-vagueness. First, the loitering law
failed to provide ordinary citizens with adequate notice of pro-
scribed conduct. Loitering was statutorily defined as "re-
main[ing] in any one place with no apparent purpose," a
description that Stevens found loaded with uncertainty.
Stevens also dismissed the idea that notice is provided when
police order loiterers to disperse, a necessary prerequisite to a
valid arrest under the ordinance. ° A command to "move along"
offers no indication of the boundaries between lawful and un-
lawful conduct-it is a direction backed by force, not a civics les-
46 Id. at 55 (Stevens,J.,joined by Souter and GinsburgJJ.).
'7 This harks back to the words ofJustice Douglas in his Papachristou opinion:
["Wandering or strolling"] are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known
them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwrit-
ten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independ-
ence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right
of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submis-
siveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating si-
lence.
Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972). Referring to this lan-
guage, the Illinois Supreme Court had previously held that Chicago's law violated
substantive due process rights to travel, locomotion, freedom of movement, and asso-
ciation with others. Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 65.
4 Morales, 527 U.S. at 55. Stevens' analysis of the right to loiter was only offered as
a potential justification for a facial, rather than as-applied, challenge to the loitering
ordinance. Id. at 52-54. The dissenters, however, painted this portion of the plurality
opinion as pure substantive due process which infected the entire opinion. See id. at
83-86 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
" Id. at 56-57 (Stevens, J.,joined by Souter and GinsburgJJ.):
It is difficult to imagine how any citizen of the city of Chicago standing in a public place
with a group of people would know if he or she had an "apparent purpose." If she were
talking to another person, would she have an apparent purpose? If she were frequently
checking her watch and looking expectantly down the street, would she have an apparent
purpose?
so Id. at 58-60.
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son-nor can it retroactively provide sufficient warning after the
predicate activity has already occurred.51 Moreover, any disper-
sal order has its own ambiguities: "After such an order issues,
how long must the loiterers remain apart? How far must they
move?" 5 To Stevens, these uncertainties further compounded
the definitional vagueness of prohibited conduct.
Although he was only able to muster two additional votes on
the issue of notice, Justice Stevens garnered a majority of the
Court under the second prong of the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine. Criminal laws can also violate due process by authorizing
or encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Unless a legislative body establishes minimal guidelines to gov-
ern and circumscribe the use of official coercion, a statute "nec-
essarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment
judgment of the policeman on his beat."54 That type of unbri-
dled discretion is inconsistent with a constitutional scheme
geared against the threat of government tyranny.
According to the Morales majority, Chicago's ordinance suf-
fers from precisely that evil. Police officers are vested with abso-
lute discretion to denominate certain conduct as "loitering,"
subject to a dispersal order and possible arrest.5 Whether a
street congregation contains a suspected gang member,
whether they have an "apparent purpose," and whether they
have sufficiently complied with a dispersal order are questions
solely within the ambit of law enforcement. 6  Such official
power might be conscientiously employed by a beat cop, with an
eye toward filling in missing details consistent with the legisla-
tive intent. But it seems equally plausible that broad grants of
discretionary authority will be used as blunt street-sweeping de-
vices against suspicious characters rather than suspicious con-
duct.5 ' The gang-loitering ordinance, the Court concluded, was
simply too dangerous a tool to be left in the hands of law en-
forcement.
58
' Id. at 58-59.
-2 Id- at 59.
"3 Id. at 60 (Stevens, J., for the Court).
'4 Id. (quoting Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 (1983)).
Id. at 60-64.
-6 Id. See also id. at 56-60 (Stevens,J., joined by Souter and GinsburgJJ.).





The Morales decision aroused sharp disapproval from three
members of the Court, most notably Justice Antonin Scalia. 9
Critics have become accustomed to his often witty but some-
times heavy-handed dissents, respecting his intellect while ignor-
ing the rhetoric as just Scalia being Scalia.60 His salvos in
Morales, however, might represent a new high (or low) in
Scalian lore,61 chock full of stinging one-liners, historical analo-
gies, and artistic references.
Core to his worldview are deference to majoritarian deci-
sionmaking by the political branches and a limited role for judi-
cial review, stances reaffirmed in Scalia's analysis of Chicago's
gang-loitering law. Readers are reminded that Chicagoans were
once free to "drive about the city at whatever speed they wished"
or "stand around and gawk at the scene of an accident."63 But
" In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas began by noting the "inestimable" "hu-
man costs exacted by criminal street gangs," id. at 98 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and ar-
guing that Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance was "the product of [a] democratic
process-the council's attempt to address these social ills." Id. at 101. He criticized
the plurality for derogating the Court's substantive due process framework, ignoring
America's long history with vagrancy laws, and distorting precedents to concoct a
fundamental right to loiter. Id. at 102-06. Thomas then argued that the ordinance
provided adequate standards to guide police in their discretionary role as peace offi-
cers, id. at 107-11, and offered sufficient notice for "[p]ersons of ordinary intelli-
gence." Id. at 112-14. "By focusing exclusively on the imagined 'rights' of" gang
members and their associates, Thomas concluded, "the Court today has denied our
most vulnerable citizens the very thing thatJustice Stevens elevates above all else-the
'freedom of movement.' And that is a shame." Id. at 115.
60 See, e.g., David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's
Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMoRYL.J. 1377, 1387 n.56 (1999) ("[I1]f we
recognize the personal nature with which Scalia presses his points, excesses we find in
his analysis might properly be attributed to emotional zeal rather than to a failure of
his vaunted intellect.").
r Justice Scalia apparently has groupies. See, e.g.,
<http://members.aol.com/schwenkler/scalia/> (web-site entitled "Cult of Scalia");
<www.uchicago.edu/-jfmitche/scalia/index.html> (web-site entitled "The Scalia
Shrine") (visited May 1, 1999); Charles Krauthammer, Supreme Hypocrisy, WASH. POST,
June 30, 2000, at A31 ("Some people have John Grisham. Others Tom Clancy. Not
me. For sheer power, stiletto prose and verbal savagery, I'll take Antonin Scalia.").
62 The dissent was sprinkled with allusions to West Side Stoy and Through the Looking
Glass. Morales, 527 U.S. at 81-82, n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("With apologies for tak-
ing creative license with the work of Messrs. Bernstein, Sondheim, and Laurents."),
id. at 94 ("This side of the looking glassjust the opposite is true."), and an analogy to
President Eisenhower's use of force to desegregate public schools in Little Rock. Id.
at 90-91.
6 Id. at 73.
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the citizens of Chicago, through their duly elected representa-
tives, determined that it was eminently reasonable to place a
mild limit on individual freedom by erecting speed limits and
forcing spectators to move along.6 Similar prophylactic laws
prohibit "riding a motorcycle without a safety helmet,... start-
ing a campfire in a national forest, or selling a safe and effective
drug not yet approved by the FDA"--all of which undoubtedly
pass constitutional muster.
So it was with the loitering law, Justice Scalia contended:
"IT]he city has been afflicted with criminal street gangs . . .
congregat[ing] in public places to deal drugs and to terrorize
the neighborhoods by demonstrating control over their 'turf'..
. [making] residents of the inner city [feel] that they [are] pris-
oners in their own homes."r Preventing gang members and
their entourage from congregating on street comers seemed, to
Scalia, just as reasonable as requiring drivers to buckle-up. In
"our democratic system" of majority rule, "[t]his Court has no
business second-guessing either the degree of necessity or the
fairness" of a publicly supported municipal ordinance.67
Along the way to this conclusion, Justice Scalia took a num-
ber ofjabs at his colleagues. Evoking the lineage of Marbuy v.
Madison,6 he paid heed to the problems of countermajoritarian
adjudication and the role that standing plays in limiting the en-
suing difficulty.69 In particular, Scalia argued that the Court
oversteps its boundaries when advisory opinions in the guise of
facial challenges are free from the case-or-controversy require-
ments of the Constitution. ° It is bad enough that legal standing
in "hot-button social issues" is subject to "a 'political correct-
ness' exception"; those cases were "at least predictable," Scalia
noted, and arguably connected to substantive rights.7' Yet in
Morales, only the imaginary "Fundamental Freedom to Loiter" is
fA Id.
Id. at 98.
' Id. at 73-74.
67 Id. at 97-98.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
61 Moraln, 527 U.S. at 74-75 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 74-83.
71 Id. at 81.
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The Morales majority/plurality leaves many questions unan-
swered for future litigants and criminal procedure doctrine in
general, while the dissents merely deconstructed the Court's
decision. At a minimum, other loitering or vagrancy statutes
will be exposed to renewed constitutional suspicion. The in-
validated Chicago law seems less blunt and far-reaching than a
Jacksonville ordinance struck down by the Court in 1972, which
punished a litany of shady characters and disreputable con-
duct.73 As such, Morales arguably places tighter restraints on leg-
islative bans of facially innocuous activity. 4 But the boundaries
set by the majority/plurality opinion are fuzzy at best.
EnterJustice O'Connor. Her concurrence recognized the grave
consequences of gangland violence and the need for a degree
7 Id. at 84. Justice Scalia also dismissed his colleagues' legal interpretations as
hermeneutic gymnastics. See, e.g., id. at 94 n.12 (referring to the Court's statutory
construction as "interpretive inanity"); id. at 90 n.9 ("This notion that a prescription
which is itself not unconstitutionally vague can somehow contribute to the unconsti-
tutional vagueness of the entire scheme is full of mystery-suspending, as it does, the
metaphysical principle that nothing can confer what it does not possess.").
" Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The statute in Pa-
pachristou read:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers,
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and las-
civious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons wander-
ing or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual
loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending
their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic bev-
erages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of
their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Mu-
nicipal Court shall be punished ... by 90 days' imprisonment, $500 fine, or both.
Id. at 156 n.1.
7' As suggested earlier, the sweep of heightened constitutional scrutiny includes
not only pure vagrancy laws like the one in Papachristou (see also Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) (striking down loitering law)), and anti-
congregation bans such as Chicago's ordinance (see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611 (1971) (striking down anti-congregation law)), but also statutes requir-
ing loiterers to provide on demand credible identification and account for their
presence. See Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
of discretion in law enforcement,75 while at the same time agree-
ing with the Court that the ordinance provides police with vir-
tually limitless authority to implement its proisions.6 Yet
O'Connor believed it inadequate to merely strike down the law
without guidance for the future and instead suggested that
"there remain open to Chicago reasonable alternatives to com-
bat the very real threat posed by gang intimidation."01 She then
offered a road map for legislatures to follow in enacting a con-
stitutional gang loitering ordinance:
For example, the Court properly and expressly distinguishes the ordi-
nance from laws that require loiterers to have a "harmful purpose," from
laws that target only gang members, and from laws that incorporate lim-
its on the area and manner in which the laws may be enforced. In addi-
tion, the ordinance here is unlike a law that "directly prohibit[s]" the
"presence of a large collection of obviously brazen, insistent, and lawless
gang members and hangers-on on the public ways," that "intimidates
residents.". . . The term "loiter" might possibly be construed in a more
limited fashion to mean "to remain in any one place with no apparent
purpose other than to establish control over identifiable areas, to in-
timidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activi-
ties." . . . [Lawmakers might also place] limitations that restricted the
ordinance's criminal penalties to gang members or that more carefully
delineated the circumstances in which those penalties would apply to
non-gang members."
Justice O'Connor noted that such a scheme would be consistent
with the findings of the Chicago City Council while avoiding the
unconstitutional vagueness of the original ordinance.79
71 Morals, 527 U.S. at 65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
76 Id. at 64-67.
77 Id. at 67.
7" Id. at 67-68.
79 Id. at 68. In his brief concurrence, Justice Kennedy argued that an order to dis-
perse by itself was not "sufficient to eliminate doubts regarding the adequacy of no-
tice under this ordinance." Id. at 69 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). Although there are circumstances where an individual can be
prosecuted for not complying with police commands, "[iut does not follow... that
any unexplained police order must be obeyed without notice of the lawfulness of the
order." Id. Justice Breyer also issued a concurring opinion, contending that "the or-
dinance violates the Constitution because it delegates too much discretion to a police
officer to decide whom to order to move on, and in what circumstances." Id. at 71
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In particular,
Breyer argued that a facial challenge was appropriate in this context, as "the city of
Chicago may no more apply this law to the defendants, no matter how they behaved,
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C. ROUND 3-REENACrMENT
Immediately following the announcement of the Morales
decision, legal commentators, government officials, and the
media were characterizing Justice O'Connor's concurrence as a
"road map"' to constructing a constitutional gang-loitering law.
"[T] he Court's decision should be viewed not as a barrier," ar-
gued Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, "but as a guide to preserv-
ing public order."8' But others were less sanguine; Stephen
Schulhofer, for instance, failed to see "anything new in the deci-
sion about what cities can and can't do. '82 "There's no question
that they could write something that would be constitutional,"
than could it apply an (imaginary) statute that said, 'It is a crime to do wrong,' even
to the worst of murderers." Id.
8' Jan Crawford Greenburg, Top Court Ruling Shows Way to a Legal Anti-Loitering
Law, CHi. TRIB., June 11, 1999, at Al ("O'Connor's concurrence ... was remarkable
because it gave government officials what several discerned to be a 'road map' for
writing similar laws that would pass constitutional scrutiny."); Editorial, The End of An
Anti-Gang Law, CM. TRm., June 13, 1999, at A18 ("Despite losing, City Corporation
Counsel Brian Crowe applauded the ruling for offering 'a partial road map as to
where we should go in the future.'"). See also Editorial, High Court Gangs Up on Bad
Law, BUFF. NEWS, June 20, 1999, at H2 ("[T] he choice is not between this bad law or
none at all .... In this case, the nation's High Court offered excellent advice to Chi-
cago and other communities with gang problems: You can do better. Try again with
laws containing more specific provisions to better guide police and inform citizens.").
But see Edwin C. Yohnka, Anti-Loitering Spin, Cm. TRm., June 18, 1999, at 30 ("The at-
tempt by City Hall to spin the [Morales] decision as a victory is overreaching and un-
supportable .... It is important to note that the High Court's ruling is not a victory
for a legal argument, nor does it legitimize a political posture. It's a vindication for
the thousands of young, African-American and Latino males who were subjected to
unnecessary arrests under the ordinance."); Al Knight, When may a cop say, 'move on'?,
DENy. PosT, June 17, 1999, at Bl ("There are a lot of objectionable elements to the
Court's ruling, but the most objectionable of all is the reasoning advanced by UJus-
tice] O'Connor to support it. O'Connorjoined with the majority invalidating the or-
dinance but then turned around and suggested that fixing the problem she has just
helped create would not be difficult .... Unfortunately, the drafting suggestion is all
but useless, even assuming that the Chicago City Counsel wants or needs O'Connor's
help in doing the job it, not the Court, was elected to perform .... Here's a thought
that arises quite naturally from the Supreme Court's recent work: If the Justices
weren't so anxious to usurp the legislative function, they just might be more able to
focus on writing soundly reasoned judicial opinions.").
81 Dan Kahan & Tracey Meares, Public-Order Policing Can Pass Constitutional Muster,
WAL ST.J.,June 15,1999, atA18.




Professor Schulhofer argued, "I wish they had done that seven
years ago."83
After the initial excitement of Morales had worn off, the
concept of reenactment laid dormant for more than six months.
Then in early January of this year, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley
announced that he would introduce a new gang-loitering ordi-
nance mirrored after the O'Connor concurrence.84 Although
admitting that the revised law might still be deemed unconstitu-
tional, Daley promised that "if this ordinance fails, we will be
right back with another plan."m The proposed law received the
necessary committee support in early February86 and was passed
by the Chicago City Council two weeks later by an overwhelming
margin.
As drafted, the new gang-loitering ordinance followed most
(but not alle) ofJustice O'Connor's road map.89 Per the Morales
concurrence, gang loitering is defined as "remaining in any one
place under circumstances that would warrant a reasonable per-
son to believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is to
enable a criminal street gang to establish control over identifi-
able areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to
conceal illegal activities. "90 Likewise, the statute places limits on
Chicago v. Chicago, U. Cm. L. S. REc., Fall 1999, at 11 (quoting Prof. Stephen
Schulhofer).
4 Gary Washburn, Daley Will Propose New Gang Loitering Law, CI. TaIB., Jan. 7,
2000, at Al.
Gary Washburn, Daley Pursuing Anti-Gang Law Despite Challenges, CmH. TRuB., Jan.
12, 2000, at Al.
Gary Washburn, Anti-Gang Loitering Law on Way to City Counci CM. TRIB., Feb. 4,
2000, at Al.
87 Gary Washburn, City OK's Gang Law, Cm. TiR., Feb. 17, 2000, at Al.
" Specifically, the new ordinance maintained criminal liability for non-gang
members who congregate with gang members. See Appendix B, infra (providing text
of new ordinance). But see Morales, 527 U.S. at 67-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting limits on non-gang member liability).
8' CHncAGo, ILL., MUN. CODE § 84-015 (added Feb. 16, 2000). Like the original
law, the new gang-loitering ordinance contained a number of findings in its pream-
ble. See Appendix B for the preamble and text of the ordinance. The Chicago City
Counsel also included a new provision using a similar procedural mechanism as the
gang-loitering ordinance but specifically geared toward narcotics-related loitering.
Id. § 8-4-017. That provision, however, does not require that the affected individual
be a gang member.
Id. § 84-015(d) (1). Compare this language to O'Connor's proposed definition
in Morales, 527 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
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the area and manner of enforcement,9' requiring the Police Su-
perintendent to designate areas of Chicago subject to the ordi-
nance and only after consulting with law enforcement agents,
elected or appointed officials, and community-based organiza-
92tions. In addition, suspects must be warned as to the distance
they must travel-out of "sight and hearing of the place at
which the order was issued"-and the period of time in which
the order is in effect--"during the next three hours."3
Officials faced heavy pressure to begin enforcement imme-
diatel 4 but nonetheless held back out of concern for litiga-
ton.9 "These are very complicated issues that have to be done
right," argued Police Superintendent Terry Hilliard, "because
we know that as soon as we designate the first hot spot, the
ACLU and every other organization that fought us at the City
Council and the Supreme Court are going to come after us."
With months of preparation-training police officers,97 desig-
nating areas of enforcement,9 8 educating the public,9 and so
on-the Chicago Police Department began implementing the
new gang-loitering law on August 17, 2000.1°° In the first month
91 See Morales, 527 U.S. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (contrasting ordinance
with "laws that incorporate limits on the area and manner in which the laws may be
enforced").
GFCICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE§ 8-4-015(b) (added Feb. 16, 2000).
9, Id. § 8-4-015(a) (iii).
See, e.g., Gary Washburn, Loitering Law Not Yet Enforced, CmI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 2000,
at 1; Editorial, City Must Not Let Violence Continue, Cm. SUN-TMES, July 24, 2000, at 27;
Editorial, Tolerate No More of Gangs' Violence, Cm. SUN-TIMES, July 21, 2000, at 39; Fran
Spielman et al., City 's Hands Tied on Gangs, Cm. SUN-TIMES, July 21, 2000, at 1.
"' See Washburn, Loitering Law Not Yet Enforced, supra note 94 ("'Certainly we ex-
pect a challenge to the ordinance,' said city Corporation Counsel Mara Georges. 'I
think we will be successful on the challenge, but the more care the Police Depart-
ment can take, the easier any defeat of a challenge is going to be. I certainly appreci-
ate their efforts in taking it carefully, making sure [officers] are ready and being very
judicious about selection of hot spots.'").
Fran Spielman, Hilliard to Review Gang 'Hot Spot' Suggestions, Crn. SUN-TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2000, at 10.
'7 See Spielman et al., City's Hands Tied, supra note 94.
" See Fran Spielman, Police Districts Choose 'Hot Spots'for Gang Law, CH. SUN-TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2000, at 3.
See Terry Wilson, Students Get Lowdown on Loitering, Cm. TRIB.,June 7, 2000, at 3.
'o See Rick Hepp, Police Enforcing New Anti-Loitering Law, Cm. TRm., Aug. 22, 2000,
at 1; Frank Main, Police: Arrest Sends Message, Cm. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000, at 8.
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and a half of enforcement, nearly 400 people had been "moved"
from the designated areas. 10'
D. ROUND 4-FUTURE ADJUDICATION
Despite the ACLU's concession that Chicago officials "did a
good job" of incorporating the O'Connor concurrence, 102 a
number of issues remain and will likely result in court chal-
lenges. The new law applies not only to gang members but to
those found in their presence,103 leading Professor Schulhofer to
quip that it is "badly misnamed" and should be called a "gang
and anyone else" ordinance. 4 Far be it from me to suggest that
those who congregate around gang members are naive cherubs;
many are violent predators. But there is something distinctly
un-American about dragnet-style policing pursuant to a pre-
sumption of guilt by association.' 05 While the broad reach of the
'0' See Raoul V. Mowatt, Daley Stands by Anti-Gang Loitering Law During Conference on
Community Policing, CHI. TiB., Oct. 1, 2000, at 3. However, officers have made only
12 arrests since implementation began. "When we first came up with this, we stated
that it was not about arrests," Chicago Police Superintendent Terry Hillard says.
"This is about getting [gang members] to move and disperse. I am elated that we
have only arrested 12." Gary Washburn, Police Effort to Promote Blacks is Hit by Alderman,
Cm. TRm., Oct. 22, 2000, at 3.
102 Washburn, Daley Pursuing Anti-Gang Law, supra note 85 (quoting Illinois ACLU
spokesman Ed Yohnka).
103 But see Morales, 527 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting "limita-
tions that restricted the ordinance's criminal penalties to gang members or that more
carefully delineated the circumstances in which those penalties would apply to non-
gang members").
104 Stephen Schulhofer, Sweeping Kids Offthe Streets, Cm-. TRB., Feb. 8, 2000, at A13.
105 See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 462 (1986) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("Rules respectingjoinder are based on recogni-
tion that the multiplication of charges or defendants may confuse the jury and lead to
inferences of habitual criminality or guilt by association."); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 925 (1982) ("liability... imposed on a 'guilt for associa-
tion' theory" is impermissible under the First Amendment); Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 186-87 (1972) ("the Court has consistently disapproved governmental action im-
posing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's
association with an unpopular organization"); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,
265 (1967) (invalidating statute that "literally establishes guilt by association alone");
NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 122 (1966) ("[rlecognizing that guilt by associa-
tion is a philosophy alien to the traditions of a free society"); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11, 19 (1966) (invalidating statute that "rests on the doctrine of 'guilt by associa-
tion' which has no place here"); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 163 (1945) (Murphy,
J., concurring) (arguing that a deportation statute "completely ignores the traditional
American doctrine requiring personal guilt rather than guilt by association"). Cf
Lanzetta v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (reversing conviction for being a "gang-
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ordinance will certainly catch many thugs who would otherwise
slip through the net, it will snare more than a few innocent
people to boot.1' And that is the precise problem: In a consti-
tutional democracy dedicated to the presumption of innocence
and a belief that it is more important to exonerate the blameless
than punish the guilty, 10 7 it is unacceptable to sacrifice the fun-
damental rights of the few for the good of the many. An indi-
vidual right that may be defeated this way is, in fact, no right at
all.
0 8
Opponents also note the disparate impact on racial minori-
ties, suggesting that the law "legalizes racial profiling."109 Al-
though neutral on its face, the ordinance will be applied almost
exclusively in poor communities of color."0 "It seems there are
ster"); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (invalidating police round-up of
twenty-four Black youths based on victim's description of rapist as a young Black
male); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-42 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the internment ofJapanese-Americans during World War II as violat-
ing the "fundamental assumption underl[ying] our system ... that guilt is personal
and not inheritable").
'0' See, e.g., Washburn, Anti-Gang Loitering Law on Way, supra note 86 ("Rev. Jeffrey
Haynes, an African-American pastor, predicted that some 'innocent kids are going to
be harassed and arrested' along with gang members and dope dealers. But he con-
tended the ordinance is necessary nonetheless."); Gary Washburn, City OK's Gang
Law, Expects Challenges, C-. TRM., Feb. 17, 2000, at 1 ("Alderwoman Freddrenna Lyle
said it will allow officers 'to sweep up the innocent along with the guilty."); Fran
Spielman, New Anti-Gang Law Passes, Cm. SUN-TAM, Feb. 17, 2000, at 3 ("The ACLU
released a statement saying it was 'disheartening' that the Council had passed the or-
dinance. 'This ensures that thousands of innocent persons of color will be arrested
for no good reason.'").
7 Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (quoting William 0. Douglas) ("We believe that it is better for ten guilty people
to be set free than for one innocent man to be unjustly imprisoned."); 4 WILLIAM
BLACxSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 (15th ed. 1809) ("[l]t is
better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.").
"6 See, e.g., RONALD DWORMN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1978) ("Individual
rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some
reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they
wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing
some loss or injury upon them.").
' Spielman, New Anti-Gang Law Passes, supra note 106 (quoting Alderwoman Les-
lie Hairston).
"' Id. See also Dorothy Roberts, It's All About Race, CH. TRIm., Jun 18, 1999, at 31
("Racism is a motivating concern underlying the constitutional objections to vague
loitering laws like the Chicago ordinance. Broadly worded statutes permit police to
haul off the streets people who look suspicious even though they have committed no
criminal conduct. Without clear guidelines, police have a tendency to enforce the
law against groups they disfavor and this often means members of minority groups.").
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two laws,'' argued a young Latino. "There's one for this kind
of area, and there's another for everyone else."1  Given the
Court's exacting legal standard, 3 however, litigants will have
difficultly mounting a selective prosecution claim. Still, racially
disproportionate enforcement tends to decrease community
trust and cooperation with law enforcement,14 as "large seg-
ments of the population [will] believe they are suspects simply
because of their age, race and location."
11 5
The new ordinance may suffer a variety of other defects as
well, including problems related to evidentiary proof,"5  in-
". Gary Washburn & Eric Ferkenhoff, City Targets 86 Hot Spots for Gangs, Keeps List
Secret CmI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 2000, at Al.
112 Id.
"' See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) ("The claimant must
demonstrate the federal prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory effect and it was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.'"). See also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAm L. REv. 13 (1998) (critiquing the
Court's selective prosecution standard).
1 See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IowA L. REv. 1107, 1154-63 (2000).
"' Washburn & Ferkenhoff, supra note 111 (quoting Illinois ACLU spokesman Ed
Yohnka).
"' Government is generally required to prove all elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, seeApprendi v. NewJersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2355-56 (2000); United
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278
(1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); and cannot shift that burden of
proof to the defendant. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702-704 (1975). But see
Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987) ("We are no more convinced that the Ohio
practice of requiring self-defense to be proved by the defendant is unconstitutional
than we are that the Constitution requires the prosecution to prove the sanity of a de-
fendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity."); Patterson v. NewYork, 432 U.S.
197, 210 (1977) ("We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative
countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact consti-
tuting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.").
Gang membership or physical proximity to a gang member is integral to the crime
itself and apparently constitutes an element of the offense. The ordinance provides
an elaborate definition of "criminal street gang," CMICAGO, ILL, MUN. CODE § 8-4-
015(d) (2) (added Feb. 16, 2000), but leaves some doubt as to whether a prosecutor
must prove the defendant or his associate was, in fact, a gang member. Without es-
tablishing actual gang membership, the due process requirements of Winship and its
progeny would seem to have been circumvented. See Wilson, Students Get Lowdown,
supra note 99 (noting that police claims of being able to distinguish "gang members
from anyone else" "drew raucous laughter from 300 students"). In addition to proof
problems, the ordinance may suffer from a variety of definitional ambiguities. For
example, how far must individuals "remove themselves" in order to be out of "sight or
hearing of the place at which the order was issued"? CHCAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-
015(a) (added Feb. 16, 2000). Is it sufficient to go around the block and quietly carry
on the conversation?
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fringement on protected liberty,17 the prohibition on status
crimes,118 and the secrecy of enforcement areas." 9 Challengers
'" The ordinance arguably threatens, for example, associational liberty emanating
from the First Amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958)
(invalidating compelled disclosure law); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960)
(similar); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 558 (1963)
(similar). "An individual's freedom to speak," the Court has noted, "could not be vig-
orously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to en-
gage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). See also City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53,
65 (1997) (arguing that Chicago's ordinance impinges upon, inter alia, "the general
right to associate with others"). But see City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25
(1989) ("we do not think the Constitution recognizes a generalized right of 'social as-
sociation' that includes chance encounters in dance halls").
"" The ordinance has an uncomfortable resemblance to those status crimes violat-
ing either due process or the Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive punishment. In
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, the Court invalidated a law making it a crime to be a "gangster,"
306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939), while in Robinson v. California it struck down a statute pun-
ishing individuals for their drug addiction. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). If "[e]ven one
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a
common cold," id., it is at least arguable that six-months imprisonment for public
congregation is equally excessive. But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968)
(upholding an alcoholic's conviction for public drunkenness). Moreover, the disper-
sal order, in itself, is a form of non-adjudicated punishment; affected individuals are
essentially banished from certain public places for a period of time. Admittedly, the
penalty is not banishment in the historical sense-being cast out into the wilderness
without hope of repatriation. Yet this is a difference in degree rather than in kind:
People are still being ordered to leave an area, backed by threat of coercive force.
"" It is troublesome that Chicago will not announce those areas subject to the or-
dinance. Gary Washburn, Loitering Proposal Raising Concern, CM. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2000,
at Al ("'The ordinance does not require the [hot spot] designations be made public,
and I think the Police Department... general practice would be not to publicize the
precise boundaries of designated areas,' Deputy Corporation Counsel Lawrence
Rosenthal said at a hearing on the new ordinance."). See also Washburn & Ferken-
hoff, supra note 111 ("'That disturbs me,' said Alderwoman Freddrenna Lyle, who
said she learned of the start of enforcement of the new ordinance only after it was
announced Tuesday by police Superintendent Terry Hilliard at a press conference. 'I
don't even know what the criteria are' for designation, Lyle said."); Editorial, Chi-
cago's Guessing Game on Gangs, Cmi. TRIM., Sep. 3, 2000, at 20 (criticizing failure to an-
nounce enforcement areas). This type of intentional opaqueness is hard to square
with the basic tenets of an open democracy. See Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note
114, at 1130-31.
Nonetheless, I admit that the inherently suspicious practice of hiding the ball
from the citizenry does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Proponents
are likely to forward at least three arguments in support of enforcement secrecy: (1)
announcement of designated areas would reduce property values or result in insur-
ance redlining in those neighborhoods; (2) law enforcement would lose a tactical ad-
vantage if gang members were aware of the geographic boundaries; and (3) public
disclosure of the designated areas would result in the displacement of gang bangers
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can also point to parts of the majority/plurality opinion, argu-
ing that the City's approach to gang congregation remains un-
constitutionally vague and without meaningful standards for
police while indiscriminately netting hoodlums and innocents
alike. But despite lingering flaws, Chicago's new gang-loitering
ordinance will almost certainly pass muster in the lower courts.
The drafters followed the basic outlines of Justice O'Connor's
road map, literally lifting words from the Morales concurrence.'o
Trial judges are usually not inclined to second-guess statutes
that formally square with higher court prescriptions, and appel-
late courts can do the math of hypothetical adjudication 2'-the
to previously unaffected neighborhoods. Although the first claim would be deemed
irrelevant if a liberty interest were being infringed, cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (rejecting "negative attitude of the majority
of property owners" as a legitimate basis for discriminatory zoning against mentally
handicapped residents); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500
(1977) ("preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and
avoiding an undue financial burden on the] school system" were insufficient to jus-
tify zoning limits on family composition); there is no constitutional right to know
where police plan to enforce a given law. (This is a descriptive rather than normative
claim. For arguments favoring greater visibility of police choices and justifications,
see Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 114.) Likewise, the second argument is
probably not fishy enough to be struck down under rationality review-but it is still
inconsistent with the alleged purpose of the ordinance itself. If the goal is to prevent
gang members from gathering in particular neighborhoods, it seems that you would
want members to know the designated areas as a means of self-enforcement. But if
the real aim is to inflict retribution rather than prevent gang congregation, secrecy
provides an effective (and illegitimate) vehicle for punishment. See, e.g., id at 1144-54
(discussing the concept of "secret law" in policing). The third claim-that full disclo-
sure will result in gang migration to non-designated areas-will also provide a suffi-
cientjustification under deferential judicial review. Thejury is still out, however, on
the nature and predictability of crime displacement. Cf Robert Barr & Ken Pease,
Crime Placement, Displacement, and Deflection, 12 CRIME &JUsTXCE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
277 (Tonry & Morris eds., 1990). More importantly, one would think that academic
proponents of Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance would actively encourage displace-
ment of gang activity. The lynchpin of their argument is that policing strategies are
less objectionable if the coercive burden is shared by the general community. See,
e.g., Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 38, at 1172-76. While it is true that
the burdens of private versus public action are incommensurate, see Cole, supra note
32, at 1089-90, what better way to share the total burden of gang violence and official
policing than to force previously unaffected neighborhoods to bear some gang-
related costs?
~ See note 90, supra.
121 Cf Uzzell v. Friday, 592 F. Supp. 1502, 1516 (D.N.C. 1984) (interpreting Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)):
In his opinion announcing the judgment of the CourtJustice Powell held that the special
admissions program was invalid-a ruling supported by four other Justices whose views
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ordinance would receive the support of the three Morales dis-
senters and, absent a change of heart, the two votes behind the
O'Connor concurrence. This does not mean, of course, that
the Chicago Police Department will wield its renewed discretion
in a constitutional manner. Given CPD's record of miscon-
duct,12 2 "as applied" challenges will undoubtedly be made and
possibly sustained in future litigation.123 Claims against the face
of the statute, however, would seem to have little chance of suc-
cess.
II. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, AND DICKEmON
Like the gang-loitering dilemma, the issue of custodial inter-
rogation is painted against a backdrop of police misconduct and
invidious discrimination. During the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, law enforcement frequently resorted to
ruthless techniques and physical brutality in eliciting confes-
sions.1 4 Minorities and the marginalized members of society
were particularly susceptible to violence under color of law.125
were expressed in an opinion by Justice Stevens-but that, at the same time, the school
could take race into account in its admissions decisions-a ruling supported by four other
Justices whose views were expressed in ajoint opinion and three separate opinions. As the
Fourth Circuit has indicated, of the several opinions filed in Bakk, the opinion ofJustice
Powell is the one which governs this case.
'2 See, e.g., William Neikirk &Jeff Meredith, Contingent Asks Federal Help in Brutality
Cases, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 5, 2000, at N3.
'23 SeeWashburn & Ferkenhoff, supra note 111 (quoting Illinois ACLU spokesman
Ed Yohnka) ("there will be a challenge to this ordinance, even if it may be on a case-
by-case basis").
124 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 361-63.
Suspects were beaten all over the body, but especially on parts that would not be immedi-
ately visible when the individual was taken before a judge. Thus, some suspects were
beaten with clenched fists or with brass knuckles under the kneecaps, across the abdomen,
or above the kidneys, or were whipped across the torso or the souls of the feet. Kicks to the
groin were not uncommon. Other times, the beatings were more obvious, as some sus-
pects were clubbed with nightsticks, or hit with pistol butts or a baseball bat. Other docu-
mented examples of torture included hanging a handcuffed suspect over the top of an
open door and using him as a "human punching bag."
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 362 (2d ed. 1997).
'2 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 362 (noting that "the
police enjoyed an enormous amount of discretion as far as the lower levels of society
were concerned" and that "Southern blacks were always fair game"); id. at 463 (not-
ing that "[p]olice brutality has been a recurrent issue" and that minorities "have his-
torically suffered more from the 'bad cop'"). See also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936) (detailing brutal beatings of black suspects).
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But while police misconduct surfaced in various governmentreot126 n u ca 127reports and judicial decisions, the necessity and nature of
remedial action remained controversial. Historically, the Su-
preme Court had scrutinized confessions under a general con-
stitutional test for voluntariness. Statements obtained through
physical or psychological coercion--denying a suspect the "free
choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer"'2 -- violated ei-
ther the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination'2 or
the due process guarantees in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.'"0 Under the "totality of the circumstances,"'3' the
judiciary would examine whether "the defendant's will was
overborne at the time he confessed."' 2 Despite the "amphib-
ian"'33 character of voluntariness, case law plotted a list of factors
and rules to guide the inquiry."4
Frustration eventually surfaced with de facto case-by-case
analysis, and the Court looked for other mechanisms to protect
against undue coercion in custodial interrogation. The first
move was to prevent federal agents from delaying appearances
126 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931).
'27 See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S.
556 (1954); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S.
547 (1941); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629
(1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936).
129 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
" See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding confession inadmissi-
ble under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
,29 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding confessions inadmissible
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
"' See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
112 Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
' Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 605 (1961).
1 Id. at 601-02 (relevant factors include "extensive cross-questioning," "undue de-
lay in arraignment," "failure to caution a prisoner," "refusal to permit communication
with friends and legal counsel," "the duration and conditions of detention," "the
manifest attitude of the police toward [the suspect], his physical and mental state, the
diverse pressures which sap or sustain his powers of resistance and self-control"). See
White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 532 (1940) (physical beatings); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 147 (1944) ("fear of violence at the hands of a mob"); Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556 (1954) (abuse of physician-patient relationship to extract confession);
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (threatening to take away suspect's children).
See also DRESSIER, supra note 124, at 383-86 (discussing factors in voluntariness test).
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before a magistrate in order to question an arrestee" Pursuant
to its supervisory powers over the lower federal judiciary, the
Supreme Court held that confessions obtained during such a
delay were inadmissible at trial regardless of their voluntariness.
A second and more important development was the application
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in police questioning.
Within a five-week span in 1964, the Court held that: (1) law
enforcement could not deliberately elicit incriminating state-
ments from an individual outside the presence of counsel after
criminal proceedings have been instituted,ss and (2) the Sixth
Amendment applies to pre-indictment interrogation and is vio-
lated when, inter alia, the police deny a suspect's request for
counsel.8 7
A. ROUND 1-MRANDA
These initial steps set the stage for "the centerpiece of the
Warren Court's revolution in American criminal proce-
dure"'5 -- Miranda v. Arizona.1'9 In a consolidated appeal, the
Miranda Court considered four separate cases with common
fact-patterns: Each defendant had given incriminating state-
ments during custodial interrogation in a police-dominated en-
vironment without first being advised of their constitutional
rights. Writing for a five-member majority, Chief Justice Earl
Warren meandered through a history of the privilege against
self-incrimination, a critique of law enforcement prerogatives
and techniques, and an analysis of the intrinsic pressures in-
"' This is the famous McNabb-Mallory rule, derived from McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). But see
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994) (holding that Congress had ab-
rogated the Court's McNabb-MaUoy rule).
' Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
'37 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Specifically, the Escobedo Court held
that "where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to elic-
iting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an oppor-
tunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assis-
tance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment...." Id. at 490-91.
's, Yale Kamisar, The Miranda Warning Takes a Body Blow, LA. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1999,
at B7.
"' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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volved in police questioning.4 0 The opinion's punch-line was a
list of admonitions that police must provide before custodial in-
terrogation on pains of evidentiary exclusion in a subsequent
prosecution. Specifically, a suspect "must be warned prior to
any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that any-
thing he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he can-
not afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.
These so-called Miranda warnings "may be the most famous
words the Court has ever written,",4 2 more recognizable to
"school children. .. than the Gettysburg Address." The deci-
sion itself actually involved more than the now-legendary police
mantra. As Professor Schulhofer has argued, "Miranda contains
not one holding but a complex series of holdings.' 4'  The final
step, however, provided Miranda its muscles-the exclusion of
unwarned but possibly voluntary confessions. The decision
thereby offered police a strong incentive to follow its dictates:
'40 Professors Richard Leo and George Thomas suggest that Miranda was "in many
ways a unique Supreme Court decision." TIE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND
POICING 249 (Leo & Thomas eds., 1999).
To begin with, Miranda did not follow the pattern of the typical appellate court opinion-
i.e., the application of legal principles and precedents to a set of facts. Instead, the Court
first reviewed the history of the privilege against self-incrimination, then criticized contem-
porary police interrogation training manuals, and finally announced a set of code-like
warnings and waiver requirements-all before reviewing the specific facts of the cases at
hand and applying the relevant law. Perhaps more significant than its "legislative quality"
is that Miranda broke with earlier doctrine and created a new set of rights based on the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Id.
141 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
142 THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra note 140, at 249.
143 id. at xv.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 435, 436
(1987). Professor Schulhofer isolated "three conceptually distinct steps" in the ma-
jority opinion: (1) "informal pressure to speak-that is, pressure not backed by legal
process or any formal sanction-can constitute 'compulsion' within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment"; (2) "this element of compulsion is present in any questioning
of a suspect in custody, no matter how short the period of questioning may be"; and
(3) "precisely specified warnings are required to dispel the compelling pressure of
custodial interrogation." Id.
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Either read suspects their rights or lose any subsequent state-
ments 45
The entire opinion was controversial,1 46 but Miranda's exclu-
sionary rule elicited particularly sharp responses from the dis-
senting justices. "In some unknown number of cases," argued
Justice Byron White, "the Court's rule will return a killer, a rap-
ist or other criminal to the streets to the environment which
produced him, to repeat his crime whenever he pleases.",1 7 Jus-
tice Tom Clark agreed, suggesting that the Court's "strict consti-
tutional specific inserted at the nerve center of crime detection
may well kill the patient."14 8  In turn, Justice John Harlan
claimed that "the social costs of crime are too great to call the
new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation." " 9
Miranda's "new confession rules" also suffered from "ironic un-
timeliness," given the "massive reexamination" of police prac-
tices taking place in private organizations and government
entities.
Although rebuffed by Justice Harlan as a mere "dis-
claimer,"' ' - the majority opinion did suggest that legislative al-
ternatives were not foreclosed. Instead of "a constitutional
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform," the
opinion encouraged "Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement
of our criminal laws.' 52 But this invitation was not uncondi-
tional, as made clear in the very next sentence: "[U]nless we
are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in ap-
prising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring
"' But see notes 197-99, infra (citing exceptions to Miranda-based evidentiary ex-
clusion).
16 For instance, Justice Clark criticized the majority's factual basis for concluding
that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499-501
(Clark, J. dissenting).
147 Id. at 542 (WhiteJ., dissenting).
14 Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting).
"9 Id. at 517 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
1 0 Id. at 523.
"' Id. at 524.
152 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (Warren, CJ., for the Court).
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a continuous opportunity to exercise, the [Miranda warnings]
must be observed."'53
B. ROUND 2-18 U.S.C. § 3501
Miranda faced immediate derision from law enforcement
and anti-crime politicians, triggering calls for the impeachment
of Chief Justice Warren, proposals for a constitutional amend-
ment, and a good deal of saber-rattling during subsequent elec-
tion campaigns., 4 The most notable response was bundled in a
massive piece of congressional legislation-the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Though generically in-
tended to "reduc[e] the incidence of crime [and] to increase
the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of law enforcement
and criminal justice systems," 55 the Act surgically abrogated a
number of the Supreme Court's leading criminal procedure de-
cisions.15r
In particular, subsections (a) and (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 3501
("3501") created a statutory replacement for Miranda. The
"new" standard was virtually identical to the voluntariness test
eschewed by the Court only two years earlier. Subsection (b)
required federal judges to consider "all the circumstances sur-
rounding the giving of the confession" and then provided a
non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to the inquiry, including
whether a defendant had been advised of his constitutional
rights.5 7  But unlike Miranda, the statute made clear that the
.5. Id. See also id. at 490 ("We have already pointed out that the Constitution does
not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-
incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are free to de-
velop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as
those described above in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in
affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.").
,' See, e.g., LIVABAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAw, AND POLTCS (1983); ADAM CARYLE
BRECKENRIDGE, CONGRESS AGAINST ThE COURTs (1970); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-
INFUCTED WOUND (1970); Patrick A. Malone, "You have the Right to Remain Silent":
Miranda after Twenty Years, 55 AM. SCHOLAR 367 (1987); George C. Thomas III, The
End of the Roadfor Miranda v. Arizona ?: On the Histoy and Future of Rules for Police Inter-
rogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (2000).
,5- S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), available at 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, and on Westlaw
at 1968 WL 4956.
,16 See id. (abrogating McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), Miranda v. Arizona, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)), codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3502 (1968)).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1968).
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presence or absence of such warnings "need not be conclusive"
on the admissibility of 
a confession.
What seems less clear is the intent of congressional legisla-
tors in enacting 3501. Some have claimed that Congress was
merely responding to Miranda's invitation for legislators "to de-
velop their own safeguards for the privilege"' 9 against self-
incrimination.' 60 This argument is hard to sustain, however,
given the evidence before Congress that Miranda could not be
undone by legislative fiat alone.1 "It is one thing to devise al-
ternative safeguards," Charles Alan Wright scoffed, "and quite
another thing to provide, as the 1968 legislation does, that no
safeguards are needed.', 62 Yale Kamisar agreed, noting that
"Congress did not walk in the door" left open by the Supreme
Court and instead failed "to replace Miranda with a credible
substitute."163
Others contend that 3501 resulted from Congress' superior
fact-finding capacity and therefore trumps the empirical conclu-
sions underlying Miranda."" In particular, federal lawmakers
repudiated the factual basis for inherent coercion in custodial
interrogation and the continuing presence of police brutality in
"4 Id. For the text of the statute, see Appendix C, infra.
Miranda, 378 U.S. at 490.
'60 See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 691 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Con-
gress... acted in response to the Court's invitation"); 145 CONG. REc. S7024-01 (daily
ed. June 15, 1999) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (omnibus crime bill was " [i]n re-
sponse to the Court's invitation"); Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, S. 675 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 181
(1967) (statement of Sen. Ervin) ("the way I interpret the majority opinion in the
Miranda case, the majority did give Congress permission to legislate in this field");
Brief of U.S. Senators as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 8-9, Dickerson v.
United States, 2000 WL 272002 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2000) (No. 99-5525) (group of U.S.
Senators detailing Miranda's invitation for legislative action).
61 See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda 2, 85 CoRNELL L. REV.
883, 910 (2000) (listing statements demonstrating congressional awareness of
Miranda's constitutional status).
162 CHARLF.S ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 76 at 185
(3d ed. 1999).
Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrue"Miranda , supra note 161, at 951.
"4 See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.Sd 667, 691 n.22 (4th Cir. 1999); Brief of
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives as Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of Affirmance at 17-22, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 271995
(U.S. Mar. 9, 2000) (No. 99-5525); Brief of Maricopa County Attorney's Office as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 5-8, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL
272015 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2000) (No. 99-5525).
2000] 1155
extracting confessions.'6 Because Miranda was grounded on
faulty empirics and not merely an unpopular theory, propo-
nents argued, "it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to
formulate a test of admissibility different from that adopted by
the Court."16 But scholars have questioned the alleged accuracy
of the congressional record, noting a calculated selectivity of
witnesses and documents as well as the redaction of testimony
that tended to undermine the constitutionality of 3501 .167 "On
this occasion at least," Professor Kamisar argues, "the much-
vaunted suerior fact-finding capacity of Congress was little in
evidence."'
A third interpretation suggests that "Congress enacted 3501
largely for symbolic purposes, to make an election-year state-
ment about law and order, not to mount a challenge to
Miranda.'6 19 Specifically, 3501 resulted from a political com-
promise-campaigning politicians could proclaim their tough-
ness on crime through hardnosed legislation, but federal agents
would continue to admonish suspects and the Justice Depart-
ment would simply ignore the anti-Miranda provisions. As such,
" S. REP'. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 2112, at 2134
("[T] he so-called third-degree methods deplored by the Supreme Court and cited as
a basis for their opinion in Miranda is not a correct portrayal of what actually goes on
in police stations across the country. While there are isolated cases of police using co-
ercive tactics, this is the exception rather than the rule."); id. at 2142 ("[e]xamples of
presumed police practice and data supporting the [Court's] conclusion of inherent
coercion in custodial interrogation were drawn solely from police manuals and texts
which may or may not have been followed"); id. at 2134 ("while coercive practices
might have been approved 30 years ago, they have no place in modern police tech-
niques"); id. ("the Court overreacted to defense claims that police brutality is wide-
spread").
" Id. at 2147. See also Hearings on the Supreme Court Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 90th Cong. 25 (1968) (statement of Sen.
Ervin) ("A decision of the Supreme Court, if it is based on a factual assumption which
is incorrect, may be subject to Congress' power to legislate. The Supreme Court has
no right to make... determinations based on unsound factual assumptions.")
167 See Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Ovenrule"Miranda?, supra note 161, at 901-06.
18 Id. at 906. See also Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title fh A Morganatic Marriage,
1969 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 126 ("As a general matter, it can be said that the entire con-
gressional debate on all sides of Title II was notably devoid of anything but the most
speculative assertion of facts.").
169 Brief of House Democratic Leadership as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner at 8, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 126192 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2000) (No. 99-
5525).
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Congress made a "gesture of defiance"170 against the Warren
Court that "only required that 3501 go on the books, not that it
force an actual court case. 1 7' At least one key advocate of the
1968 crime bill, however, rejects the historical validity of this ar-
gument. "We did not enact the law to make some vague state-
ment about crime," Senator Strom Thurmond snapped. "We
passed it to be enforced.'
72
The final and most accepted explanation is that Congress in-
tended to overturn Miranda, plain and simple. This rationale is
supported by the accomjanying Senate Report, 73 the statements
of individual legislators, 74 subsequent court decisions, 75 and a
consensus of opinion among legal commentators.76 Certainly,
'" Burt, supra note 168, at 127. See also Terry Carter, The Man Who Would Undo
Miranda, 86 A.B.A.J. 44, 47 (Mar. 2000) ("'It was an act of defiance by the Congress,
ridiculing the Court, an unbelievable hostility to the Court,' says [Professor] Kamisar.
'The country was going to hell with riots in the streets, and they blamed it all on the
Supreme Court."').
Brief of House Democratic Leadership, supra note 169, at 16.
146 CONG. REc. S760-02 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2000) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond).
'7 S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CA.N. 2112, at 2141 ("the
intent of [3501] is to reverse the holding of Miranda v. Arizond').
' See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 11,206 (1968) (statement of Sen. McClellan); id. at
11,594 (statement of Sen. Morse); id. at 11,612 (statement of Sen. Thurmond); id. at
13,202 (statement of Sen. Scott); id. at 14,136 (statement of Sen. Fong); id. at 14,158
(statement of Sen. Hart); id. at 14,167 (statement of Sen. McIntyre); id. at 14,176
(statement of Sen. Ervin); id. at 16,066 (statement of Rep. Celler); id. at 16,074
(statement of Rep. Corman); id. at 16,075 (statement of Rep. Rogers); id. at 16,278
(statement of Rep. Poff); id. at 16,278 (statement of Rep. Whitten); id. at 16,279
(statement of Rep. Taylor); id. at 16,295 (statement of Rep. Reid); id. at 16,296
(statement of Rep. Randall); id. at 16,297-98 (statement of Rep. Pollock); 113 CONG.
REc. 1583, 1584 (1967) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
17 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000) ("we agree...
that Congress intended by its enactment [of 3501] to overrule Miranda'); United
States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Based upon the statutory lan-
guage, it is perfectly clear that Congress enacted 3501 with the express purpose of
legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting
confessions in federal court.").
,71 See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANiEL J. CAPRA, AMRmcAN CRiMINAL
PROCEDURE 545 (5th ed. 1996) ("the intent of Congress was to 'overrule' Miranda in
favor of a return to the 'voluntariness' standard"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 'Miranda'
Now on the Endangered Species List, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1999, at A22 ("Congress sought,
in a word, to overrule the Court on the precise point of constitutional law that
Miranda hadjust settled."); GRAHAM, supra note 154, at 319-20 (Title II "was essentially
an attempt to use a statute to reverse a string of Supreme Court decisions, most of
which had been interpretations of the Constitution"); Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress
"Overrule"Miranda ?, supra note 161, at 906 (intent of 3501 was "to bury Mirandd').
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other goals could be sustained by the congressional record;
conversely, determining the exact legislative intent of 3501 pre-
sents an exercise in futility. Yet it seems pretty clear that abro-
gating Miranda was high on Congress' list.
C. ROUND 3-STASIS: 1968-1997
The ensuing federal enforcement of 3501 is also subject to
varying interpretations. A number of judges,'77 legislators,'78 liti-
gants, m and commentators' 80 contend that the anti-Miranda
provisions have gone largely unenforced over the past three
decades. Beginning with President Johnson's cautious signing
of the 1968 crime bill,'81 seven successive administrations have
allegedly "treated 3501 as an unenforceable dead letter."8 2 But
an equally impressive group rejects this claim,' including three
former Attorneys General who insist that 3501 was in play dur-
'7 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1994) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999); id. at 695 (Mi-
chael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
178 See, e.g., Brief of House Democratic Leadership, supra note 169, at 19-25.
17 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 9-10, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 142076
(U.S. Jan. 28, 2000) (No. 99-5525); Reply Brief for the United States at 19-20, Dicker-
son v. United States, 2000 WL 374574 (U.S. Apr. 10, 2000) (No. 99-5525).
18' See, e.g., Kamisar, Body Blow, supra note 138; Schulhofer, Endangered Species, su-
pra note 176; Laurence Tribe, Miranda Warning Is the Law of the Land, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 15, 1999, at A99; CONG. lts ONY (May 13, 1999) (statement of Prof. Daniel C.
Richman), available at 1999 WL 16947866.
'81 See Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 4 PUB. PAPERS 981, 983 (June 19, 1968)
("Under long-standing policies, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
other Federal law enforcement agencies have consistently given suspects full and fair
warning of their constitutional rights. I have asked the Attorney General and the Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assure that these policies will con-
tinue.").
8 Schulhofer, Endangered Species, supra note 176.
1 See, e.g., Brief of Former Attorneys General of the United States as Amici Curiae
in Support of Affirmance at 8-9, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 271993 (U.S.
Mar. 9, 2000) (No. 99-5525) (William P. Barr, Edwin Meese III, and Dick Thorn-
burgh); 145 CONG. REC. S7024-01 (Strom Thurmond and Stephen Markman); CONG.
TESTMONY (May 13, 1999) (statement of Edwin Meese), available at 1999 WL 390429;
Brief of U.S. Senators, supra note 160, at 1-2 (Senators Orrin G. Hatch, Trent Lott,
Don Nickles, Strom Thurmond, Bob Smith, Larry E. Craig, Paul Coverdell, Fred
Thompson,Jon Kyl, and Jeff Sessions); Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18
U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling ofMiranda, 85 IOWAL. REV. 175, 197-203 (1999).
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ing their tenures. Paul Cassell has likewise argued that, except
for the past eight years under the Clinton Administration, the
U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has consistently supported
the constitutionality of 3501 and its use in appropriate litiga-
tion.18s Professor Cassell compares, for example, the DOJ's suc-
cessful invocation of 3501 in a 1975 lower court case' s6 with the
current Administration's recurring failure to defend the statute
in any forum.
187
What cannot be debated, however, is the lack of a definitive
Supreme Court statement on the validity of 3501 in the three
decades following its enactment. Although a few cases had
danced around the issue,s the anti-Miranda provisions re-
mained in limbo-at least as a matter of judicial precedent.
The Supreme Court eventually took note of the DOJ's "re-
peated failure to invoke 3501."" 9 Justice Scalia even ridiculed
the DOJ for "caus [ing] the federal judiciary to confront a host
of Miranda issues that might be entirely irrelevant under federal
law," facilitating "the acquittal and the nonprosecution of many
dangerous felons, [and thereby] enabling them to continue
their depredations upon our citizens."19° To Scalia, there was
"no excuse for this."19
Miranda doctrine and scholarship, of course, did not wait in
abeyance for an authoritative ruling on 3501. Instead, the Su-
preme Court and legal commentators were occupied with a va-
riety of difficult (and possibly unforeseen ) questions
stemming from Miranda. At the most basic level, the Court was
184 See Brief of Former Attorneys General, supra note 183, at 8-9; 146 CONG. REC.
S760-2 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2000) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
"5 See Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot, supra note 183, at 203-19; CONG.
TESTIMONY (May 13, 1999) (statement of Prof. Paul G. Cassell).
" United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
287 See Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot, supra note 183, at 203-219.
18 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.* (1994) (declining to rule on
3501 because "the issue is one of first impression involving the interpretation of a
federal statute on which the Department ofJustice expressly declines to take a posi-
tion"); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (c) replaced the Court's McNabb-Mallory rule).
"' Davis, 512 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 But see Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2347 (2000) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (noting that "most of [the difficulties were] predicted with remarkable pre-
science by Justice White in his Miranda dissent.").
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forced to define "custody"'193 and "interrogation,"194 the efficacy
of incomplete or altered Miranda warmings,95 and the adequacy
of rights waivers.1 96  A different set of cases carved out excep-
tions to Miranda's exclusionary rule. Beginning in 1971, the
Court held that un-Mirandized statements could be used for
purposes of impeachment,9 7  that evidence derived from
Miranda violations was not suppressible as "fruit of the poison-
ous tree,"19' 8 and that Miranda warnings need not precede ques-
tioning "prompted by a concern for public safety."'9 At the
same time, the Supreme Court continued to apply Miranda in
'93 See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-42 (1984) (holding that ordi-
nary traffic stops do not constitute "custody" for purposes of Miranda and that a "po-
liceman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was
'in custody' at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in
the suspect's position would have understood his situation"); California v. Beheler,
463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (holding that police station questioning does not inher-
ently constitute "custody" for purposes of Miranda and that "the ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest"); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)
(similar); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (holding that "custody" may attach
even when the suspect is questioned in a seemingly non-coercive environment).
" See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that voluntary state-
ments made to an undercover police officer did not constitute "interrogation" within
the meaning of Miranda); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (holding that
routine booking questions do not constitute "interrogation" within the meaning of
Miranda); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (holding that "'interroga-
tion' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect").
'95 See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (holding that warnings need
not be given in any exact form as long as they reasonably convey Miranda's require-
ments); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (similar).
"' See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (holding that "[o]nly if the
'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoer-
ced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude
that the Miranda rights have been waived"); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,
373 (1979) (holding that "in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from
the actions and words of the person interrogated").
7 SeeHarris v. NewYork, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
"8 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974).
" See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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state prosecutions °° and extended its protections to habeas pro-
ceedings. °'
These last two groups of precedents-the various exceptions
to the exclusionary rule and Miranda's application to both state
and habeas decisions-were hard to reconcile and would even-
tually create a "conundrum '20 2 for the Court. If Miranda warn-
ings were truly demanded by the Fifth Amendment, the
introduction of unwarned statements or their fruits at any point
in a criminal prosecution would be blatantly unconstitutional.
If instead Miranda lacked a constitutional basis, the federal judi-
ciary had no business interfering with state judgments or creat-
ing a new cause of action for habeas petitioners. But in the first
three decades, the Supreme Court seemed content to ignore
the puzzle and continued to sketch out custodial interrogation
law regardless of confusion or incoherence.
As might be expected, the Court faced considerable heat
from legal scholars of all political bents. °s Joseph Grano, for
2w See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498
U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981).
2" See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (holding that state-court deter-
mination as to whether suspect was "in custody" at time of interrogation for purposes
of Miranda is mixed question of law and fact warranting independent review by fed-
eral habeas court); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 683 (1993) (holding that "re-
striction on the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction does not extend to a state
prisoner's claim that his conviction rests on statements obtained in violation of the
safeguards mandated by Miranda"). See also Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct.
2326, 2335 (2000) (noting cases in which the Court "broadened the application of
the Miranda doctrine").
Transcript of Oral Argument, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (No.
99-5525) available at 2000 WL 486733, at *19 (Apr. 19, 2000) (statement of ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist). See also Brief of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae
in Support of Affirmance at 25, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 271991 (U.S.
Mar. 9, 2000) (No. 99-5525) ("[S] tare decisis blocks both paths. If the Court is really
forced to the choice the government asserts is necessary, then it will have to overrule
some precedent-either Miranda itself with all its progeny or the many cases holding
that the Constitution does not require the Miranda rule.").
203 See, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSiONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 173-98 (1993)
(pointing to Miranda exceptions as demonstrating that the original decision was "ille-
gitimate"); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT.
REv. 99, 188 (describing exception as "an outright rejection of the core premise of
Miranda"). See also Donald Dripps, Miranda Caselaw: Really Inconsistent? A Proposed
Fifth Amendment Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 19, 20 n.9 (2000) ("When [scholars]
cite Stone and Grano for the proposition that Tucker and like cases are inconsistent
with Miranda, there can be no doubt that thoughtful commentators across a wide
spectrum of ideological persuasions suspect the Court of inconsistency.").
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one, criticized Miranda as an ultimate form of judicial activism
without constitutional mandate,2°4 while Professor Schulhofer
defended the Court's original decision as a legitimate exercise
of judicial interpretation in a modem context.15 Over the past
decade or so, the academic focus shifted away from Congress'
power to abrogate Miranda and toward a public policy debate
on the social costs and benefits of different approaches to cus-
todial interrogation.l In a series of articles, Professor Cassell
collected data suggesting that Miranda impedes law enforce-
ment, leads to fewer confessions, and thereby decreases the
clearance rate for crime.27 But a number of scholars-includ-
ing Stephen Schulhofer, °s John Donohue,° and George Tho-
mas2 1 -2reject Cassell's conclusions as empirically incorrect,
methodologically flawed, and grounded on false premises. This
statistical standoff proves ironic in a debate that may well be im-
possible2 1 1 or irrelevant.
212
2 See GRANO, CONFESSIONS, supra note 203; Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in
Criminal Procedure: A Question ofArticle HI Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985).
20s See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 144.
m See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 687 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Interestingly,
much of the scholarly literature on Miranda deals not with whether Congress has the
legislative authority to overrule the presumption created by Miranda, but whether it
should.").
217 Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective
on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1055 (1998); Paul G.
Cassell & Richard Fowles, Falling Clearance Rates After Miranda: Coincidence or Conse-
quence?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interro-
gation: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839 (1996); Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387 (1996);
Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1084 (1996).
21 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanish-
ingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda
and Clearance Rates, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 278 (1996).
"' John J. Donohue, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1147 (1998).
2'0 George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Bet-
ter) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996); George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk
About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L
REv. 933 (1996).
"'* See Brief of National Legal Aid and Defender Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 17-18, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 122089 (U.S.Jan.
28, 2000) (No. 99-5525) (Prof. Charles Weisselberg, counsel of record):
There is no single empirical method to establish the ordering of Fifth Amendment values
and the "costs" of Miranda. These values and costs are incommensurate; they cannot be
1162 [Vol. 90
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D. ROUND 4-DICKERSON
The "indefatigable 2 13 Professor Cassell did not limit himself
to number-crunching alone. Cassell testified before Congress
on numerous occasions, criticizing Miranda, the exclusionary
rule, and DOJ policy.21 4  His greatest influence, however, has
been as an advocate before the federal judiciary. In conjunc-
tion with a conservative public interest group, Professor Cassell
participated as amicus curiae in a number of federal prosecu-
tions, prodding the courts to rule on the constitutionality of
3501 .216 Yet through happenstance 2'7 or DOJ maneuvering, 218 he
measured along the same scale. We may describe Fifth Amendment values, such as respect
for individual autonomy and retention of the predominantly adversarial character of our
system, but we cannot quantify them. Thus, even if it were possible to estimate the cases
that Miranda renders "lost" or not subject to prosecution, there is no single metric that can
capture Miranda's "costs" and "benefits."
212 Thomas, Plain Talk, supra note 210, at 935 ("It is not clear to me why a constitu-
tional interpretation that will soon be thirty years old must justify itself with empirical
evidence.").
2's YALE KAMISARETAL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 506 (9th ed. 1999). See also
Carter, supra note 170, at 47 ("Compared to Cassell, the Energizer Bunny suffers
chronic fatigue syndrome."); Laurie Magid, The Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present,
and Future, 36 Hous. L. REv. 1251, 1276-77 (1999) (noting that Cassell "has been un-
relenting in his efforts to see Miranda overturned").
214 See CONG. TESTIMONY (May 13, 1999), available at 1999 WL 16947869 (Prof. Cas-
sell's testimony on 18 U.S.C. § 3501); CONG. TESTIMONY (Nov. 14, 1995), available at
1995 WL 674878 (Prof. Cassell's testimony on the Office of the Solicitor General);
CONG. TESTIMONY (Mar. 14, 1995), available at 1995 WL 105412 (Prof. Cassell's testi-
mony on reforming Miranda rules).
2" Cassell was first introduced to 3501 as a member of the Reagan DOJ:
Miranda and Cassell found each other in 1986, soon after he finished his clerkship with
ChiefJustice Burger and moved into the Justice Department as an associate deputy attor-
ney general. A high-flying Reagan appointee, Stephen Markman, assistant attorney general
in the Office of Legal Policy, had just written a report circulating in the department that
called for using 3501 to lessen the damaging impact of Miranda. Cassell read it, he says,
and "latched onto it." Soon, he was tapped by Attorney General Edwin Meese to find ap-
propriate cases to use 3501 in challenging Miranda. Some possibilities came along, but he
never got the big one.
Carter, supra note 170, at 108.
216 For example, Cassell has raised 3501 in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457
n.* (1994) (acknowledging argument but "declin [ing] the invitation of some amici to
consider [3501]"); United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Nafkha, 1998 WL 45492 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998); United States v. Leong, 116
F.3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1997); and United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424 (D.
Utah 1997).
217 See Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot, supra note 183, at 219 (3501 argument
mooted when defendant skipped bail).
218 See id. at 203-219 (detailing efforts by Clinton DOJ to avoid a ruling on 3501).
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lacked a viable test-case to press 3501 before the Supreme
Court.
1. Background
In 1999, Professor Cassell finally "hit paydirt 21 9 in a Virginia
case. Defendant Charles Dickerson had been arrested for bank
robbery and allegedly admitted his guilt to federal agents.
When a conflict arose over whether Miranda warnings had been
given prior to questioning, the trial court found "that Dicker-
son's in-court testimony was more credible than that of [the FBI
agent]" 2 0 and suppressed the defendant's confession. On ap-
peal, the Fourth Circuit accepted Cassell's invitation to consider
the relevance of 3501 for federal confession law. A divided ap-
pellate panel held that: (1) the DOJ's failure to defend 3501
did not prevent a court from raising it sua spont,2 1 (2) 3501 was
intended to supplant Miranda,222 and (3) Congress had the con-
stitutional authority to replace the irrebuttable presumption
and exclusionary rule created by Miranda.2 3 Because Dicker-
son's confession had been voluntary despite the lack of Miranda
warnings, the court held it admissible at trial.2 4
Dickerson then sought review in the Supreme Court, which
was granted in late 1999.22 There was a problem, however, as
the Attorney General made clear earlier that year: "In this ad-
ministration and in other administrations preceding it, both
parties have reached the same conclusion [that 3501 is uncon-
stitutional] .226 With both defendant Dickerson and the DOJ
standing against 3501, the Court had no other option but to
appoint counsel to defend the statute. The obvious choice, and
that of the Supreme Court, was to "invite [] Professor Paul Cas-
219 Carter, supra note 170, at 108 (quoting Prof. Yale Kamisar).
220 United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023, 1023 (E.D. Va. 1997).
2"' United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 672, 680-683 (4th Cir. 1999). Prior
case law had held that 3501 must be raised in the trial court to be considered on ap-
peal. See Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot, supra note 183, at 215. Dickerson avoided
this procedural bar, however, as "the prosecution had presented 3501 to the trial
court." Id. at 216, 219-20.
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 684-87.
20 Id. at 687-92.
224 Id. at 692-93.
222 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999) (mem.).








Speaking for a seven-member majority, ChiefJustice William
Rehnquist struck down 3501 and reaffirmed the basic holding
of Miranda. After reviewing the history of confession law, the
Miranda decision, and the enactment of 3501, the Chief Justice
charged that the case "turns on whether the Miranda Court an-
nounced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervi-
sory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of
congressional direction., 228 He then offered a handful of rea-
sons for accepting the former and rejecting the latter. "[F]irst
and foremost," Rehnquist opined, "Miranda and two of its com-
panion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts"
and "[s]ince that time, we have consistently applied Miranda's
rule to prosecutions arising out of state courts."2 Unless
Miranda is constitutionally based, the opinion reasoned, the
Court would lack the authority to review such cases.
The majority also rejected the argument that various excep-
tions to Miranda's exclusionary rule demonstrated its non-
constitutional character. "These decisions illustrate the princi-
ple-not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but that no
2-7 United States v. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 n.7 (2000).
Id. at 2333. Apparently, the Chief Justice's reading of his Dickerson opinion,
"[iJn a hushed courtroom crowded with spectators .... provided high drama to a
case already among the most anxiously awaited of the Court's term. Announcing he
would explain Mirandds fate, he began by reciting the familiar warnings, pausing af-
ter each one .. ., his strong voice filling the marble courtroom." Jan Crawford
Greenburg, High Court Upholds Miranda Warnings, Cm. TRIB., June 27, 2000, at 1. See
alsoJoan Biskupic, Rehnquist shifts on Miranda with little warning, USA TODAY, June 27,
2000, at A4 ("'The Chief Justice's reading of the Miranda warnings was one of the
most dramatic moments I've seen in the courtroom,' says former Clinton administra-
tion solicitor general Walter Dellinger.").
20 Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333. The Court also suggested that its
conclusion regarding Miranda's constitutional basis is further buttressed by the fact that we
have allowed prisoners to bring alleged Miranda violations before the federal courts in ha-
beas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus proceedings are available only for claims that a
person "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." Since the Miranda rule is clearly not based on federal laws or treaties, our decision
allowing habeas review for Miranda claims obviously assumes that Miranda is of constitu-
tional origin.
Id. at 2333 n.3.
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constitutional rule is immutable. "2'° Advocates in post-Miranda
litigation were bound to seek extensions or contractions of that
precedent, "and the sort of modifications represented by these
cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the
original decision."23' The Chief Justice likewise rebuffed the
idea that new procedures, such as Bivens actions,232 coupled with
3501 created an alternative as effective as Miranda at protecting
the privilege against self-incrimination. Though conceding
"that there are more remedies available for abusive police con-
duct than there were at the time Miranda was decided," the
Court could "not agree that these additional measures supple-
ment 3501's protections sufficiently to meet the constitutional• • ,,23
minimum. Of particular concern was police discretion under
3501 to dispense with pre-interrogation warnings altogether. 4
Finally, the Court suggested that "the principles of stare de-
cisis weigh heavily against overruling [Miranda] now."235 There
was no "special justification, 236 for uprooting three decades of
case law, particularly since "Miranda has become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our natural culture."237 Subsequent decisions
have tempered the impact of its exclusionary rule, the ChiefJus-
tice argued, while the bright-line nature of the Miranda warn-
ings continued to provide a degree of certainty unattainable in
238a balancing test for voluntariness.
3. Scalia's Dissent
Joined only by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissenting Justice
Scalia lashed out at the majority for its "radical revision, 23 9 of
Miranda. Although not stated in so many words, the Court's
opinion reaffirmed that custodial interrogation in the absence
of Miranda warnings is unconstitutional-despite the fact that
Id. at 2335.
23 Id.
'2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (creating a
civil cause of action against federal officials for constitutional violations).
2' Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
234 id.
Id. at 2336.
2 Id. (citations omitted).
237 Id.
2W Id.
2" Id. at 2337 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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three "Justices whose votes are needed to compose today's ma-
jority are on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is
not a violation of the Constitution., 240 After a scathing critique
of the original Miranda decision,24 Justice Scalia turned to the
Court's use of prophylactic rules not mandated by the Constitu-
tion itself. He deemed the majority's various descriptions of
Miranda as "word games,"2 42 arguing that "what makes a decision
'constitutional' . . . is the determination that the Constitution
requires the result., 243  But because the majority "refuses to
abandon" those cases holding that Miranda is not required by
the Constitution, "what today's decision will stand for, whether
the Justices can bring themselves to say it or not, is the power of
the Supreme Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional
Constitution, binding on Congress and the States."2" To Scalia,
this is "an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and
it does not exist.
2
4
In the final section of his dissent, Justice Scalia assailed the
majority's reliance on stare decisis as a basis for affirming
Miranda. Having been whittled away by subsequent decisions,
the core of Miranda now lacked constitutional legitimacy and
instead supplied the "special justification" needed for its jetti-
son. 24 Nor was Scalia convinced that the "totality of the circum-
stances" test under 3501 would be more difficult to apply than
the Court's Miranda doctrine. The "nearly 60 cases involving a
host of Miranda issues" in the ensuing decades had demon-
strated that the Court's interrogation rules were less than
bright.247 What is more, the judiciary is still required in many
cases to scrutinize confessions under both Miranda doctrine and
21 Id. (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-458 (1994) (opinion of the
Court, in which Kennedy, J., joined); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989)
(opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, J.,joined); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985) (opinion of the Court by O'Connor, J.); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984) (opinion of the Courtby Rehnquist,J.)).
241 Id. at 2338-40.
242 Id. at 2342 ("The Court today insists that the decision in Miranda is a 'constitu-
tional' one, that it has 'constitutional underpinnings,' a 'constitutional basis' and a
'constitutional origin,' that it was 'constitutionally based,' and that it announced a
'constitutional rule."').
243 Id.
24 Id. at 2346.
21 Id. at 2337.
246 Id. at 2346.
247 Id. at 2346-47.
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the voluntariness test.2 8  Scalia also rejected the claim that
Miranda should be saved because it "occupies a special place in
the 'public's consciousness.' 249 The "public is not under the il-
lusion that we are infallible," Scalia noted, and there was "little
harm in admitting that we made a mistake" and "much to be
gained by reaffirming for the people the wonderful reality that
they govern themselves."20
As in his Morales dissent, Scalia peppered the majority with
harsh rhetoric, suggesting that the Court may have become
"some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-
down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its col-
lective fancy."2' In closing, Justice Scalia argued that the deci-
sion "converts Miranda from a milestone of judicial
overreaching into the very Cheops' Pyramid (or perhaps the
Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance." 2
His parting shot then offered a (mild) threat: "[U]ntil 3501 is
repealed, [I] will continue to apply it in all cases where there





E. ROUND 5-FUTURE LEGISLATION?
"Civil libertarians breathed a sigh of relief" when Dickerson
was issued.24 Like many others, I was pleased with the decision's
bottom line: A musty, largely unenforced statute could not
supplant three decades of case law by simply reverting to the
pre-Miranda status quo. The Court's means to this end, how-
ever, were substantially less gratifying. In large part, Miranda
will continue to rule the world of custodial interrogation as
cause celebre, with the original decision taking on a life of its own,
transcending its pages in the U.S. Reports. The "new" Miranda
248 Id. at 2347.
249 Id. (quoting Petitioner's Brief).
250 id.
2" Id. at 2342.
22 Id. at 2348.
25I rd.
"' Yale Kamisar, Miranda: A rule surrounded by silence, DET. NEws, July 5, 2000, at
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is concerned not only with the conditions of police questioning,• * • ,, -- ,,255
but also its position within "our national culture.
This seems pretty thin cover for maintaining judge-
mandated rules of police behavior, particularly given the
Court's unsatisfying response to an undeniable doctrinal con-
flict: Apparently, a third type of constitutional rule exists, less
exacting than the dictates of the Constitution (allowing a host
of exceptions to evidentiary exclusion), but more powerful than
the Court's supervisory authority over federal courts (permitting
the application of these rules to state prosecutions). For rea-
sons previously articulated by noted scholars, 6 I have little
doubt that the Court has the power to create such devices. But
it would have been nice if Dickerson had offered a general justifi-
cation for prophylactic constitutional rules and a rationale for
application to custodial interrogation.
Equally troublesome is the lack of guidance for legislators
seeking to "develop their own safeguards for the privilege
[against self-incrimination]." It seems unlikely that Miranda is
the end-all of custodial interrogation law, that a century from
now police will still be admonishing suspects out of fear of the
exclusionary rule. Law-and-order conservatives, of course, are
concerned with the future of police questioning-but so are
liberals and libertarians. Professor Kamisar notes that "[t] here
is good reason to believe that in a substantial number of police
stations, police interrogators are getting suspects to waive their
rights-by persuading them it is in their 'best interest' to do
so-before they ever advise them of their rights."2s5 Likewise,
2 Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336. See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992) (making similar argument in sup-
port of upholding Roe v. Wade).
2'b See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190
(1988); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 144, at 448-53;
Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975).
27 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
2 Kamisar, A rule surrounded by silence, supra note 254. For instance, consider the
following excerpts from a 1999 taped interrogation conducted by New Orleans police
officers:
Officer 1: But... when you want f- with me I will f- you in the end! Now we could sit
here and go through these lies some more. The more you lie, the more I'mma
dig you deeper and deeper because ink pens are a m-a f-al I could send you
way, way down that road with just some ink pen. I ain't gotta put a hand on
you. So, you willing to talk to us, tell us the f- truth. Tell us your part of this
crime. We get this f- ball rolling.
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Albert Alschuler suggested more than a decade ago that the
Court's Miranda jurisprudence had created a virtual "bad
man' s 9 guide to custodial interrogation, offering an inventory
of police strateges that would avoid suppression of incriminat-
ing statements.
Officer 2: Alright as much as I wanna cut you a deal I can't cut you a deal along these
lines, you follow what I'm saying? You gotta talk to me.
Officer 1: Even if you walked out here today, if you walk out here today, you gon' be a
dead man not long from now, watch! Cause I'm sure just like you heard every-
thing, you heard your name implicated, right?
Suspect: I never hear people talking my name.
Officer 2: I'm offering you the whole pie. Man when you can go down from first-degree
murder! I ain't even going down to second-degree or manslaughterl I'm talk-
ing about a burglaryl You follow what I'm saying? I'm talking about a burglary
but I gotta have you work with me man!
Suspect: I'm working ....
Michael Perlstein, Tape Captures Hardball Cop Tactics, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
July 7, 2000, at Al. Although the officers "took turns badgering, cajoling, and railing
against [the suspect] as they tried to extract a confession," in the end the suspect did
not confess. Id. "Uncomfortable with the bullying methods used by police interroga-
tors, Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick [eventually] dropped plans to
use [the] taped interrogation as evidence .... " Susan Finch, Connick to Ditch Tape of
Interview, Lawyer May Asks Feds for Civil Rights Probe, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PIcAYUNE, July
8, 2000, at BI.
29 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables
him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.").
260 Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 1436, 1442 (1987):
Upon arresting a suspect, do not give him the Miranda warnings. When the public safety
requires it, you may question this suspect without advising him of his rights, and his an-
swers will be admissible. In the absence of a special public need, however, you should not
question an arrested, unwarned suspect. If the suspect does make a statement, it will be a
'volunteered' statement of the sort that Miranda makes admissible. Moreover, if the suspect
remains silent, his silence may be used to impeach any defense that he offers at trial. After
an hour or two (during which your suspect will have provided either a statement or a po-
tentially useful period of silence), you should advise him of his rights. If the suspect waives
these rights, his statement will be admissible. If he indicates that he wishes to remain silent
or to consult a lawyer, however, continue to interrogate him without a lawyer. Although
the prosecutor will be unable to introduce as part of the state's case-in-chief any statement
that the suspect makes, the suspect's statement will become admissible to impeach his tes-
timony if he later takes the witness stand to say something different from what he told you.
Indeed, if the suspect's testimony on direct examination fails to contradict his earlier
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A variety of alternatives might be preferable to Miranda and
its exclusionary rule, with videotaping confessions being high
on most lists. 261 Others propose judicially supervised question-
ing in lieu of interrogation on the streets or in police cruisers.
262
Unfortunately, a post-Dickerson lawmaker is left to wonder
whether Miranda is immutable and without substitute-or
whether some yet unlegislated solution might be "at least as ef-
fective' '2" at informing suspects of their privilege against self-
incrimination and providing a continuous opportunity to in-
voke it. Chief Justice Rehnquist did mention Miranda's invita-
tion for reform efforts but only as "[a] dditional support for our
conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based." Moreover,
his Dickerson opinion ended on a blunt, discouraging note for
creative lawmakers: "Miranda announced a constitutional rule
that Congress may not supersede legislatively.
2
6
statement, the prosecutor may cross-examine him about facts reported in the earlier state-
ment and may introduce the statement if the suspect fails to confirm what he said to you.
Id. at 1442-43. "Do not place too much pressure on the suspect, however," Professor
Alschuler quips. "If a court holds his confession involuntary under pre-Miranda stan-
dards, it will be inadmissible for any purpose. The Supreme Court has said that pre-
Miranda voluntariness standards are part of the 'real' Constitution. Miranda is part of
the Court's just pretend' Constitution." Id. at 1443. I would only add that the Hol-
mesian "bad man" cop may also freely use an un-Mirandized statement to uncover evi-
dence without concern for the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). See also Charles
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 132-136, 189-192 (1998) (not-
ing that "Alschuler's writings proved prescient" and then providing excerpts from a
"training bulletin, which the California District Attorneys Association published,....
encouraging officers to continue questioning a suspect who has invoked his or her
rights"). But see note 265, infra (noting change in custodial interrogation policy pur-
suant to Dickerson and a Ninth Circuit case that rejected civil immunity for police who
intentionally violate Miranda).
26 See Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 114, at 1170 n.243 (listing supporters
of videotaping confessions); Kamisar, A rule surrounded by silence, supra note 254 ("For
a long time, virtually all of the nation's leading criminal procedure professors-critics
and defenders of Miranda alike-have favored the idea [of videotaping confes-
sions].").
212 See, e.g., AEHIL REED AMAR, THE CONsITrrTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 46-88 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857 (1995).
23 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
V Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2334.
2 Id. at 2336 (emphasis added). On the same day it delivered Dickerson, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in a case concerning government liability for failure to
provide Miranda warnings to criminal defendants. Butts v. McNally, 120 S. Ct. 2717
(2000). In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit had rejected a claim of qualified
So is the Miranda's invitation still open? Could Congress en-
act a valid confession statute-incorporating, for instance,
videotaping requirements-if it provided evidence that such a
provision was "at least as effective" as Miranda at protecting a
suspect's right of silence? The answers remain uncertain 32
years later. What seems clear, however, is that Dickerson failed to
advance these questions any closer to a final resolution.
III. JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR INTERBRANCH DIALOGUE
In Morales and Dickerson, the Supreme Court presented dif-
ferent visions of judicial review and its role in interbranch dia-
logue on criminal procedure issues. The Morales decision struck
down Chicago's ordinance but simultaneously presented,
through Justice O'Connor's concurrence, a "road map" for en-
acting a valid statutory scheme. The local government then
adopted a new gang-loitering law that roughly mirrored
O'Connor's suggestions and will likely pass judicial muster pre-
cisely for its obedience. In contrast, Dickerson nullified 3501 but
offered no advice (or even encouragement) to federal and state
lawmakers interested in passing a valid confession statute. The
result has been near legislative silence, broken only by a con-
gressional bill to formally take the anti-Miranda sections off the
books and thereby preclude Justice Scalia from applying 3501 in
future cases. 266 Aside from this partisan effort, there has been
immunity, holding that "[o]fficers who intentionally violate the rights protected by
Miranda must expect to have to defend themselves in civil actions." California Attor-
neys for Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999). As a consequence of
both Dickerson and Butts, "police across [California] are being warned to obey the U.S.
Supreme Court's famous Miranda ruling and stop interrogating citizens who invoke
their rights to remain silent or obtain legal help." Seth Rosenfeld, Warning to respect
Miranda, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 27, 2000, at Al. "'The bottom line now must be: Do
not intentionally violate Miranda,' [the California Department ofJustice] says. 'This
is because an intentional violation will virtually guarantee a civil rights suit against you
and your department.'" Id.
26 SeeS. 2830, 106th Cong. § 2 (2000) ("A bill to preclude the admissibility of cer-
tain confessions in criminal cases."). The bill would strike subsections (a) and (b)
from 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and then redesignate subsections (c), (d), and (e). In intro-
ducing "the Miranda Reaffirmation Act of 2000," Senator Patrick Leahy stated:
This week's resounding reaffirmation of the Miranda rule should put to rest the issue of
Miranda's continuing vitality. Most law enforcement officers made their peace with
Miranda long ago: It is time for the rest to do the same. That is why I am so disturbed by
Justice Scalia's parting shot in Dickerson. In a dissenting opinion joined byJustice Thomas,
Justice Scalia vowed to continue to apply 3501 until such time as it is repealed. Mr. Presi-
dent, that time has come. I am introducing a bill today, together with my good friend,
Senator Feingold, to repeal 3501.
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no further political dialogue on reforming the law of custodial
interrogation.
The divergent approaches and political consequences of
Morales and Dickerson raise an important question: Are judge-
made road maps an appropriate means of stimulating inter-
branch dialogue on issues of criminal procedure? As suggested
earlier, the answer depends on the capacity of less aggressive ju-
dicial techniques to spur interbranch dialogue, the Court's past
experience with constitutional road maps, and the balance of
arguments both for and against judge-made road maps. This
Part begins with an overview of the leading theories of inter-
branch dialogue and then examines the Court's experience
with constitutional road maps.
A. THEORIES OF INTERBRANCH DIALOGUE
"[T]he Supreme Court is the Constitution," declared then-
Professor Felix Frankfurter in 1930.67 Whether out of arro-
gance, paternalism, or self-preservation, the justices have occa-
sionally espoused a Court-centric vision of American
constitutionalism. t Yet legal commentators of all political
stripes have rejected unqualified judicial supremacy as unten-
able in theory and unworkable in practice; 69 even Justice Frank-
146 CONG. REc. S6124-01, S6140, available in Westlaw at 2000 WL 868356.
2f'7 Felix Frankfurter, The United States Supreme Court Molding the Constitution, 32
CURRENT HisT. 235, 240 (1930). See also CHARLES EvANs HUGHES, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EvANS HUGHES 144 (Danelski & Tuchin eds.,
1973) ("We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it
is."); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson,J., concurring) ("We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("Marbury v. Madison... de-
clared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this
Court and the country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitu-
tional system."). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("Deciding whether a
matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has
been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("it is the responsibility of this Court to act as
the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution").
219 See, e.g., DWOPMN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 108, at 211 ("Some-
times, even after a contrary Supreme Court decision, an individual may still reasona-
bly believe that the law is on his side .... We cannot assume... that the Constitution
is always what the Supreme Court says it is."); id. at 214-15 ("A citizen's allegiance is to
the law, not to any particular person's view of what the law is .... [I]f the issue is one
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furter would later admit that "the ultimate touchstone of consti-
tutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it." 270 Instead of commanding from on high, the Supreme
Court is only one actor in an ongoing dialogue on the meaning
and application of the Constitution, sharing interpretive duties
with other courts, legislators, executives, and the citizenry.7
Sometimes the Court has the final say, 2  sometimes it does
not.2 73 But in reality, most constitutional interpretation occurs
touching fundamental or political rights, and it is arguable that the Supreme Court
has made a mistake, a man is within his social rights in refusing to accept that deci-
sion as conclusive."); 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 470-71 (1923) ("However the Court may interpret the provisions of the Con-
stitution, it is still the Constitution which is the law and not the decision of the
Court."); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TULANE L. REv. 979, (1987)
("[A Supreme Court] decision does not establish a supreme law of the land that is
binding on all persons and parts of government henceforth and forevermore....
Once we understand the distinction between constitutional law and the Constitution,
once we see that constitutional decisions need not be seen as the last words in consti-
tutional construction, once we comprehend that these decisions do not necessarily
determine future public policy, once we see all of this, we can grasp a correlative
point: constitutional interpretation is not the business of the Court only, but also
properly the business of all branches of government."); Review and Outlook: The Irre-
pressible Mr. Meese, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1986, at 28 (noting a "distinction between the
Constitution and judicial enforcement of its commands" and that "we must distin-
guish the dancer from the dance") (quoting Prof. Laurence Tribe). Which branch
reigns supreme is a question that has dogged legal scholars for decades and will likely
do so for many more. It is possible, of course, to construct a moral theory that sides
with President Lincoln rather than ChiefJustice Taney on the issue of slavery, see gen-
erally 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Basler ed., 1953), but supports
the Warren Court's stand in Cooper v. Aaron against a recalcitrant and segregationist
Arkansas state government. But articulating a structural or procedural theory that
would justify oscillating supremacy between the legal and political branches is an en-
tirely different matter.
' Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2" See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 5 (1991) ("[The
Constitution] is the subject of an ongoing dialogue amongst scholars, professionals,
and the people at large."); PHILIP BOBBrrT, CONSITtTIONAL FATE 185 (1982) ("All
constitutional actors participate in creating constitutional decisions of principally ex-
pressive significance."); LoUIs FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION As
POLncAL PROCESS 3-8 (1988).
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down congres-
sional attempt to abrogate the Court's free exercise decision in Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (strik-
ing down Congressional attempt to abrogate the Court's flag burning decision in
Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
'7' Consider, for example, the repeated enactment of child labor laws in spite of
Supreme Court rulings. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 44 (1922);
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918). Congress eventually won this battle.
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outside the walls of the Supreme Court Building-in the well of
the Senate, in the White House, in the chambers of lower fed-
eral courts, in the offices of administrative agencies, and in
analogous institutions of state government. Constitutional is-
sues confront various governmental actors on a daily basis and
often contain the dialogic characteristics of "ordinary" politics.
274
The question for legal commentators, then, is determining
the appropriate amount of constitutional dialogue between the
Court and other officials, as well as a suitable medium for this
discourse. Toward these ends, a number of suggestions have
been forwarded by scholars and jurists with varying degrees of
success.
1. Cardozo's Ministry OfJustice
In 1921, then-Professor Benjamin Cardozo lamented the
poverty of interaction between the branches of government,
concluding that the "[1] egislature and courts move on in proud
and silent isolation." 7m The barrier between lawmakers and
judges had very real costs, both in terms of efficiency and quality
of outcomes:
On the one side, the judges, left to fight against anachronism and injus-
tice by methods of judge-made law, are distracted by the conflicting
promptings of justice and logic, of consistency and mercy, and the out-
put of their labors bears the tokens of the strain. On the other side, the
legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the needs and
problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or
systematic advice as to the workings of one rule or another, patches the
fabric here and there, and mars often when it would mend.7 6
The solution, Cardozo argued, was to create an agency with
the express responsibility of mediation between the courts and
See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941). See generally LOUIS FISHER & NEAL
DEvINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 62-67 (3d ed. 2001) (detailing
child labor dispute between Congress and the Supreme Court). See also Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 400-01 (1943) ("There is no reason to doubt that this Court
may fall into error as may other branches of the Government. Nothing in the history
or attitude of this Court should give rise to legislative embarrassment if in the per-
formance of its duty a legislative body feels impelled to enact laws which may require
the Court to re-examine its previousjudgments or doctrine.").
27' Cf Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 184 (1986)
("[C] onstitutional issues are not radically discontinuous from other political issues.").
2 Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministiy ofJustice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (1921).
276 Id. at 113-14.
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legislatures. Borrowing from the writings of Roscoe Pound, 7
the future member of the Supreme Court articulated the con-
cept of a "ministry of justice" specifically empowered to debate
the interstices between law enactment and law adjudication and
to suggest recommendations for reform. The ministry would be
composed of judges, legislators, academics, and practitioners,
charged with opening up the lines of communication between
the branches of government.27 8  "The spaces between the
plants," Cardozo suggested, "would at last be bridged.
2 79
Following this blueprint, New York created a law revision
commission in 1934 to pinpoint deficiencies in the law and
propose necessary legal modifications. 20  A number of states
would follow its lead, adopting similar commissions to expose
flaws that resulted from limited dialogue between judicial and
political bodies. 1 In addition, a non-governmental entity, the
American Law Institute ("ALI"), has promulgated code reforms
in numerous legal disciplines that have been subsequently
adopted in whole or in part by state governments.282 The ALI's
Model Penal Code ("MPC"), for example, has been particularly
influential on systematic revisions of substantive criminal 
law.283
Unfortunately, the MPC provides only marginal assistance
to legislators interested in fighting gang congregation and no
help to Chicago after it enacted the loitering ordinance at issue
in Morales. The MPC does have provisions concerning "failure
to disperse," "disorderly conduct," "harassment," "loitering or
prowling," and "obstructing public passages. '2  But none of
Id. at 114 (citing Roscoe Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC.
142, 146 (1920); Roscoe Pound, Juristic Problems of National Progress, 22 AM. J. OF
SOCIOLOGY 721, 729, 731 (1917)). See also Roscoe Pound, A Ministry ofJustice: A New
Rolefor the Law School, 38 A.B.A.J. 637 (1952).
' Cardozo, A Ministry ofJustice, supra note 275, at 124-25.
279 Id. at 125.
" See, e.g., Bernard L. Shientag, A Ministry ofJustice in Action: The Work of the New
York State Law Revision Commission, 22 CORNELLL.Q. 183 (1937).
2" See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8280-8297 (West 2000) (establishing the California
Law Revision Commission).
212 See <www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm> (describing ALI's creation, operation, and
projects).
283 See, e.g., Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2000) (discussing the influence of the Model Penal Code).
"84 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1 (riot; failure to disperse); id. § 250.2 (disorderly
conduct); id. § 250.4 (harassment); id. § 250.6 (loitering or prowling); id. § 250.7 (ob-
structing highways and other public passages).
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these offenses incorporates an individual's status or identity into
their definitions and, conversely, all apparently require suspi-
cious overt action prior to arrest.2" By contrast, Chicago's
original loitering law expressly targets individuals by their status
(gang membership) and their otherwise innocuous conduct
(congregating in public).
As for the problem of custodial interrogation raised by
Miranda and Dickerson, there has been no successful analog to
the MPC in the realm of criminal procedure. The National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws adopted
the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure in 197426 and the ALI
promulgated a Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure a
year later.8 7 Yet neither effort has encouraged state reform nor
significantly affected the American criminal process. Wayne
LaFave noted that the Uniform Rules "dropped out of sight like
a lead balloon" after publication without a single state adopting
any of its provisions, while Jerold Israel suggested that crimi-
nal procedure is "an unlikely candidate for state law uniformity"
as it is "hardly touched by those interests that typically have led
2" For example, the MPC's loitering provisions suggest that "alarm for the safety
of persons or property" can be justified by "the fact that the actor takes flight upon
appearance of a peace officer, refuses to identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to
conceal himself or any object." Id. § 250.6
216 UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1974). Rule 212 of the Uniform
Rules lists specific information that must be provided an individual upon detention.
Although roughly mirroring the warnings required by Miranda, the rule also de-
mands an admonition "[t]hat if at any time during any questioning [the detainee]
desires to consult with a lawyer or desires it to stop, questioning will stop." Id. rule
212(b) (5).
27 A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNm:ENT PROCEDURE (1975). The Model Code re-
quires Miranda-type warnings when "a law enforcement officer stops any person who
he suspects or has reasonable cause to suspect may have committed a crime," id. §
110.2(5), as well as when the officer makes an arrest. Id. § 120.8. But the stop-and-
frisk warnings also require, among other things, that a suspect be informed "that
within twenty minutes he will be released unless he is arrested" and "that if he is ar-
rested he will be taken to a police station where he may promptly communicate by
telephone with counsel, relatives, or friends." Id. § 110.2(5)(i)(ii). Likewise, the
post-arrest warnings require, inter alia, that a suspect be informed "that he will
promptly be taken to a police station where he may promptly communicate with
counsel, relatives or friends." Id. § 120.8(1) (d) (ii).
Wayne F. LaFave, Random Thoughts &y a Distant Collaborator, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2431, 2434 n.7 (1996). See a/soYale Kamisar, Bouquets forJery Israel, 94 MICH. L. REv.
2455 (1996) ("I would like to believe that the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure
have significantly affected the thinking of judges and law professors, but as LaFave
notes, it appears that no state has adopted any of the Uniform Rules' provisions.").
states to adopt uniform laws." 89 It is also possible that the War-
ren Court's constitutionalization of criminal procedure damp-
ened reform efforts by transferring primary responsibility for
the criminal process from the political branches to the judici-
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ary.
2. Bickel's Passive Virtues
In contrast to Cardozo's extrajudicial proposal, Alexander
Bickel seemed to recognize that interbranch dialogue between
the Court and the political branches was, for the most part,
driven by case-based disputes. According to Bickel, the Su-
preme Court "wields a threefold power": it may strike down po-
litical action as unconstitutional, it may uphold the action as
constitutionally valid, "[o]r it may do neither."29' This latter
category comprises the "passive virtues," a loose grouping ofju-
dicial strategies that can dodge difficult constitutional issues.
By employing avoidance doctrines such as standing and ripe-
ness,293 the Court can abstain from adjudicating politically sensi-
tive issues and erroneously casting its imprimatur in
undeveloped controversies.
Ironically, Professor Bickel believed that judicial silence
through the employment of passive virtues does not prevent but
instead allows a broad debate on the propriety of certain state
actions. 4 The comparative finality of constitutional decision-
making has the potential to stifle discourse by precluding a po-
litical resolution outside of the Article V amendment process.
2"' Jerold Israel, Federal Criminal Procedure as a Model for the States, 543 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 130, 133-34 (1996).
m See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 523 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the
"ironic untimeliness" of Miranda's new exclusionary rule given the ongoing "massive
re-examination of criminal law enforcement procedures on a scale never before wit-
nessed").
2q BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 69.
' See id. at 115-198; see also Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961).
' Cf Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-54 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring) (listing seven avoidance doctrines employed by the Court).
2" BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 70-71.
21 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 224 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("This Court acts at the limits of its power when it invalidates a law on constitutional
grounds. In recognition of our place in the constitutional scheme, we must act with
'great gravity and delicacy' when telling a coordinate branch that its actions are abso-
lutely prohibited absent constitutional amendment.").
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Conversely, avoidance doctrines "engage the Court in a Socratic
colloquy with the other institutions of government and with so-
ciety as a whole concerning the necessity for this or that meas-
ure, for this or that compromise. " '
Bickel connects the passive virtues to criminal procedure
through the void-for-vagueness doctrine, arguing that its opera-
tion avoids thorny constitutional or political issues. "[W]hen
the Court finds a statute unduly vague, it withholds adjudication
of the substantive issue in order to set in motion the process of
legislative decision.", 7 But equating this doctrine with jurisdic-
tional limits such as standing is, at best, a stretch in cases like
Morales. There is a world of difference between using the
vagueness doctrine against shoddy draftsmanship and its appli-
cation, for instance, to Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance. In
the former case, the Court is arguably employing a passive vir-
tue-esque device that "does not hold that the legislature may not
do whatever it is that is complained of' but instead asks that
lawmakers be more precise in their terms.28 In the latter case,
however, the Court is making a substantive value judgment that
law enforcement cannot be vested with undue discretion in ar-
eas of personal liberty.m This is not avoidance; it is a frontal
confrontation between judges and politicians. Once the Court
granted certiorari, then, the passive virtues became an unlikely
tool for resolving Morales.
Although Professor Bickel does not address Miranda,3°° it
seems hard to argue that the passive virtues would inspire inter-
2m BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 70-71. See also
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORATY OF CONSENT 111 (1975) (arguing that the Court
"interacts with other institutions, with whom it is engaged in an endlessly renewed
educational conversation" even when jurisdiction is "declined").
2 BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 152.
m .d.
' Bickel does, in fact, recognize this distinction. "[A] statute may deter conduct
that should on principle be altogether free from governmental regulation. When a
court finds this to be the case and holds the statute void for vagueness, it renders a
substantive adjudication based on constitutional principle." Id. at 149.
In testimony unrelated to his passive-virtues theory, Bickel argued that Con-
gress could not abrogate Miranda based solely on its superior fact-finding capacity:
[I]t is not quite enough to refer to the factual bases of Supreme Court decisions and be
willing to let Congress override those, because the realm of fact probably covers most of
what there is.... [Iln Miranda there are facts more at large to which the Supreme Court
could retreat. The answer could be no, we don't think every policeman tries to administer
the third degree to every prisoner. We believe that in the station house situation, there is a
natural unintended effect of overbearing the prisoner. That is a factual premise, but I sup-
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branch dialogue on custodial interrogation between the Su-
preme Court and the political branches. It is true, of course,
that staying constitutional judgment-by denying certiorari in
Dickerson, for example-allows debate to continue among legis-
lators, executives, and their constituents without the back-
ground limitation of Supreme Court precedent. Yet it is
difficult to discern the Court's contribution to the dialogue. Ab-
sent an annotation of potential unconstitutionality,-"' the passive
virtues merely deflect the issue back to the lower judiciary or the
political branches without providing input from the Justices
themselves. Unless the Court addressed the merits of Dickerson,
lawmakers and law enforcers would be guided solely by lower
court rulings on 3501 and their own estimation of constitution-
ality. To many, this would be tantamount to deferential silence
not interbranch dialogue.
3. Sunstein 'sJudicial Minimalism
Bickel's intellectual heir, Cass Sunstein, has revived the idea
of passive virtues under the title "judicial minimalism." °2 Like
Bickel, Sunstein supports the use of avoidance doctrines and
the prudent exercise of certiorari jurisdiction as a means of lim-
iting unnecessary strife between the Court and the political
branches.03 Moreover, "constructive use of silence" is conducive
to political discourse "because it allows democratic processes
room to maneuver" and "ensures that certain important deci-
sions are made by democratically accountable actors. '0 4
But Professor Sunstein goes beyond the passive virtues of
judicial avoidance and suggests a minimalist approach to opin-
pose it is too near to the core of the constitutional proposition that if you allow that to be
overruled, what is left of the function ofjudicial review?
Senate Hearings on Separation of Powers, supra note 166, at 26 (statement of Prof.
Bickel).
501 Cf Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997) (statement of Stevens, J., respect-
ing the denial of certiorari) ("It is well settled that our decision to deny a petition for
writ of certiorari does not in any sense constitute a ruling on the merits of the case in
which the writ is sought. That is certainly true of our decision to deny certiorari in
this case.").
302 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999); Cass R Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996).
'o3 See Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 302, at 8; see also id. at 7, 51-53, 99 (discussing
justiciability and denials of certiorari as minimalist techniques).
30' Id. at 7, 14, 19-20.
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ion writing as well. Rather than announcing broad principles
that transcend the particular case at hand, the Court generally
should address constitutional questions on limited grounds and
employ analogical rather than deductive reasoning in its justifi-
cations.""5 By narrowly deciding a case without settling related
issues, the Court instigates dialogue with the political branches
on those unresolved questions, solicits input from the academy
on the case and its potential consequences, prods the lower
courts into testing the implications of its decision in other legal
contexts, and leaves the door open for future cases that extend
or limit the original decision.
Sunstein largely omits analysis of criminal procedure issues
as they relate to his theory ofjudicial review, focusing instead on
constitutional law proper-freedom of speech, equal protection,
substantive due process, and so on. Yet like Bickel, he does sug-
gest that the void-for-vagueness doctrine offers a minimalist ap-
proach to unduly ambiguous laws: "When the Court strikes
down a statute as void, it leaves open the possibility that a more
specific version of the legislative judgment-regulating speech
or conduct-may be valid. A void-for-vagueness holding leaves
that question undecided; it demands a focused legislative de-
termination. 0 7 As such, Professor Sunstein would likely en-
dorse the judgment of Morales but not the maximalist rhetoric
ofJustice Steven's plurality opinion. The Court did "ensure leg-
islative rather than executive lawmaking °30 8 in its application of
the vagueness doctrine's second prong, striking down the gang-
loitering ordinance for Chicago's failure to "establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement. 3°9  But the plurality
opinion's broad and superfluous theorizing-that, for example,
"the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the 'lib-
erty' protected by the Due Process Clause"01°--seems inconsis-
tent with Sunstein's charge for democracy-enhancing minimalist
decisions that promote rather than foreclose political solutions.
' Id. at 15-20.
See, e.g., id. at 51 (noting that minimalism is appropriate when "the Court
thinks that additional discussion, in lower courts and nonjudicial arenas, is likely to
be productive").
-'7 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE ATATIME, supra note 302, at 110-11.
Id. at 31.
Morales, 527 U.S. at 60 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
3'0 Id. at 53 (Stevens,J.,joined by Souter and GinsburgBJ.).
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Instead, the existence of a fundamental right to loiter should be
left for another day.*"
In contrast, Professor Sunstein points to Miranda as an ex-
ample of a maximalist decision that might nonetheless be justi-
fied. Although it created "a virtual code of police behavior,"
3 12
"perhaps Miranda v. Arizona made sense in light of the extreme
difficulty of proceeding case by case to see whether confessions
were actually involuntary."3 s Of course, one could imagine a
minimalist opinion on custodial interrogation, where the Court
would suppress Ernesto Miranda's confession as lacking suffi-
cient indicia of voluntariness under prevailing legal standards.
Or the Court might have moderately increased the state's bur-
den through a rebuttable presumption of coercion. But readers
are generally left to wonder what a minimalist Miranda might
look like under Sunstein's theory.
It is difficult, however, to describe Dickerson as either strictly
maximalist or minimalist in nature. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion eluded issues not before the Court, such as a videotap-
ing substitute for Miranda, and avoided a deeply theorized ex-
planation for prophylactic constitutional rules. Conversely, the
Chief Justice seemed to close the door on political debate and
alternatives, concluding that Miranda announced a constitu-
tional rule that may not be superseded by statute.1 4 Dickerson
was thus "minimalist" in the issues it addressed but "maximalist"
in its foreclosure of further democratic deliberation and legisla-
tion. Under Professor Sunstein's theory, this latter aspect of the
Court's opinion could only be justified if Miranda represents an
irreducible minimum for custodial interrogation consistent with
the Fifth Amendment. In other words, the maximalist preclu-
sion of democratic options assumes that pre-interrogation warn-
ings are demanded by the Constitution forever (or at least for
the foreseeable future).
. In fact, that is precisely what happened: Justice Stevens was able to garner only
two additional votes on his explication of the fundamental right to loiter. Id. at 53-54
(Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, J.).
312 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT ATIME, supra note 302, at 262.
-11 Id. at 30. See also id. at 55.
31 Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
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4. Calabresi's Second-Look Doctrine
In his scholarly work as a Yale law professor and dean,3 5
Guido Calabresi contends that tempered activism rather than
avoidance often provides the best means of encouraging dia-
logue between courts and legislators. 6 The passive virtues re-
quire deference to otherwise suspicious or stagnant statutes and
therefore provide insufficient motivation for legislative reform,
while full-blown judicial activism leaves little room for political
debate and compromise. Calabresi suggests a middle-ground to
spur reform without foreclosing legislative alternatives:
" [W] hen the legislature has acted with haste or hiding in a way
that arguably infringes even upon the penumbra of fundamen-
tal rights, courts should invalidate the possibly offending law
and force the legislature to take a 'second look' with the eyes of
the people on it.
5 17
This second-look doctrine is nevertheless consistent with
Sunstein's judicial minimalism. Under Calabresi's quasi-
common law approach, courts would strike down constitution-
ally dubious statutes on narrow grounds and expressly cabin
their opinions to the context of particular cases. Without the
presence of sweeping constitutional principles looming in the
background, lawmakers would be relatively free to experiment
with other statutory schemes. Calabresi's theory takes only one
option off the table-the statutory status quo.
After being appointed to the Second Circuit, Judge
Calabresi has further refined his second-look doctrine, this time
in live cases rather than scholarly publications. In Quill v. Vacco,
for instance, he concurred in the invalidation of New York's
criminal suicide laws as violating equal protection.3 1 8 But unlike
his colleagues, Calabresi limited his opinion to the statutes'
nineteenth-century legislative record and took no position on
whether such prohibitions would survive judicial scrutiny if re-
3"5 GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Guido
Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional
Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1991).
Somewhat ironically, Calabresi relies on an article co-authored by Professor Bickel as
the basis for his second-look doctrine. See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Welling-
ton, Legislative Purpose and theJudicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv.
1 (1957) (detailing the Court's "remanding" function).
316 CAIABREsI, COMMON LAW, supra note 315, at 141-77.
317 Calabresi, Foreword, supra note 315, at 104.
311 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
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enaced wth cnteporay " " 319enacted with contemporary justifications. When lawmakers
"wish to regulate conduct that, if not protected by our Constitu-
tion, is very close to being protected, they must do so clearly and
openly. They must, in other words, face the consequences of
their decisions before the people.' ' 0
Criminal procedure doctrine, however, illustrates the in-
herent limitations of Judge Calabresi's theory. For the most
part, constitutional precedents rather than statutes regulate the
crucial elements of the criminal process, diminishing the im-
port of Calabresi's second-look doctrine for contemporary
criminal procedure. If the boundaries of the Fourth Amend-
ment's exclusionary rule are either too constraining or not con-
straining enough, for instance, it is the Court rather than the
political branches that must take a second look. Nonetheless,
there are a few statute-driven aspects of constitutional criminal
procedure. Calabresi cites the Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence as an example of the second-look doctrine at
work.32' The Court essentially struck down every death penalty
statute in 1972 as inconsistent with the Eight Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment,322 but then approved a new
set of capital punishment schemes four years later urman
remanded "to the states, in effect, the issue of the constitution-
ality of the death penalty," while Gregg accepted the state legisla-
tures' second-look and "reaffirmation of capital punishment.
'3 24
Assuming the Court continued to abide by Miranda's invita-
tion for political altematives, 32- Dickerson might have presented
an ideal case for employing the second-look doctrine. As sug-
gested earlier, 3501 was enacted in an atmosphere of hostility
toward the Warren Court and its constitutionalization of crimi-
9 Id. at 743 (Calabresi,J., concurring).
121 Id. at 742. See also United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (arguing that, although the defendant's drug conviction
must be affirmed, the sentencing disparity between crack and rock cocaine might be
"heading toward unconstitutionality" in light of "changed circumstances").
321 See Calabresi, Foreword, supra note 315, at 120.
" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
"2 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
-'4 Calabresi, Foreword, supra note 315, at 120 n.127. See also id. at n.126 (citing
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857 (1988), as "raising the possibility that state
legislatures did not realize children could be executed under their own statutes")).
*" But see Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336 (concluding "that Miranda announced a
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively").
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nal procedure. Yet the statute's exact intent seems hard to pin
down and the legislative record was purposely manicured rather
than inclusive in coverage. By the time it finally reached the
Court, 3501 was more than three decades old and without any
significant track-record of enforcement or judicial considera-
tion. Per the Calabresian second-look doctrine, the Dickerson
Court might have (carefully) struck down the statute, thereby
sending 3501 back to Congress for further reflection "with the
eyes of the people on it.
26
But Calabresi's theory would seem to have little effect on
other criminal justice statutes. Chicago's gang-loitering ordi-
nance, for example, neither suffered from desuetude (it was
passed in 1992 and was actively enforced) nor was enacted in
haste (it was subject to prolonged and vigorous debate) .37 In
Morales, then, the issue was not whether the City had openly
considered the means and ends of its ordinance, but whether
the loitering law was unconstitutional despite lengthy political de-
liberation and public participation in the legislative process. In
such circumstances, Judge Calabresi's second-look doctrine may
be out of place. "The true justification for imposing a second
look," Calabresi argues, is the Court's assurance that, "to the ex-
tent that the law clashes with the legal topography in a funda-
mental way, the clash is the result of the genuine and considered
wishes of majoritarian bodies.0 2' By contrast, the Morales Court
faced a conflict between publicly aired legislation and the rights
of individuals-a clash animated by concerns for personal lib-
erty and countermajoritarian adjudication rather than popular
ignorance of the underlying legislative process.
B. THE COURT AS CARTOGRAPHER
These legal scholars have attempted to strike a balance in
judicial review-inspiring interbranch dialogue and democratic
deliberation while avoiding interbranch conflict and appear-
ances of illegitimacy. Bickel believed that gentle nudges from
the passive virtues could encourage dialogue on important so-
326 Calabresi, Foreword, supra note 315, at 104.
"" See Robert Davis, New Police Arrest Power Lights City Council Fuse, CHI. TRIB., June
18, 1992, at Al. Cf Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 38; Al-
schuler & Schulhofer, supra note 32; Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray, supra
note 38.
2 CAt.ABaRSI, COMMONLAW, supra note 315, at 136.
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cial issues without discouraging reasonable solutions or inspir-
ing societal strife. Sunstein supplemented Bickel's theory with
the concept ofjudicial minimalism, advocating narrow decisions
that permit further consideration by the political branches.
Calabresi went even further by suggesting that statutes of dubi-
ous constitutionality be remanded for a second look by the leg-
islature. Cardozo, in contrast, sought an external mechanism
for interbranch dialogue that was not bound by jurisdictional
requirements or the pragmatic constraints of American politics.
Each theory, however, adopts a distinct perspective on the
meaning of dialogue. Cardozo envisions interbranch dialogue as
a somewhat colloquial collaboration among judges, legislators,
and executives, where each party can directly and immediately
interact with other government institutions outside of formal
proceedings. In turn, Bickel privileges the discourse among
politicians and between the political branches and the citizenry,
suggesting that the judiciary enhances this type of dialogue
through its silence. Sunstein and Calabresi advocate slightly
more aggressive approaches and recognize a limited role for ju-
dicial voice in interbranch dialogue. Yet despite disagreement
on the active participants in a normatively superior discourse,
the scholars seem to agree that judicial opinions are, at most, a
catalyst for conversation.
Unfortunately, the ability of these theories to inspire inter-
branch dialogue has not been tested and, in fact, might not be
amenable to empirical analysis at all. But assume for present
purposes that the theories fall short of optimal dialogue, de-
fined as a judicial strategy that leads to an appropriate political
response. In certain cases, techniques such as minimalist opin-
ions and the second-look doctrine might produce confusion
rather than clarity for the political branches, informing legisla-
tors what they cannot enact but offering no other guidance.
The use of these strategies in Morales, for instance, might have
inadvertently squelched the reenactment of Chicago's gang-
loitering ordinance. As such, it might be argued that height-
ened conversation requires a more intrusive form of judicial re-
view that prods, more or less, a response from the political
branches. This approach would not merely invalidate official
acts but would propose alternatives consistent with the Constitu-
tion. After striking down a statute, in other words, the Court




The idea is fairly novel for criminal procedure but not to
constitutional scholarship. Frederick Schauer described this ju-
dicial strategy as "lawmaking by specific rules."5 2 According to
Schauer, the approach "most closely resembles lawmaking by a
legislative body in the 'normal' manner."030 Under this model,
the judiciary provides detailed rules for official actors, whether
they be legislators, police officers, lower court judges or juries.
Neil Katyal has noted a similar phenomenon that he labels "ex-
emplification," where the Supreme Court "uses judicial review
to strike down an act for its unconstitutionality, but then pro-
vides the legislature with a constitutional method to achieve the
same end."3 In essence, the Court tells lawmakers that they
missed the mark and then hands out a map for the legislature to
follow.
1. Federalism
The Supreme Court has occasionally issued constitutional
road maps when striking down federal law as beyond the enu-
merated powers of Article I. It is not an altogether surprising
technique in this context given the judicial reticence toward flat
bans on congressional legislation. New York v. United States, for
example, struck down a federal provision requiring states to
"take title" of undisposed radioactive waste produced within
their borders33 According to the Court, the dual boundaries of
the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment barred Con-
gress from commandeering state government, demanding local
enactment and enforcement of a national regulatory scheme.3
But Justice O'Connor's majority opinion "identified a variety of
methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may
urge a state to adopt a legislative program consistent with fed-
329 Frederick Schauer, Refining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 U.
MfCH.J.L. REFORM 1, 19 (1983).
SId.
"' Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges asAdvicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1718 (1998).
S12 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 956-57 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("the presumption of validity that supports all congressional enactments has
added force with respect to policy judgments concerning the impact of a federal stat-
ute upon the respective States").
3" New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down a provision of
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-
j).
" Id. at 159-66.
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eral interests."3 5 Congress might condition the receipt of fed-
eral funds on state adoption of a waste disposal program, for in-
stance, or it might give state government the option of
managing radioactive waste consistent with national standards
or having its law pre-empted by federal regulation.3 6
Justice O'Connor issued a similar road map a few years
later, this time in a concurrence in Printz v. United States.3.7 In
that case, the Court struck down provisions of the Brady Hand-
gun Violence Prevention Act requiring local law enforcement to
conduct background checks on prospective gun purchasers.338
In her separate opinion, O'Connor argued that this "does not
spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act, 3 9 as Congress
might condition federal largesse on state oversight of handgun
transactions.
2. Abortion
Probably the most (in)famous constitutional road maps are
found in the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence. In Roe v.
Wade,m° the Court invalidated most criminal abortion statutes as
they then existed in 1972, arguing that these laws impermissibly
encroached on a woman's rights to privacy and reproductive
freedom. Justice Harry Blackmun's majority opinion then
sketched out a three-part scheme consistent with substantive
due process: (1) the states cannot limit access to abortion in
the first trimester; (2) the states may regulate abortion after the
first trimester "in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health"; and (3) the states may prohibit abortion after viability
"except where it is necessary... for the preservation of the life
or health of the mother.
3 41
" Id. at 166.
See id. at 167-68.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
's Id. at 933.
"9 Id. at 936 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
3"0 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
" Id. at 164-65. For a statutory example adopting the language of Roe, see 22 ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598 (West 1999) ("After viability an abortion may be per-
formed only when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."). But
see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-79 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (affirming the "essential holding of Roe v. Wade" but reject-
ing its "rigid trimester framework" in favor of an "undue burden" test).
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Seven years later, the Court struck down a statute prohibit-
ing an unmarried minor from receiving an abortion without the
consent or notification of her parents. The plurality opinion in
Bellotti v. Baird4 2 held that a state must provide an alternative le-
gal procedure that bypasses parental consent.4 In particular, a
pregnant minor is constitutionally entitled to a proceeding
where she can demonstrate: (1) sufficient maturity and knowl-
edge to make an independent decision or (2) an abortion
serves her best interests.
3. Pornography
After years of unprincipled, ad-hoc adjudication of pornog-
raphy cases,34 the Supreme Court issued a road map in 1973
specifically detailing what types of sexually explicit materials can
and cannot be banned consistent with the First Amendment. In
that case, Miller v. California,*46 the Court essentially crafted a
patterned jury instruction for obscenity prosecutions.347 It then
gave examples of what a legislature might prohibit: (1)
"[p] atently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated," and (2)
"[p]atently offensive representations or descriptions of mastur-
bation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the geni-
tals.
' 48
3"2 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
343 Id. at 643.
'4' Id. at 643-44. For statutory examples adopting the Belotti formulation, see A.
CODE § 26-21-4 (2000); GA. CODEANN. § 15-11-114 (2000).
341 See text and notes 421-31, infra (describing pre-Miller approach to sexually ex-
plicit materials).
3" 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
'' The Court stated:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted).
54, Id. at 25. See Part IV.D.1, infra (analyzing Miller road map); note 460, infra (list-
ing statutes adopting Millerformulation).
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4. Syndicalism
For a half-century, the Supreme Court had struggled with
the First Amendment's implications for subversive speech and
advocacy of unlawful conduct, analyzing syndicalism-type stat-
utes under varying constitutional tests. 49 In 1969, the Court fi-
nally settled on a workable standard in Brandenberg v. Ohio.50
That case involved the prosecution of a Ku Klux Klan leader
under a broad state syndicalism statute35l In a per curium opin-
ion, the Court struck down the Ohio law but also laid out the
'"9 See, e.g., Schenkv. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a na-
ture as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.");
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668, 670 (1925) (holding that "a State in the exer-
cise of its police power may punish those who abuse [expressive] freedom by utter-
ances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime,
or disturb the public peace," and "when the legislative body has determined gener-
ally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind
involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question
whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of
itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration"); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion) (adoptingJudge Learned
Hand's interpretation of the clear-and-present-danger test as "whether the gravity of
the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger"); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 321-22 (1957)
(holding that "indoctrination of a group in preparation for future violent action, as
well as exhortation to immediate action, by advocacy found to be directed to 'action
for the accomplishment' of forcible overthrow, to violence as 'a rule or principle of
action,' and employing 'language of incitement,' is not constitutionally protected
when the group is of sufficient size and cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented towards
action, and other circumstances are such as reasonably to justify apprehension that
action will occur," but "that mere doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow....
even though uttered with the hope that it may ultimately lead to violent revolution, is
too remote from concrete action to be regarded as the kind of indoctrination pre-
paratory to action" unprotected by the First Amendment); Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203, 234 (1961) (indicating "at least two patterns of evidence sufficient to show
illegal advocacy: (a) the teaching of forceful overthrow, accompanied by directions
as to the type of illegal action which must be taken when the time for the revolution is
reached; and (b) the teaching of forceful overthrow, accompanied by a contempo-
rary, though legal, course of conduct clearly undertaken for the specific purpose of
rendering effective the later illegal activity which is advocated").
-"0 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
... The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute prohibited "'advocat[ing] ... the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism
as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform' and for 'voluntarily as-
sembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or ad-
vocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.'" Id. at 444-45 (quoting OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.13).
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boundaries of permissible legislation: "[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law vio-
lation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producin-
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
It then dropped a footnote suggesting that the federal Smith
Act had been upheld in prior cases precisely because of the dis-
tinction between "mere advocacy" and the incitement of immi-
nent lawlessness. s Not surprisingly, subsequent syndicalism-
type statutes have- obeyed the Court's formulation. 4
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ROAD MAPS: A PREuMINARYASSESSMENT
The Supreme Court has created constitutional road maps in
other contexts as well, from voting rights to involuntary servi-
tude.s55 Seminal decisions such as New York Times v. Sullivan
3 56
and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke" 7 offered varia-
tions on the road mapping strategy--for libel laws and affirma-
tive action statutes, respectively. But the Court's criminal
312 Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
' ' Id. at 447 n.2 (discussing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)).
"' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-114 (2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 151 (Deering 2000);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (1999); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 83 (1999); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-105 (1999); 21 OxLA. STAT. § 850 (1999).
"' See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 84 (1932) (participation in political parties);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 237, 239, 245 (1911) (criminal penalties for breach
of contract). See also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1922) (congressional regula-
tion of futures markets); Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 463, 498 (1908)
(congressional regulation of common carriers); United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82,
96-97 (1879) (congressional regulation of trade-marks).
"6 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
117 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
' It must be noted that neither New York Times nor Bakke involved legislation,
strictly speaking. Instead, the former case concerned a civil action "that is common
law only, though supplemented by statute," New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265, while the
latter decision focused on the rules promulgated by "a corporation administering a
university." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 366 n.42 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting). Nonetheless, both cases placed boundaries on the lawmaking
function by suggesting a line between permissible and unconstitutional legislation.
For a statutory example using the New York Times formulation, see UTAH CODE ANN. §
45-2-3 (2000) (requiring evidence of malice for defamation claims against the press).
For an example applying the Bakke formulation, see CAL. CONST. art. 9, § 9(d) (2000)
("Regents shall be able persons broadly reflective of the economic, cultural, and so-
cial diversity of the state, including ethnic minorities and women. However, it is not
intended that formulas or specific ratios be applied in the selection of regents.").
procedure jurisprudence has largely3 59 eschewed this approach,
possibly for lack of statutes governing the conduct of law en-
forcement or out of sensitivity for the exigencies of criminal jus-
tice.
Reticence was lacking in Morales, however, with Justice
O'Connor explicitly suggesting legislative alternatives to Chi-
cago's original gang-loitering ordinance. As such, it might have
foreshadowed further use of the road mapping strategy in other
areas of criminal procedure. Dickerson seemed to present just
such an opportunity: The Miranda opinion had invited "sound
efforts at reform, yet Congress responded with a constitu-
tionally dubious statute. If the Court felt compelled to invali-
date 3501 but remained faithful to the Miranda invitation-and
if it wanted to promote (or at least not discourage) political dia-
logue on confession law-then a constitutional road map in
Dickerson might have instigated a fresh round of debates on the
appropriate limits of custodial interrogation. In the end, the
Supreme Court chose a more standard path: invalidation with-
out legislative guidance.
Which brings us back to the basic issue-the propriety of
judge-made road maps for enacting valid legislation. The an-
swer depends, I believe, on three questions:
(1) Are constitutional road maps everpermissible?
(2) If so, when should constitutional road maps be used?
(3) Assuming an appropriate case, how should constitu-
tional road maps be used?
3'9 As I have defined it, a constitutional road map accompanies the Court's invali-
dation of legislation. Because of, inter alia, the relative dearth of statutory schemes
governing criminal procedure, there are few road mapping examples in this area.
But if the definition was expanded to include detailed, legislative-like guidelines for
lower courts and law enforcers, a number of Supreme Court cases would be consistent
with the road mapping strategy. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967) (articulating detailed procedures before court-appointed appellate counsel
can withdraw because the case is "wholly frivolous"); Smith v. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. 746,
759 (2000) (holding "that the Anders procedure is merely one method of satisfying
the requirements of the Constitution for indigent criminal appeals" and that the
"States may-and, we are confident, will-craft procedures that, in terms of policy,
are superior to, or at least as good as, that in Anders").
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
1192 ERTK L UNA [Vol. 90
CONSTITUTIONAL ROAD MAPS
This Part will examine each of these questions in turn. It will
then consider the road mapping strategy in distinct cases and,
in particular, the decisions in Morales and Dickerson.
A. WHETHER TO USE
Constitutional road maps present a fairly narrow concern
within a much larger debate on interaction between the courts
and the political branches. The overarching problem has been
variously described by commentators,361 but for the most part,
judge-made road maps merely iterate the challenges posed by
nonessential opinion writing and creative uses of dicta. With
this in mind, here are some of the leading arguments both for
and against the road mapping strategy:
Interbranch Dialogue and Judicial Efficiency. Advocates would
likely begin with the dialogic value of road maps, their ability to
promote discourse between the judiciary and the other
branches of government. Rather than locking out political solu-
tions, this approach leaves the door ajar and tacitly invites legis-
lative reenactment consistent with the Court's opinion. Road
maps openly share constitutional concerns with those institu-
tions charged with making and enforcing law, refracting issues
with judicial insight rather than merely reflecting them back to
the political branches. This strategy thereby allows legislation
that can survive constitutional challenges rather than leaving
lawmakers in the lurch.
Legal commentators can disagree, however, on whether a
given road map has heightened dialogue or merely increased
hostilities. Barry Friedman has suggested that Roe v. Wade
62
"generated a highly interactive process of legislative enactment-
federal court response, tailoring the areas in which states could
regulate the abortion process.",363 But according to then-Judge
"' See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
995, 995 (1987) (describing problem as "the failure of Congress to review and revise
statutes that slip from the judges' grasp"); Schauer, Refining the Lawmaking Function,
supra note 329, at 24 (1983) (describing problem as the need for "more guidance and
more attention to the needs of those who must follow [the Court's] lead"); Shirley S.
Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in
Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1056 (1991) (describing problem as
whether "the courts [should] use their opinions as a vehicle to draw legislative atten-
tion to statutory deficiencies").
362 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 Barry Friedman, Dialogue andJudicial Review, 91 MCH. L. REv. 577, 663 (1993).
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Roe "invited no dialogue with legislators"
and instead "remove [d] the ball from the legislators' court."
' '3
The problem, then, is not only uncertainty about the seemliness
of constitutional road maps as a judicial strategy but also the
appropriate definition and scope of dialogic deliberation in
government.
If dialogue means ensuring legislative responses compatible
with a judicial vision of permissible statutes, then judge-made
road maps clearly fit the bill. Lawmakers are given advice ex
ante instead of largely unconstructive disapproval ex post. It is
possible to imagine a succession of statutes on a given issue,
each struck down without guidance on what the Constitution
would allow-a type of "close but no cigar" method of judicial
review. At best this approach would be frustrating; at worst, de-
bilitating to the legislative function. In contrast, constitutional
road maps focus dialogue on the possible rather than the im-
permissible. Suggested legislative strategies, however, are just
that-suggestions. Obiter dictum lacks the binding quality of a
judgment or its constituent parts and may be discarded by legis-
lators."5 Nor is dictum stare decisis in subsequent cases and may
be reevaluated or flatly rejected by future Courts.6
If instead interbranch dialogue means spurring discussion
between the political branches and the citizenry about the vari-
ous options available to lawmakers and the fitness of each alter-
native, road maps seem far from dialogic. Conversation is not
guaranteed, only judicial instructions and legislative acceptance.
In this sense, road maps amount to commands, not conversa-
tions, akin to parent-child interaction rather than dialogue be-
tween co-equal partners.
Separation of Powers and Advisory Opinions. Opponents of
constitutional road maps would probably appeal to the textual,
structural, and practical limitations of the judiciary. Article III
of the Constitution has been interpreted as restricting federal
court jurisdiction to live "cases or controversies" and conversely
"" Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. RIv. 1185, 1205
(1992).
"5 See United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439,
463 n. 11 (1993) (emphasizing "the need to distinguish an opinion's holding from its
dicta").
'6 See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 714 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("Those statements are dicta, to be sure, and thus
not binding on us as stare decisis.").
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precluding advisory opinions on issues not properly before the
Court. 7 In other words, federal judges are empowered to issue
judgments (i.e., "affirmed," "reversed," "remanded," etc.) and
the necessary justifications but have no authority to speculate on
how they might decide a hypothetical controversy. A constitu-
tional road map presents precisely that vice by suggesting the
Court's predisposition toward statutes that have not been raised
by the litigants nor even enacted by the legislature. 69
The structure of the Constitution suggests a related im-
pediment in the separation of powers doctrine. Article I explic-
itly vests "all legislative powers" ° "in Congress while the balance
of the original document makes no mention of sharing the
lawmaking function with any other institution. Instead, the
constitutional scheme was intended to prevent the "accumula-
tion of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands"3 71 and, "by means of the inevitable friction incident
to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy. 3 72  Constitu-
tional road maps would seem to violate the separation of powers
by usurping the legislative function: The Court is, for all intents
and purposes, constructing a statute rather than rendering
judgment.373
" See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947) (noting "the
Court's refusal to render advisory opinions"); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring) ("The Court has frequently called
attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the validity
of an act of Congress; and has restricted exercise of this function by rigid insistence
that the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual cases and controversies; and
that they have no power to give advisory opinions.").
See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-67 (3d ed. 1988) (detailing the Supreme Court's refusal in 1793 to
issue an advisory opinion on an American treaty with France).
'6 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 6 (1959):
The duty [of the Court] is not that of policing or advising legislatures or executives, nor
even, as the uninstructed think, of standing as an ever-open forum for the ventilation of all
grievances that draw upon the Constitution for support. It is the duty to decide the liti-
gated case and to decide it in accordance with the law, with all that that implies as to rigor-
ous insistence on the satisfaction of procedural and jurisdictional requirements ....
"70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
37' THEFEDERA STNo. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Rossiter ed., 1961).
"' Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
373 See LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRrr OF LiBERTY 109 (1953):
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Advocates of constitutional road maps can muster decent
arguments in rebuttal. Judicial advice to elected officials has
not only been allowed but encouraged throughout American
history, and the separation of powers was never intended to
hermetically seal the courts from the political branches."4
Functionalism has defeated formalism in the partition of gov-
ernment institutions, proponents might argue,- 5 ensuring "that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable gov-
ernment."3 76 Moreover, judges make law every day--in the la-
cunae of statutes, for example, or in the interpretation of open-
ended constitutional provisions. 7
Institutional Competence, Responsibility, and Legitimacy. Consti-
tutional road maps raise a more pragmatic question of institu-
tional competence-whether the judiciary has the tools and
materials to properly craft a statute.378 After all, legislatures can
conduct hearings and take expert testimony; can openly consult
[T]he judge must always remember that he should go no further than he is sure the gov-
ernment would have gone, had it been faced with the case before him. If he is in doubt,
he must stop, for he cannot tell that the conflicting interests of society for which he speaks
would have come to ajust result, even though he is sure that he knows what the just result
should be. He is not to substitute even hisjuster will for theirs; otherwise it would not be
the common will which prevails, and to that extent the people would not govern.
37' SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (James Madison) (Rossiter ed., 1961) (ar-
guing that Montesquieu's concept of the separation of powers "did not mean that
these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of
each other," but only that "the whole power of one department [cannot be] exercised
by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 48, at 1 (James Madison) (Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It was shown in the
last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legis-
lative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each
other."). See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725
(1996).
" See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REy. 573 (1984).
... Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,J.,
concurring).
377 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 10-11 (1921)
("I take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life. There, before us, is the
brew. Not a judge on the bench has not had a hand in the making."). See also
Schauer, Refining the Lawmaking Function, supra note 329, at 1 (noting that in "the le-
gal academy, denial of the Court's lawmaking activity is considered conclusive evi-
dence of professional incompetence").
' See generally Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to
Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998) (detailing the differences in institu-
tional competence between judges and legislators).
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with constituents and interested parties; can interact with execu-
tive officials and administrators regarding enforceability; and
can leave the particulars to professional draftsmen. In contrast,
most judges lack legislative experience; are limited in their de-
liberations to admissible materials or the trial record; cannot
freely confer with experts, political officials, or even the parties
to the litigation; are supported only by law clerks and court ad-
ministrators; and must draft any work product by themselves. 79
It is also possible that this judicial strategy can decrease po-
litical accountability and responsibility.m0 Constitutional road
maps might allow legislators to shirk their duties to fully investi-
gate the relevant social problem, to craft a workable solution
based on the totality of evidence, and to independently scruti-
nize a legislative proposal for constitutional defects. Likewise,
lawmakers could pass blame to the courts for programmatic
failures that they in good conscience should bear. It's not our
fault, legislators might cry; the courts gave us no other choice.
The ghost of Lochnei" ' looms large as well, with a counter-
majoritarian fear that judges will use the road-map approach to
thwart otherwise valid legislation in support of spurious rights.
38 2
"Courts are not representative bodies," Justice Frankfurter
warned. "They are not designed to be a good reflex of a demo-
cratic society."m Instead, the members of the Supreme Court
are appointed not elected, hold life tenure rather than a term
of years, and can heed or ignore popular sentiment as they
please. As a general matter, the Court recognizes the anti-
democratic nature of judicial review and seeks to avoid (or at
least limit) those decisions that could undermine its legitimacy.
Consistent with this institutional constraint, judge-made road
"7 Or, more likely, have their clerks (typically recent law school graduates) draft
the opinions for them. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglo-
rious Determinants ofJudicialBehavior, 68 U. QN. L. REv. 615, 628 (2000) ("there is little
doubt that law clerks have great influence in the way opinions are actually drafted,
since law clerks do most of the opinion writing for most of the Justices").
'" See Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1006-
07 (1924).
Lochnerv. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
S2 Cf BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 16-23 (defining the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty").
'a' Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (FrankfurterJ., concurring).
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maps might seem the treacherous product of "a third legislative
chamber" "ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians.
Weighing the Pros and Cons. The arguments for and against
constitutional road maps are neither theoretically compelling
nor facially ridiculous. One could envision a lively public dis-
course spurred by this approach, with legislators, executives,
and their constituents discussing various regulatory schemes
consistent with the Court's road map. Instead of stifling the de-
bate, the map might guide lawmakers through the strictures of
the Constitution and encourage creative solutions that avoid ar-
eas of personal liberty. Yet it is also possible to imagine the ju-
diciary hijacking the legislative process, becoming an imperial
super-lawmaker that can both strike down and redraft statutes at
will.3s Legislators may follow a road map in this scenario, not
from belief of constitutionality, but out of obedience to the
Court's commands.
A recurring problem is the appropriate definition of dia-
logue and whether the road mapping strategy furthers or im-
pedes the interaction between government institutions. Even
assuming a basic definition of dialogue in this context-en-
couraging action by the other branches of government, for in-
stance-I remain agnosticS toward the Supreme Court's role in
this conversation. I like discourse just as much as the next per-
son; it is, after all, how individuals of varying interests attain mu-
tually beneficial outcomes. But there are always limits to a good
thing, 7 and so it is with interbranch dialogue: A healthy tripar-
tite scheme of government requires a conversation among the
14 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 42, 7 3 (1958).
m' See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (the
Court does "not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to de-
cide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare"); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("We do not sit as a super-legislature to deter-
mine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, busi-
ness affairs, or social conditions.").
" Cf SANFORD LEVINSON, CoNSTrTnYIONAL FAITH 27-53 (1988) (drawing a parallel
between the Catholic-Protestant divide over religious authority and the debate over
Supreme Court supremacy in constitutional interpretation).
' Baseball slugger Reggie Jackson might have put it best in his analysis of flame-
throwing pitcher Nolan Ryan: "Every hitter likes fastballs like everybody likes ice
cream. But you don't like it when somebody's stuffing it into you by the gallon." Tim
Sullivan, Ryan Induction Adds Heat to the Moment; Fiery Fastball Scorched Hitters,
CINCiNNATI INQtIRER, July 25, 1999, at D1.
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judiciary, the legislature, and the executive-yet too much de-
bate can lead to acrimonious friction or an unintelligible din.
Sometimes the Court should be Scalia's "nine-headed Cae-
sar, giving thumbs up or thumbs down""" on a particular issue-
providing judgment and little else-only to chariot away from
the (political) forum.3 Although the other branches have be-
come accustomed to, if not dependent on, the give-and-take
among lawmakers and law enforcers, courts are strangers to this
partisan process of debate and compromise.3' For any number
of prudential reasons, sometimes it is best that judges stay on
the sidelines rather than venturing into the political rumble.39'
In the abstract, then, it is well near impossible to discern
whether this approach is a helpful jurisprudential tool or a
harmful distortion of the constitutional design. At a minimum,
road maps are theoretically problematic for the strict construc-
tionist and potentially dangerous in practice from institutional
incompetence or the specter of illegitimacy. 2 But the question
is not whether road maps are usually inappropriate-which may
well be true-but whether they are always inappropriate. And
given the rough balance of arguments, reasonable minds could
differ. 93
Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2342 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
The Court's desegregation decisions presented just such an occasion. Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See section IV.D.2, infra (discussing Brown I & I1).
"0 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when
courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibil-
ity in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures.").
'"" Cf Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 292 (arguing for passive virtues of
avoidance); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-54 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing avoidance doctrines). But see Gerald Gunther, The
Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues, 64 COLTM. L. REv. 1 (1964) (arguing against passive
virtues).
3' Cf LON L. FULLER, THE MoRAuTY OF LAW 82 (1964) ("All of the influences that
can produce a lack of congruence between judicial action and statutory law can,
when the court itself makes law, produce equally damaging departures from other
principles of legality: a failure to articulate reasonably clear general rules and an in-
constancy in decision manifesting itself in contradictory rulings, frequent changes of
direction, and retrospective changes in the law.").
... As an aside, constitutional road maps seem substantially less intrusive on legis-
latures than judicial decisionmaking in other nations. For example, the West Ger-
man Constitutional Court held in 1975 that the legislature could not repeal its
criminal abortion law. See MARYANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS
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B. WHEN TO USE
Assuming in arguendo that constitutional road maps might
be an acceptable judicial tool, at least in certain circumstances,
the question becomes one of discretion: When might the Court
properly employ the road mapping strategy? "Rarely" offers a
true but not altogether helpful response, as it seems clear that
road maps should be the exception and not the norm. In addi-
tion to concerns ofjudicial aptitude and legitimacy, frequent re-
liance on the mapping approach might well agitate the political
branches or become the unheeded cry of wolf. With that said,
however, the problem might be informed with factors or pat-
terns indicating that a given constitutional road map will attain
the advantages of interbranch dialogue while minimizing poten-
tial danger.
Judicial Competence. A suitable starting point for analysis is
the relative competence of the Court vis-A-vis lawmakers on a
particular issue. As just suggested, the judicial and legislative
branches diverge sharply in training, experience, and informa-
tion. Legislators must stay in tune with popular sentiment in
setting agendas and seeking reelection, for example, while
courts enjoy political insularity in the largely closed universe of
"cases or controversies." In turn, judges are constantly chal-
lenged by questions of litigation procedure that rarely (if ever)
face lawmakers.
The problem, then, is how to disaggregate the comparative
fitness of these institutions at a given task. On the most basic
level, courts seem skilled at dichotomous yes-no/either-or ques-
tions--guilty or not guilt, for instance-as well as issues of
amount, such as the damages to be awarded in a particular case.
By contrast, they are ill-suited for assessing the merits of various
social policies and allocating government largesse among com-
peting interests. These "polycentric"' ' issues are best left to po-
litical institutions with extensive fact-finding capacity and a
knack for the art of the horse trade. Consider also those deci-
sions that require flexibility, expediency, and definitiveness, in-
86-106 (1985) (reprinting decision). Consider also a section of the Swiss Civil Code
explicitly stating that if a rule cannot be discerned from either statutory or customary
law, the judge may act "according to the rule which he would establish as legislator."
Id. at 221.
.. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353
(1978). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153,
184-85 (1986) (critiquing Fuller's distinction between polycentric and bipolar issues).
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cluding foreign affairs and the use of military force. Out of
prudence, these matters have been denominated "political
questions" reserved to the political branches.5
Individual rights provide another area of actual or alleged
competence. As a practical matter, federal judges are called
upon to construe and apply certain constitutional provisions in
their regular course of business. Occasional opportunities to in-
terpret the Fourth Amendment, for example, offer the judiciary
a level of familiarity with search-and-seizure principles not avail-
able in legislative halls. And as a matter of theory, the Court has
maintained a decisive power to protect certain basic freedoms.
"One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the out-
come of no elections."'' 6 The Court may also have a special ob-
ligation to protect "discrete and insular minorities" and remedy
defects in the legislative process that obstruct political change.1
97
Definitive Guidance. A second group of factors concerns the
need for convincing and conclusive leadership from the Su-
preme Court. The judiciary generally operates at a cautious
pace, methodical in case management and painstaking in delib-
erations. But some issues naturally raise the stakes of litigation
and call for prompt action. For instance, Professor Schauer
suggests that the Court should avoid "a state of uncertainty" in
judgments on school financing, given the large consequences
for millions of Americans.""8 A similar argument can be made
on important issues of criminal justice. With untold lives in the
' See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (ordering the dismissal of suit
against the President challenging his power to terminate treaties).
3 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). See
Schauer, Incentives, supra note 379, at 627 ("Although the Supreme Court deals with a
host of questions about separation of powers, federalism, and statutory interpretation,
... the bulk of the Supreme Court's business, and an even higher proportion of its
most publicly visible business, deals with claims of individual rights under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.... [T] he Supreme Court
... exists as an institution of rights protection and with a consequent internal culture
of rights protection.").
39 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See gen-
erallyJoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACYAND DIsTRUST (1980). See also Erik Luna, The Models
of Criminal Procedur 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 389, 442-47 (1999) (describing political
process theory); Erik Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DuKE L.J. 787, 804-09 (1999)
(same).
s' See Schauer, Refining the LawmakingFunction, supra note 329, at 23.
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balance-suspects, defendants, past and future victims, and so
on-the criminal process seems to require a greater level of at-
tentiveness than its civil counterpart. Admittedly, civil litigation
often concerns major social policy issues affecting countless in-
dividuals. Yet the Microsoft anti-trust case,* for example, can
be conducted at a substantially slower gait than a death penalty
appeal with only days before execution. Criminal prosecu
tions also face a double-eopardy bar precluding appellate re-
view after an acquittal; 1 unlike civil litigation, there is no
second chance once the jury says "not guilty."
4 02
Frequently confronted issues require definitive guidance as
well. "[T] o the extent that the situation is extremely common,"
Professor Schauer notes, "then the possibility of continuing ju-
dicial supervision, refinement and reevaluation is nonexist-
ent."40 3  Fourth Amendment litigation often presents such
problems, with the Justices reviewing only a small fraction of
search and seizure challenges despite their ubiquity in the lower
judiciary.0 4 The realities of law enforcement also favor clear di-
rections from the Court, as "[a] single, familiar standard is es-
sential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
39 See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 25 (2000) (mem.) (denying cer-
tiorari before judgment).
410 Cf John T. Noonan, Horses of the Night: Harris v. Vasquez, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1011,
1017-20 (1993) (describing hurried litigation prior to the execution of Robert Alton
Harris). See also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 381 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("Virginia is now pursuing an execution schedule that leaves less time for argument
and for Court consideration than the Court's rules provide for ordinary cases.");
Clark v. Collins, 502 U.S. 1052, 1052 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of stay
of execution) ("The compressed schedule has denied state and federal courts the
opportunity to review filings with adequate time for reflection, much less to review
the record, or even to receive a full response from the State.").
40 U.S. CONsr. amend. VI (no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 717 (1969) (noting that the double jeopardy clause "protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal").
402 Another important category involves cases "capable of repetition, yet evading
review," such as abortion litigation. The Court, however, has made a jurisdictional
exception in such circumstances, as "pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much
beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied." Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).




expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual in-
terests involved in the specific circumstances they confront., 40°
The Supreme Court may have a similar responsibility when
the risks of litigation tend to suppress creative solutions by Con-
gress or the States. "Some people assert that our present plight
is due, in part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimen-
tation in the fields of social and economic science," argued Jus-
tice Louis Brandeis in 1932. 40 Just as it (initially) stifled New
Deal legislation, the Court can silence reform efforts by summa-
rily striking down laws without indicating those options left
open. Conversely, it can encourage continued experimentation
in the face of an unconstitutional statute by suggesting alterna-
tive means to the same end . 7
Three additional factors support definitive guidance within
an opinion. First, the Court can jettison case-by-case analysis of
a thorny issue, preferring deference to trial courts without me-
ticulous oversight from above. In such circumstances, the Su-
preme Court provides guidelines for other decisionmakers and
then vacates the field out of concern for its own institutional
competence and capital. Second, detailed advice can mollify
legislators who took their cue from a previous case. When strik-
ing down legislation that had been inspired by a prior decision,
the Court may feel obligated to highlight the deficiency and
suggest other options consistent with the Constitution. Finally,
the Supreme Court can feel more confident in crafting precise
rules if the trial-court record is fully developed, the relevant is-
403 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979)). But see Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imper-
fect World: On Drawing 'Bright Lines' and 'Good Faith,' 43 U. Prr. L. REV. 307 (1983)
(critiquing the bright-line drawn by the Belton Court).
6 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
407 When the Court struck down a statute imposing a tax on futures contracts for
grain, for instance, it simultaneously suggested that Congress' power over interstate
commerce might encompass similar legislation if supported by the legislative record.
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1922). Federal lawmakers followed the constitu-
tional road map and enacted a new statute that was subsequently upheld by the
Court. Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). See E.F. Albertsworth, Advisory
Functions in Federal Supreme Court, 23 GEo. LJ. 643, 651-52 (1935). But more recent
examples have been less successful; Congress did not reenact the nuclear waste provi-
sion struck down in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and has yet to
pass a background-check statute to replace the one invalidated in Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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sue has been explored at length by the lower courts, and the
Justices can predict future controversies with a degree of cer-
tainty. Such circumstances reduce the risk of imperfect fit be-
tween a given rule and the problem it was intended to solve.0 8
Institutional Efficiency. Some of the factors just considered
also have relevance in evaluating the relative costs and benefits
of a given constitutional road map. To the extent that a particu-
lar strategy reduces either the number of court challenges or
expedites judicial review of those challenges, the legal system
will experience an efficiency gain. If the Supreme Court sets
out a bright-line rule in automobile searches, 09 for instance, it
may reduce the amount of time spent by trial courts litigating
that issue.410 In turn, if the Court is solely concerned with its
own economics-such as the number of decisions needed to re-
solve a point of law--detailed guidance in an initial opinion
may lessen the load on future dockets.
Efficiency analysis can also be viewed from the legislative
perspective. The road mapping approach seems particularly
apt, for example, when the constitutional flaw is small or tech-
nical. While a terse opinion might leave legislators guessing as
to the location and size of the defect, a road map points out the
exact problem and suggests potential remedies. The legislature
can then focus its energy on correcting rather than finding the
defect. Likewise, the road mapping strategy may be invaluable
if the only apparent alternative is tinkering with the Constitution.
The Article V amendment process is deliberately stubborn, en-
suring that changes to the original design attach only after pro-
tracted deliberation and concerted efforts.411 But if the Court
believes that a regular statute could suffice despite appearances
to the contrary, a constitutional road map can avoid perceptions
of legislative impotence or unnecessary alterations to the Con-
stitution.
The context of legislation and litigation can offer insight as
well. When a statute is of recent vintage, passed with strong en-
dorsements, the road mapping approach may catch that politi-
41 See Schauer, Refining the LawmakingFunction, supra note 329, at 8.
41 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
4,0 If the rule turns out to be a poor one, however, the Court may create more
work for itself and the lower judiciary in ferreting out the precise definition and ap-
plication of the rule's terms.
411 See note 9, supra.
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cal support before it has ebbed and thereby facilitate a legisla-
tive response. In contrast, an old, idle law is unlikely to be re-
vived by lawmakers pursuant to a constitutional road map. As a
general rule, legislators rarely correct statutory lapses and
vagueness, preferring to make new laws rather than fix old
412
ones.
Reenactment, with or without guidance from the judiciary,
is more likely when the decision itself sparks attention and
stimulates popular demands for a political response. "Legisla-
tive action will probably occur," one state supreme court justice
suggests, "when the decision has received media attention, when
one or more legislators or legislative committees become inter-
ested in the subject, when there is near unanimity that the court
decision is wrong, when a powerful interest group or govern-
mental agency is affected by the decision and seeks legislative
relief, or when the decision arouses passionate response among
various constituencies. 41 3 The difficult question for the Court,
then, is whether a constitutional road map provides needed en-
couragement or will instead be ignored by lawmakers. If the lat-
ter proves true, this judicial strategy will carry all the baggage of
creative dicta without any instrumental value to the political
branches and the public.
Judicial Legitimacy. A final factor in assessing a constitutional
road map-or, for that matter, any other judicial strategy-is its
effect on the perceived legitimacy of the Court. Lacking demo-
cratic accountability, financial autonomy, and independent
means of enforcement, the judiciary relies heavily on popular
compliance through apparent authority of the institution and
its commands. History demonstrates that the greatest chal-
lenges to the Supreme Court-such as President Roosevelt's
Court-packing proposa 1-are frequently linked to appear-
ances of illegitimacy.45  Decisions on hot-button social issues
412 See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary In-
quiry, 60 NoTRE DAmE L. REv. 947, 995 (1985).
"' Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 361, at 1055.
4,1 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 183-85
(13th ed. 1997) (detailing the Court-packing plan); FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 273,
at 67-75 (same).
"' See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862 (1992) (noting that,
because of Lochner, "the Court lost something by its misperception, or its lack of pre-
science, and the Court-packing crisis only magnified the loss"); id. at 960 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[Lochnerwas overruled] at a time when Congress was considering Presi-
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have also provoked loud, sometimes violent responses by the
public and political branches.4 6 But given the moral virtue of
some judgments, 7 the question of legitimacy suggests caution
rather than categorical abstention.
Three points bear mentioning. First, prior court decisions
and political acts often create reliance interests in the general
population. To the extent that overruling a case or invalidating
legislation threatens public dependence on the status quo, the
Court will diminish citizen confidence and thereby undermine
the legitimacy of judicial review. Second, the authority to craft
detailed rules for the political branches seems intimately tied to
the source of those rules. By staying close to the text of the
Constitution and the core policies underlying a particular provi-
sion, the Supreme Court is more likely to be perceived as faith-
ful interpreter rather than social engineer. Finally, just as the
Constitution is no "suicide pact,""" the Court is not bound to
any strategy that threatens its ability to "do justice" in future
cases.
C. HOW TO USE
Assuming an appropriate case presents itself to the Court,
the final question is how to employ the road mapping strategy.
A preliminary issue is a road map's position within the decision
itself. By my count, the strategy can be incorporated in at least
five distinct locations:
(1) the majority opinion;
dent Franklin Roosevelt's proposal to 'reorganize' this Court and enable him to name
six additional Justices in the event that any Member of the Court over the age of 70
did not elect to retire. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the Court would
face more intense opposition to a prior ruling than it did at that time. ").
41 See, e.g., Note, Safety Valve Closed: The Removal of Nonviolent Outlets for Dissent and
the Onset of Anti-Abortion Violence, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1210, 1211 (2000) ("[Plrior to Roe,
[abortion opponents] relied almost exclusively on legislative action to effect change.
Roe removed this principal nonviolent outlet, and the first wave of anti-abortion vio-
lence in American history ensued.").
417 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4,8 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981) ("[W]hile the Constitution protects
against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.") (quoting Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)).
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(2) a portion of the Court's opinion lacking majority sup-
port;
(3) a concurrence supported by swing votes necessary for
the judgment;




In choosing among these points of insertion, two competing
interests are at stake-intrusiveness versus authoritativeness. A
road map within the majority oginion, for instance, carries the
Supreme Court's full authority. ° There is no legislative guess-
work when five or more Justices advocate political alternatives
consistent with the Constitution; simply adopt its suggestions
and the Court will be inclined to defer. On the other hand, this
approach maximizes the potential for interbranch conflict pre-
cisely because its carries the imprimatur of the Supreme Court
rather than a single Justice or two. If such a road map is viewed
as judicial legislation, it cannot be shaken off as the wayward
opinion of a mistaken jurist and instead might become a symbol
of illegitimate activism.
In contrast, road maps contained within dissenting opinions
would seem to have limited instrumental value. The general
power of road mapping comes from the Court's suggestion that,
despite striking down the statute under consideration, a differ-
ent alternative might survive constitutional scrutiny. But a dis-
senting opinion offers little encouragement to lawmakers, as it
lacks the support of those votes necessary to uphold future legis-
lation. In between the extremes are less authoritative but also
less intrusive means of delivering a constitutional road map. A
concurrence, for example, does not cast the Court's full weight
'1 It seems possible, of course, to have variations on the road mapping dissent,
classified by the amount of support from other dissenting Justices. But given that
such road maps generally lack instrumental value to political actors-i.e., legislators
cannot merely adopt dissenting dicta and expect validation by the courts-I need not
belabor the potential variations here.
'2 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 331, at 1795 ("The general power of advicegiving is.
at its high when a majority ofJustices sign on to it.").
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behind a particular strategy but still offers a lightly veiled indica-
tor of its leanings, particularly when supported by swing votes.
Packaging a judicial strategy presents another considera-
tion. The language and tone of a road map are particularly im-
portant if the Court wants to inspire dialogue on the issue
without prompting political animosity or limiting potential al-
ternatives. An opinion might explicitly state that it does not
foreclose legislative solutions, for instance, and then suggest
possible options couched in accommodating terms (e.g., "ex-
amples of valid legislation might include . . ."). Real-world
models, such as legislation in other jurisdictions, could demon-
strate the road map's feasibility by pointing to successes in simi-
lar arenas. The overarching tenor of this strategy, then, should
be one of comity and cooperation with the political branches,
encouraging dialogue while tempering the sting of judicial re-
view.
One last caveat: The Court should be extremely careful in
its word choice and the potential pitfalls created by the phrasing
of a given road map. The precise language used in describing
an alternative may very well find its way into new law. This is, of
course, a variation on the "garbage in-garbage out" phenome-
non: A faulty road map will only breed equally flawed statutes.
D. APPLICATION
Using this framework, the advantages and disadvantages of
the road mapping strategy can be roughly assessed in the cir-
cumstances of a specific case. What has just been described,
however, is not an algorithm; it does not analyze with mathe-
matical certainty or produce ultimate conclusions. Instead, it
offers a non-exhaustive list of factors that should be weighed by
the Court in considering a constitutional road map. With that
in mind, this final section briefly examines two well-known cases
outside of criminal procedure and then evaluates the road
mapping strategy in the context of Morales and Dickerson.
1. Miller v. California
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court had consistently strug-
gled with the issue of obscenity prior to its 1973 decision in
Miller v. California.42 ' The problem's intractability4 22 had been
12, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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best illustrated some nine years earlier in an oft-quoted and
much derided passage by Justice Potter Stewart: "I shall not to-
day attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced within [unprotected obscenity]; and perhaps I
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when
I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
that."'23
In the years immediately preceding Miller, the Supreme
Court used an ad hoc approach to obscenity cases, issuing per
curiam reversals regardless of the underlying theory espoused by
each individual Justice.424 Between 1967 and 1973, 31 cases were
decided in this manner4H without acknowledging the actual
methodology used by the Court's members.4 2 6 'Year after year,
several of the Justices and most of the clerks went either into a
basement storeroom or to one of the larger conference rooms
to watch feature films that were exhibits in obscenity cases that
had been appealed to the Court.4 2 7 Other materials-"boxes of
magazines, books, an occasional set of glossy photos or playing
cards, 2 8 -circulated among the chambers. The Justices (or
their clerks) would then compare the alleged obscenity to their
own personal standard and either uphold or invalidate the
lower court conviction.42 As a consequence, the Supreme Court
42 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (describing "the intractable obscenity problem").
'2'Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (StewartJ, concurring).
41" See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 771 (1967) ("Whichever of [the justices'
individual] constitutional views is brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is clear
that the judgments cannot stand.").
' SeeMiller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 n.3 (1973).
426 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("By disposing of cases through summary reversal or denial of certiorari we have
deliberately and effectively obscured the rationale underlying the decisions.").
'2 BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 234 (1979).
42 Id. at 226-27.
"' See id. at 227, 229:
In the pending cases, [Justice] White's clerk checked to see whether the material violated
his boss's personal-definition of hard-core pornography. It was a definition thatWhite had
never written into an opinion-no erect penises, no intercourse, no oral or anal sodomy.
For White, no erections and no insertions equaled no pornography .... [Justice] Bren-
nan, like White, had his own private definition of obscenity: no erections. He was willing
to accept penetration as long as the pictures passed what his clerks referred to as the "limp
dick" standard. Oral sex was tolerable if there was no erection .... In Casablanca, as
watch officer for his ship [during World War II, Justice Stewart] had seen his men bring
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"resolve[d] cases as between the parties, but offer[ed] only the
most obscure guidance to legislation, adjudication by other
courts, and primary conduct."4  This approach consumed pre-
cious time and frustrated even the Court's most patient mem-
bers.43 '
The Miller decision drastically altered not only the legal
analysis of obscenity but also the Supreme Court's role in the ul-
timate conclusion. Acknowledging the legitimate interests on
both sides of the debate43 2 and the difficulty the Justices experi-
enced in delineating obscenity,43 the Court set out "to formu-
late standards more concrete than those in the past," "'
"abandon[ing] the casual practice of' its prior approach and
"attempt[ing] to provide positive guidance to federal and state
courts alike. "4ss It crafted a defactojury instruction for obscenity
prosecutions based in large part on prior decisions. 36 The Miller
Court then employed a road mapping strategy by offering legis-
lators "a few plain examples of what a state statute could define
for regulation.437
The potential sting of this constitutional road map was mod-
erated in three distinct ways. First, the Court "emphasize [d]
that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for the
back locally produced pornography. He knew the difference between the hardest of hard
core and much of what came to the Court. He called it his "Casablanca Test."
4'0 Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 83 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
43' As Justice Brennan allegedly lamented, "I'm sick and tired of seeing this god-
damn shit." WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 427, at 228.
112 Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 (noting that "the States have a legitimate interest in pro-
hibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene materials"); id. at 24 (noting "the in-
herent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression" and that "State
statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited").
" Id. at 22 ("Apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no majority of
the Court has at any time been able to agree on a standard to determine what consti-
tutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the States' police
power. We have seen 'a variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched
in any other course of constitutional adjudication."').
43 Id. at 20.
4" Id. at 29.
46 Id. at 24. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 435 (6th ed. 1996)
(CALJIC No. 16.182) (duplicating language from Miller to define "obscene material"
injury-instruction form).
417 Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. See text accompanying note 348, supra (quoting the
Court's examples).
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States," which "must await their concrete legislative efforts. " '4ss
Second, it listed "examples of state laws directed at depiction of
defined physical conduct, as opposed to expression," that would
seem to pass constitutional muster. The Court was careful,
however, to note that "[o]ther state formulations could be
equally valid in this respect" and that it did "not wish to be un-
derstood as approving of them in all other respects nor as estab-
lishing their limits as the extent of state power."'4 9 And finally,
the decision made clear that the Supreme Court was abdicating
primary responsibility to trial courts:" ° and that it would no
longer exercise case-by-case review of obscenity prosecutions.4 '
Neither the opinion 442 nor its road map443 was met with open-
arms by all members of the Court.4 " But from an institutional
"8 Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
"" Id. at 24 n.6.
41 Id. at 26 (noting that the Court must "rely on the jury system, accompanied by
the safeguards that judges, rules of evidence, presumption of innocence, and other
protective features provide"); id. at 30-34 (arguing in favor of "community standards"
to be applied by local juries).
41 See id. at 28-29:
Mr. Justice Brennan also emphasizes 'institutional stress' in justification of his change of
view. Noting that'[t]he number of obscenity cases on our docket gives ample testimony to
the burden that has been placed upon this Court,' he quite rightly remarks that the ex-
amination of contested materials 'is hardly a source of edification to the members of this
Court.' He also notes, and we agree, that 'uncertainty of the standards creates a continuing
source of tension between state and federal courts .... 'The problem is ... that one can-
not say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this Court, ap-
plying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so.' It is certainly true that the
absence, since Roth, of a single majority view of this Court as to proper standards for testing
obscenity has placed a strain on both state and federal courts. But today, for the first time
since Roth was decided in 1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on concrete guidelines
to isolate 'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment.
Now we may abandon the casual practice of Redrup v. New York, and attempt to provide
positive guidance to federal and state courts alike.
42 See id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Today we leave open the way for Califor-
nia to send a man to prison for distributing brochures that advertise books and a
movie under freshly written standards defining obscenity which until today's decision
were never the part of any law."); Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 73 (Brennan,J., dis-
senting).
43 Miller, 413 U.S. at 47 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("I need not now decide whether
a statute might be drawn to impose, within the requirements of the First Amendment,
criminal penalties for the precise conduct at issue here. For it is clear that under my
dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I, the statute under which the prosecution was brought is
unconstitutionally overbroad, and therefore invalid on its face.").
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perspective (and with perfect hindsight), the road mapping
strategy in Miller seems at least defensible. Justices on both sides
of the obscenity issue expressed concern with the Court's ad
hoc approach in prior cases.445 This methodology challenged
the Justices' competence as arbiters of good taste and the le-
gitimacy of the "Court's sitting as the Super Censor of all the
obscenity purveyed throughout the Nation."446 Conversely, the
Court faced little danger of political revolt by issuing guidelines
in a constitutional road map, as there were no powerful lobbies
behind pornography production nor an inherent legislative de-
sire to protect such materials. 7
There was a need, though, for definitive guidance to other
government actors and the public at large. Obscenity was a fre-
quently confronted problem in the Court, taxing its time and
patience, but generating only vague standards and confusion in
the lowerjudiciary.48 "We are back again before this Court," de-
fense counsel argued in Miller, "to discuss . . . the continuing
saga of life in the pits, or what goes on in the lower courts, be-
cause we don't know what, actually, this Court is saying with re-
spect to the pornographer."4 49 What prior decisions had done,
nonetheless, was set the stage for the Miller road map-demon-
strating the inadequacy of case-by-case analysis, offering the raw
.4.Journalists Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong describe a deeply divided
Court on the issue of obscenity, particularly in the machinations leading up to the
Miller decision. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 427, at 236-41, 290-300.
4"- See Millet 413 U.S. at 29; Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 92-93 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 427, at 228 (notingJustice
White's distaste for case-by-case adjudication).
... Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). See also
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 427, at 293 (quoting a political cartoon show-
ing "two gentlemen in black robes strolling along .... and one of them is saying, 'If it
turns me on it's smut"').
... Or at least Chief Justice Burger thought as much. See WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 427, at 239 ("I confess I do not see it as a threat to genuine
First Amendment values to have commercial porno-peddlers feel some unease ....
[A] little 'chill' will do some of the 'pornos' no great harm and it might be good for
the country.").
"8 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The
upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is that anyone who undertakes to examine
the Court's decisions since Roth which have held particular material obscene or not
obscene would find himself in utter bewilderment.").
"9 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 427,at 292.
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material for detailed rules,45 ° and reassuring the Court that the
issue had been fully developed by its own case law and that of
the lower courts. The road mapping strategy seemed particu-
larly apropos in Miller, as the California law in question "ap-
proximately incorporate [d]" a prior standard that was now
being abandoned by the Supreme Court.451
The most important advantages of the Miller road map were
efficiency gains for the Court and the political branches. By is-
suing a road map and then relinquishing primary responsibility
for review to the trial courts, it substantially lightened "the bur-
den that has been placed upon this Court" by "[t]he number of
obscenity cases on our docket. 4 52 Moreover, it was freed from
"spend [ing] an inordinate amount of time in the absurd busi-
ness of perusing and viewing the miserable stuff that pours into
the Court."53 The Justices would still have to refine the rough
contours of Miller, such as the type of "sexual conduct" that
might be deemed "patently offensive, 45 4 and the limits of "com-
munity standards."'4 55 For the most part, however, the road map
served its purpose: "As far as [Justice] White was concerned, the
[Miller approach] worked perfectly. The Justices still had to re-
view a few cases, but by and large, communities were enforcing
their own standards."4 6
4' See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (supporting its "jury instruction" with case cites).
... See id. at 23 ("The case we now review was tried on the theory that the Califor-
nia Penal Code § 311 approximately incorporates the three-stage Memoirs test. But
now the Memoirs test has been abandoned as unworkable by its author, and no Mem-
ber of the Court today supports the Memoirs formulation.")
412 Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 92 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To be clear, Jus-
tice Brennan was not advocating the Miller approach to obscenity but instead justify-
ing his change of heart to absolute protection for most sexually explicit materials. Id.
at 93 ("The severe problems arising from the lack of fair notice, from the chill on
protected expression, and from the stress imposed on the state and federal judicial
machinery persuade me that a significant change in direction is urgently required.").
... Ginsberg v. NewYork, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
... See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (explaining why the film
"Carnal Knowledge' could not be found under the Miller standards to depict sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way").
... See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987) (describing the "proper
inquiry" under Millets "community standards" prong).
"(, WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 427, at 332.
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Efficiency gains accrued to the political branches in two
ways. First, Miller gave prosecutors greater guidance in their
case selection, providing rough outlines of protected speech
where only scattered precedents and assorted tests existed be-
fore. And second, the road map offered concrete models of
valid legislation as well as referencing statutory schemes
adopted in other jurisdictions.4  The Court was nevertheless
accommodating and deferential in language,5 8 presenting only
"a few plain examples" 459 rather than unchangeable schemes. As
a consequence, the Miller road map suggested that legislatures
could efficiently enact a range of obscenity statutes that would
survive constitutional challenges. And, in fact, lawmakers have
subsequently crafted obscenity statutes consistent with the
Court's decision,460 demonstrating that the road map was a fea-
sible alternative.
457 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25, 24 n.6.
418 See text accompanying notes 437-39, supra.
... Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
46 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-190, -195, -200.1 (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
3501 (2000); ARE. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-68-302, -403, -501 (1999); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3505
(2000); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311, 312.1, 313 (2000); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-7-101, -
501, -601 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-193 (1999); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10 § 7201,
tit. 11 § 1364 (2000); FLA. STAT. §§ 365.161, 847.001 (2000); GA. CODEANN. §§ 16-12-
80, 16-12-102, 36-60-3 (2000); HAw. REV. STAT. § 712-1210 (2000); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-
1514, 18-4101, 52-103 (2000); 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/11-20, -21 (2000); IND. CODE §§
35-49-2-1, -2 (2000); IowA CODE §§ 728.1, 728.4, 904.310A (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
21-4301, -4301c (1999); KY. REV. STAT. § 531.010 (1998); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:106
(2000); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 §§ 2911, 2912, 2913 (1999); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
419 (1999); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 31 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 124.693,
722.674, 752.362 (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 617.241, 617.292 (1999); Miss. CODE ANN. §
97-29-103 (2000); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 573.010, 573.050, 573.090, 573.100 (1999);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-8-201, -205 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-807, -814 (2000);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.700, 201.235, 201.257 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
571-B:1, 650:1 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:34-2, -3 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-
37-1, -38-1 (2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.00, 235.20 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-
190.1, 14-190.13, 19-1.1, 19-12 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE, §§ 12.1-27.1-01, -02 (2000);
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01, 2919.22 (Anderson 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§
1024.1, 1040.12, 1040.18, 1040.75 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.087 (1999); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5903 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-31-1, 11-31-10, 42-43-3 (2000); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-260, -305, -375 (1999); S.D. CODnIED LAWS § 22-24-27 (2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-901, -1002 (1999); TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 43.21, .24 (2000);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1201, -1203 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2801 (2000);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-372, -390 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.48.050, 7.48A.010,
9.68.050, 9.68A.140 (2000); W. VA. CODE §§ 7-1-4, 8-12-5b, 61-8A-1 (2000); WIS. STAT.
§§ 134.46, 450.155, 944.21, 948.11 (1999); WYo. STAT. § 6-4-301 (2000).
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Let me make clear that Miller does not represent a norma-
tively superior stance on the appropriate protections for sexu-
ally explicit materials. I am no fan of "community standards"
when individual constitutional rights are at stake.46' Instead, the
consistently libertarian position of William 0. Douglas 62 seems
preferable to either ad hoc Supreme Court adjudication or def-
erence to criminal juries. But if we put aside the moral debate
surrounding Miller and instead examine the vehicle for deliver-
ing that decision, the constitutional road map seems to have
served its purposes without imposing undue institutional costs
on the Court. Legislatures were given guidance as to what they
could or could not ban, while the Justices lightened their docket
and largely eliminated the need for "movie day 463 at the Su-
preme Court.
2. Brown v. Board of Education
If Miller represents a case example conducive to the road
mapping strategy, the Court's desegregation decisions seem to
offer an opposing scenario. Following the Civil War, the "dark
days of slavery',4 64 gave way not to egalitarian government but to
a new era of racism under color of law. Involuntary servitude
was replaced by the Southern system of Jim Crow, ensuring ra-
cial segregation and subjugation backed by both official prose-
cution of Black Codes465 and private enforcement of the lynch
mob.4t Statutes separated the races in all facets of life, from
segregated railroad cars for colored patrons to segregated cor-
'6' See, e.g., Luna, Models of Criminal Procedure, supra note 397, at 454-76 (detailing
an "individual rights" model of criminal procedure); Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion,
supra note 397, 818-861 (similar).
462 Compare Millen 413 U.S. at 37-47 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), with Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
'6 SeeWOODWARtD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 427, at 233-35.
4" Frederick Douglass, The Civil Rights Case, Speech at the Civil Rights Mass-
Meeting Held at Lincoln Hall in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 22, 1883), in NEGRO SocIAt
AND POT.cAL.THOuGHT 1850-1920: REPRE SENTATrvETExTS 303 (Brotz ed., 1966).
46' "The Black Codes of 1865, passed in almost all of the states of the old Confed-
eracy, were meant to replace slavery with some kind of caste system and to preserve as
much as possible of the prewar way of life." FRIEDMAN, A HiSTORY OF AmRICAN LAW,
supra note 24, at 504.
'6 "The Ku Klux Klan terrorized the blacks. Ultimately, the South saw to it that
blacks did not vote or hold office. Blacks were relegated to a kind of peonage." Id. at
505. See also id. at 506-07 (describing the use of lynch mobs to suppress blacks).
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rections facilities for colored inmates. "Law and social custom
defined a place-a subordinate place-for blacks," legal histo-
rian Lawrence Friedman notes. "IT]hose who violated the code
were severely punished," while "[m]ajor infractions could mean
death. 467 In one of its darkest moments," even the Supreme
Court placed its imprimatur on racial segregation into "separate
but equal" facilities.469
Against this background, the NAACP forged a sophisticated
litigation strategy in the 1920's to undermine the "separate but
equal" doctrine and eventually force the Court to reconsider its
stance on segregation.7 Even supporters were skeptical of the
campaign's chances of success, as "the forces that keep the Ne-
gro under subjection will find some way of accomplishing their
purposes, law or no law."471 Undaunted, the NAACP proceeded
to attack "targets of opportunity,, 472 where it could clearly show
that the separate facilities were, in fact, not equal. Such a strat-
egy could chip away at segregation without a facial challenge to
the practice itself, thereby preventing an adverse judgment from
"an exceedingly conservative Supreme Court" or "engen-
der[ing] a violent backlash" from the Southern white establish-
ment.473 The result was a series of Court victories between 1938
and 1950 forcing the admission or accommodation of black
students in state universities. 4
467 Id. at 506.
"8 The ignobility of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding segrega-
tion), can only be met by that of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (uphold-
ing slavery).
419 See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548 ("enforced separation of the races, as applied to the
internal commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the
colored man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him
the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment"),
470 For excellent reviews of the NAACP's strategy, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JusncE (1975); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
41, KLUGER, supra note 470, at 132 (quoting Roger Baldwin of the ACLU).
47 TUSHNET, supra note 470, at 145.
47 KLUGER, supra note 470, at 134-37.
474 See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (striking down Mis-
souri law that denied African-American students admission to in-state law school but
paid their tuition to an out-of-state institution); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S.
631, 632 (1948) (holding that a qualified African-American student is "entitled to se-
cure legal education afforded by a state institution"); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,
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By 1954, the stage was set for the most important decision of
the twentieth century, Brown v. Board of Education.475 Before the
Court was a facial attack on Jim Crow-whether the states must
end racial segregation in public schools "even though the physi-
cal and other 'tangible' factors may be equal."476 In a short
opinion for a unanimous Court, ChiefJustice Warren suggested
that despite the "inconclusive nature of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment's history,, 477 there could be no doubt as to the im-
portance of education in modem America4 78 and segregation's
"detrimental effect upon the colored children. ,4 9  The Chief
Justice then concluded that "in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place," as "[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."'48
What was admittedly lacking, however, was clear guidance
for government officials. 81 There was no constitutional road
map for local or state legislators on integrating public schools
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment; instead, the Court
simply informed the nation that segregation was unconstitu-
tional without suggesting political solutions. The Supreme
Court did consider legal remedies the very next term, emphati-
cally restating that "[a]ll provisions of federal, state, and local
law requiring or permitting [racial] discrimination must yield"
4 82
to its pronouncement in Brown. But this time the Court essen-
tially punted to trial judges the issue of appropriate relief, not-
635 (1950) (holding that an African-American student must be admitted to the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School because a "legal education equivalent to that offered by
the State to students of other races" "is not available to him in a separate law school");
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (holding that an Afri-
can-American graduate student, "having been admitted to a state-supported graduate
school, must receive the same treatment at the hands of the state as students of other
races").
475 Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'76 Id. at 493.
47 Id. at 489-90.
479 Id. at 492-93.
479 Id. at 494 (quoting lower court).
410 Id. at 495.
411 Id. at 495-96 (noting that "the formulation of decrees in these cases presents
problems of considerable complexity" and requesting reargumentation of that issue
the next term).
02 Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
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ing that "the courts which originally heard these cases can best
perform this judicial appraisal."08 3  With minimal advice, the
opinion then directed lower courts to desegregate public
schools "with all deliberate speed."4 In the immediate wake of
these decisions, the Supreme Court would order the desegrega-
tion of various public facilities in short per curium opinions, cit-
ing to Brown or its progeny but offering little guidance for
political actors.
The Court was widely criticized for its approach to desegre-
gation-and notjust by white supremacists. While lauding the
moral principle announced in Brown, some commentators ar-
gued that the lack of definitive rules ensured local chicanery,
with the "all deliberate speed" language producing more delib-
erateness than speed. Instead, the Supreme Court should have
forwarded, in explicit terms, the structure of government obli-
gations and discretion under Brown. In other words, the deseg-
regation decisions should have laid out a constitutional road
map of sorts for local and state officials to follow in integrating
their public school systems. And in a perfect world, the road
mapping strategy might have offered a nice solution: On May
17, 1954, the Justices would have issued definitive rules and
guidelines for implementing its decision, and the following
day-voila!-the schools would have been desegregated. Unfor-
tunately, the real world doesn't work that way; it takes time to
41 Id. at 299.
484 Id. at 301.
4" See, e.g., Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (munici-
pal amphitheaters); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public
beaches, pools, and bathhouses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(municipal golf courses); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413
(1956) (state graduate schools); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses);
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (school for orphans); New
Orleans City Park Improvement Association v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public
parks); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (athletic contests);
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (restaurant in municipal airport);
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (public facilities); Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S.
395 (1964) (municipal auditorium).
48 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L.
REV. 3, 16-31 (1970); Robert Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L.




institute a change in social policy affecting millions of people,
even when that change is of undoubted moral correctness.
At least three factors militated against the Court's use of a
road map in its desegregation decisions. First, Brown in itself
was a powerful statement from an authoritative institution that
could expect some obedience even without explicit guidance.487
And, in fact, some compliance followed: A year after its first de-
cision, the Court announced "that substantial steps to eliminate
racial discrimination in public schools have already been taken,
not only in some of the communities in which these cases arose,
but in some of the states appearing as amid curiae, and in other
states as well."4M This is not to say that desegregation had come
quick and easy; most segregated schools remained as such well
after Brown. Yet by simply announcing a constitutional principle
and little else, the Court persuaded more than 500 school dis-
tricts to abandon segregation 489 without triggering the dangers
of creative dicta.
A second consideration was the competence of the Supreme
Court to fashion a solution for diverse school systems spread
across the nation. Untold numbers of statutes and regulations
would have to be conformed to Brown; schoolhouses would have
to be built or torn down; teachers and administrators would
have to be hired or reassigned; transportation for students
would have to be adjusted; new school district lines might have
to be drawn;491 most of all, money would have to be raised and
'87 See BIcxEL, TiE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH, supra note 2, at 245-46:
Like poetry, then, as a verse by Auden tells us, the great School Segregation decision of May
17, 1954, made nothing happen. But only like poetry. Only as it may sometimes seem that
nothing but power, purposefully applied, can affect reality, only thus could it be said that
this first decision had no consequences. And this is a species of romantic illusion. In fact,
announcement of the principle was in itself an action of great moment, considering the
source from which it came. Immediately, in the phrase Lincoln used about slavery, segre-
gation was placed "where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of
ultimate extinction" ....
'" Brown 17, 349 U.S. at 299. See also BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra
note 2, at 246.
49 See BIcxEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 246. See also
KLUGER, supra note 470, at 720.
4 Of course, any redistricting or change in student matriculation would have to
survive judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment or (eventually) the Voting
Rights Act. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Shaw v.
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spent. Given the judiciary's limited expertise on such subjects,
offering judgment without detailed guidance may have been the
only path open to the Court. "Seen in its totality, as involving
some 5,000 school districts, nearly nine million white children
and nearly three million colored, the situation exhibited great
variety and complexity," argued Professor Bickel. "No solution
could be fabricated and made effective overnight, no matter
what anyone might wish."'4 91
The third and most important consideration was the institu-
tional legitimacy of the Supreme Court. No modern scholar
92
can doubt the validity of the Court's judgment on May 17, 1954;
it remains the moral apogee of American jurisprudence. But
the Justices recognized the dangerous ground on which they
had ventured, "subject to scurrilous attack by men who pre-
dicted that integration of the schools would lead directly to
'mongrelization of the race' and that this was the result the
Court had really willed."493 Racists are, almost by definition, ob-
stinate in their beliefs and dull in their cognitive powers. They
are also quick to use intimidation and violence against those
seeking equality of treatment, as more than aptly demonstrated
by the angry mobs that engulfed black students seeking admis-
sion in various Southern schools and universities. Segregation-
ist politicians only stoked the fire of race-hate, advancing their
careers by vowing to fight integration at every turn."'
The threat to the ongoing authority of the Court was palpa-
ble, as "any head-on challenge to the segregated South . . .
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1998); Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997);
Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
'9' BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 248.
4' But see Wechsler, supra note 369, at 31-35 (arguing that no "neutral principle"
could justify Brown). For a brief attempt to resuscitate Wechsler's "neutral principles"
thesis in law enforcement, see Luna, Principled Enforcement, supra note 283.
... BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 174.
... For example, nearly all congressional representatives from segregated states
signed on to a "Southern Manifesto," attacking "the decision of the Supreme Court in
the school cases as a clear abuse of power" and pledging "ourselves to use all lawful
means to bring about the reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitu-
tion and to prevent the use of force in its implementation." Id. at 257-58. See also 102
CONG. REC. H3948, 4004 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1956) (reprinting "Southern Manifesto").
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would have produced civil strife sufficient to make Little Rock
and Birmingham seem gatherings of good will.",115 Nor was it
clear that President Eisenhower would enforce the desegrega-
tion decisions against recalcitrant Southern states, let alone a
detailed set of rules issued in the form of an opinion.9 6 In this
context, outright defiance by the South coupled with acquies-
cence by the President and Congress would have emasculated
the Supreme Court. It could still issue orders, but who would
listen? The original decision and the subsequent charge to de-
segregate "with all deliberate speed" were cautiously crafted
against this background. 7
What was needed more than detailed judicial guidelines was
a swelling of national opinion against segregation and resolute
action from the federal government. And eventually that sen-
timent did take hold, culminating in the adoption of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.498 Yet one is left to wonder whether the ul-
timate consequences of Brown would have come to fruition had
the Justices issued a comprehensive road map toward desegre-
gation, whether this strategy would have given segregationists
J" . HARVIEWILINSON, FROM BROWNTO BAKE 68 (1979).
49 See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 264-65. See also EARL
WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 291 (1977) (quoting President Eisenhower's
attempt to justify Southern resistance to school desegregation: "These are not bad
people. All they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little girls are not re-
quired to sit alongside some big overgrown Negro."). Eventually, President
Eisenhower did use force to implement the Supreme Court's desegregation deci-
sions. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 273, at 267-68 (reprinting excerpts from Presi-
dent Eisenhower's public announcement to send federal troops to Little Rock,
Arkansas).
497 See, e.g., FISHER & DEviNs, supra note 273, at 256-57:
When Brown was decided, segregation was so ingrained in the South that the outlawing of
dual school systems promised social turmoil and massive resistance.... These deep feel-
ings were not lost either on the Court or on the Department of Justice. In an effort to
temper Southern hostility, Chief Justice Warren sought to craft a unanimous opinion of
limited reach and the Justice Department recommended that the Court not specify a rem-
edy in the case.... By not insisting on immediate implementation of its policy, the Court
was able to unanimously agree upon a brief declaration that segregation in education was
unconstitutional. A year later the Court issued its remedy for Brown, declaring that deseg-
regation must proceed with "all deliberate speed." The Court's bifurcation of merits and
remedies, as well as the absence ofjudgmental rhetoric in its segregation decisions, reveals
that the Justices sought to improve the acceptability of their decision by speaking in a sin-
gle moderate voice.
49 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1994)).
more fodder against the Court, whether Southern states would
have loudly defied not only the principle of Brown but also its
dictates, and whether the President and Congress would have
stood to defend the Supreme Court against such challenges.
Given these ambiguous circumstances, the initial49 lack of de-
tailed rules or guidance for desegregation seems entirely defen-
sible.5°°
3. City of Chicago v. Morales
Having laid out an analytic framework and considered cases
where the application or rejection of the judicial strategy ap-
peared reasonable, we turn now to the use of constitutional
road maps in the Supreme Court's criminal procedure juris-
prudence. To reiterate the sequence of events in Morales: Chi-
cago enacted a loitering ordinance aimed at gang congregation,
the Supreme Court struck down the law but offered a road map
toward constitutional legislation in Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence, and the City recently enacted a new gang-loitering ordi-
nance consistent with the O'Connor road map. The question,
then, is the propriety of the road mapping strategy in the con-
text of Morales.
A handful of arguments can be made against issuing a road
map in this case. Neither the Court nor the lower judiciary con-
front the void-for-vagueness doctrine and, in particular, va-
grancy-type statutes on any consistent basis. Certainly, Illinois
judges considered various constitutional challenges after the
gang-loitering ordinance was passed. But in general, this spe-
cies of law is sporadically litigated and hardly constitutes the
type of frequently confronted issue requiring definitive guid-
ance from the Supreme Court. Likewise, it is not entirely clear
'" The Court would eventually have to face a variety of thorny issues. See, e.g.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (busing to
achieve desegregation).
'00 This does not mean that the entire opinion can be defended. For example, the
Court's reliance on scientific evidence to justify desegregation was empirically dubi-
ous. See Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and So-
cial Science Research in the Supreme Cour 72 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 57, 70 (1978)
("Virtually everyone who has examined the question now agrees that the Court erred
[in using social science studies]. The proffered evidence was methodologically un-
sound."). Instead, the Brown Court should have announced a moral principle-
forced separation by race produces inherent inequality, for instance-without regard
to scientific data.
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that the lower courts have considered a sufficient number of
similar cases to provide trends and practical experience for the
Justices. And unlike Miller, the Morales Court was not faced with
an endless stream of litigation squandering limited time and
docket space.
By and large, though, Morales seemed to present a fairly
strong case for using the road mapping strategy. As an initial
matter, the Supreme Court was not dealing with a polycentric
issue that involved, for example, choosing among various public
policies and allotting tax dollars among rivals.50 Massive social
change was an unlikely consequence of the Court's decision, re-
gardless of whether the ordinance was upheld or struck down.
Chicago's approach to gang loitering remains relatively unique,
with most jurisdictions opting for more traditional policing
strategies, focusing on harmful conduct rather than congrega-
tion alone. 2
The stakes were high, however, for individuals subject to the
law's bite and community members living in constant fear of
gang activity. On one side were the suspected gang members
and their associates, rousted and sometimes jailed for merely
standing on a street corner. On the other side were law-abiding
citizens and families, burdened by the devastation of their
communities and the danger accompanying even simple, every-
" It is true, however, that Chicago would have to make resource allocation deci-
sions as a necessary consequence of the Court's decision.
' , See, e.g., Gaylord Shaw, Justices Reject Chicago's Anti-Gang Loitering Law, ARIZ.
REPUB., June 11, 1999, atA3 (police official stating that "the case will not affect Phoe-
nix procedures"); David Savage, High Court Rejects Ban on Gang Loitering, L.A. TIMES,
June 11, 1999, at Al ("Since Chicago's law was new and untested, its demise should
have no direct impact on California .... San Jose Mayor Ron Gonzales said that his
city had never even considered the Chicago approach 'because it seemed obviously
constitutionally defective."'); James H. Burnett III, Ruling unlikely to affect Milwaukee
ordinances, MILWAUKEEJ. & SENTNEL, June 11, 1999, at 3 ("In spite of Thursday's U.S.
Supreme Court ruling striking down a Chicago anti-loitering ordinance aimed at
keeping gang members from congregating, Milwaukee's anti-loitering laws are likely
to remain intact, city officials say."). Moreover, the decision was unlikely to have ma-
jor effects even on Chicago law enforcement, "because Chicago police already have
adjusted their tactics since the law was first declared unconstitutional in state court
more than three years ago." Marx & Wilson, supra note 34. But see Mark LeBien, The
U.S. Supreme Court strikes down Chicago's gang loitering ordinance, CmH. TRm., June 10,
1999, at I ("Legal experts say the Court's decision in the Chicago case could be its
most important law-enforcement ruling in decades. Cities all over the country,
plagued by gang violence in mainly poor, minority communities, have moved to new
systems of policing that could be affected by the ruling.").
20001 1223
EPK LUNA
day activities. With an obligation to ensure fairness in the
criminal justice system and, in particular, adequate notice of
banned conduct, the Morales Court was acting within an area of
alleged judicial expertise and on an issue that called for defini-
tive guidelines. Given that the ordinance's very defect was a
failure to "provide sufficiently specific limits on the enforce-
ment discretion of the police, it seemed fitting for the Su-
preme Court to suggest such limits through the road mapping
strategy.
Although efficiency gains were doubtful for the Court itself,
the political branches had much to benefit from a constitutional
road map. From the law enforcement perspective, a freshly
minted loitering ordinance would resume police intervention at
an early stage in the timeline of street crime. Rather than wait-
ing for a drug deal, youth violence, or physical intimidation, of-
ficers could interrupt a precursor to such conduct-gang
congregation on street corners-allowing preventative measures
before crime occurs. From the legislative point of view, a consti-
tutional road map would permit lawmakers to efficiently reenact
just such a tool for police. If the Morales Court had struck down
the ordinance in a terse opinion, the Chicago City Counsel
might have foregone new legislation or spent its time finding
the defect rather than correcting it. The road mapping strategy
could allow the City to focus its efforts on crafting a fresh loiter-
ing ordinance consistent with the Constitution. Moreover, a
constitutional road map seemed likely to spur political action, as
the ordinance had been enacted in the recent past, public sup-
port remained high for this type of community policing tech-
nique, and the City had made clear its intentions to pursue
legislative alteratives.5
°4
The placement and phrasing of the Morales road map
seemed to limit the potential downside as well. It was located
within a concurring rather than a majority opinion, avoiding
appearances of brazen judicial activism or at least limiting such
claims to discrete members of the Supreme Court. The road
map was backed, however, by swing votes necessary for the
Court's judgment, giving it a heightened degree of influence on
-o0 Morales, 527 U.S. at 64.
" See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, Justices Look at City Law, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 10,
1998, at 3 ("Daley defended the ordinance and said that if the Supreme Court deci-
sion goes against the city, it 'will come back and correct' it.")
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political actors. Legislators need only conduct a simple head-
count of the Justices to assess the chances of a new gang-
loitering law: An ordinance that follows, more or less, the Mora-
les road map will likely receive the votes of concurring Justices
O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy and those of the three dis-
senters, ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Through its location, the road map thus minimized any appear-
ances of judicial lawmaking while maximizing the potential
guidance for the political branches.
Likewise, Justice O'Connor was careful to package her road
map in accommodating, even sympathetic terms. "I share Jus-
tice Thomas' concern about the consequences of gang vio-
lence," O'Connor opined, "and I agree that some degree of
police discretion is necessary to allow the police 'to perform
their peacekeeping responsibilities satisfactorily.' ' 0 5  And
though concurring with the majority that the ordinance was un-
constitutionally vague, she felt it "important to courts and legis-
latures alike that we characterize more clearly the narrow scope
of today's holding."5 6 Justice O'Connor then suggested that
Chicago had reasonable alternatives at its disposal to fight gang
intimidation and violence. 7 In addition to providing "exam-
ples" of such alternatives, O'Connor noted that much of her
road map "would be consistent with the Chicago City Council's
findings and would avoid the vagueness problems of the ordi-
nance."' Her suggestions also appear in harmony with estab-
lished principles of criminal liability and due process-
distinguishing "harmful" purposes and conduct from facially
innocuous activity, for instance, and limiting coverage to gang
members to avoid the problem of guilt by association. 9
The strongest argument in favor of the Morales road map,
and the one that seemed to animate Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence, was the plight of crime-infested neighborhoods and their
efforts to protect law-abiding residents. According to its advo-
cates, Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance was but one example
0' Morales, 527 U.S. at 65 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
06 Id. at 66.
507 Id.
Id. at 68.
5 See id. at 67-68. As noted earlier, however, the new ordinance maintained
criminal liability for non-gang members who congregate with gang members. SeeAp-
pendix B, infra (providing text of new ordinance).
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of poor, urban, largely-minority communities retaking the
streets from criminals. 5' Such efforts deserve acknowledgement
if not deference from the courts, supporters contend, as strict
scrutiny is little more than the second-guessing of judges who
don't live in gangland.51'
The challenge for the Morales Court, then, was striking down
an unconstitutionally vague statute without stifling commend-
able reforms and crime fighting techniques in the inner-city. As
always, the Justices had many options before them. They might
have exercised the "passive virtues" and denied certiorari, given
that the Illinois Supreme Court had already invalidated the or-
dinance. 2  Or the Court might have issued a minimalist opin-
ion, striking down the law without any deep theorizing or
prognostication on future issues. But had the Morales Court fol-
lowed the advice of Professors Bickel or Sunstein, the idea of a
new gang-loitering ordinance may well have been scuttled.513 If
510 See Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 38, at 208:
Perhaps the most important reason why courts should take notice .. .is that minority
communities are using their new political power to take charge of the crime problems that
plague their neighborhoods. They are working with their elected officials to establish law
enforcement policies that will help them reinforce weak social structures that accompany
neighborhood poverty. They are not shunning the police. Instead, they are demanding
that police give them the protection they always deserved.
O,' See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 38, at 1167-69 (describing
"strict scrutiny as second guessing"). See also Mowatt, supra note 101 ("[Chicago
Mayor Richard Daley] said critics who have defended the rights of suspected gang
members don't live in gang-infested communities. 'I don't see to many gangbangers
hanging on Lake Shore Drive,' Daley said, drawing applause and laughter."); note 38,
supra (listing scholarship supporting judicial deference to the "new community polic-
ing"). But see note 39, supra (listing scholarship opposingjudicial deference).
112 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (IIl. 1997).
.. For many liberals and libertarians, discouraging reenactment might seem a
good thing, as vagrancy-type laws typically license dangerous levels of police discre-
tion without a substantial showing of necessity. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 24
("Leaders in Chicago are stuck in a time loop, making the same mistake again and
again .... We can repeat the mistakes of the past by adopting a street-sweep-based
policy. We know the certain outcome. Thousands of unnecessary arrests will occur
followed by years of expensive litigation and-finally-rejection of the policy by some
court. Sadly, we also know the policy will have little impact on the crime rate.").
Told that the law might run afoul of the Constitution, one supporter snorted, "I don't be-
lieve when the Founding Fathers were drafting the Constitution that the Latin Kings were
sitting in Philadelphia." ... It would be interesting to transportJames Madison to a street
corner on Chicago's Southwest Side to engage a Latin King in a discussion of where a free
society should draw the line between protecting liberties and upholding public safety. Un-
der the city ordinance, though, Madison could have found himself ordered by a police of-
ficer to terminate the conversation and leave the vicinity, or else see how he liked talking
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the Supreme Court was fearful of dampening experimentation
in the field of police science and truly believed that "reasonable
alternatives" "remain open, avoidance and minimalism were
not appropriate vehicles for relaying that sentiment. In con-
trast, a strategy such as road mapping could illustrate the limits
of the Court's decision and its willingness to accommodate
other legislative solutions. And the consequence of the Morales
road map was just that-reenactment of the gang-loitering or-
dinance consistent with the Court's opinion.
4. Dickerson v. United States
Little more than a year after Morales, the Supreme Court was
faced with another dubious statute with even broader implica-
tions for criminal procedure doctrine. As previously detailed,
the stages in the Dickerson saga were: the Court's announce-
ment of its Miranda rules for custodial interrogation in 1966,
Congress' enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 to abrogate Miranda in
1968, relative non-enforcement of 3501 throughout the ensuing
three decades, and the Supreme Court's invalidation of 3501 on
June 26, 2000. Unlike Morales, the Dickerson Court did not sug-
gest that valid alternatives existed nor did it encourage creativity
in the political branches; and needless to say, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion did not include a road map for crafting a
constitutional confession statute. Not surprisingly, the months
following the decision have been filled with legislative silence.
law with fellow inmates of the Cook CountyJail. Madison was never affected by the ordi-
nance, but plenty of Chicagoans were .... One approach to war, as the old saying goes, is
"kill them all and let God sort them out" The law takes a similar view of loitering, creating
a broad prohibition and trusting police to distinguish unwholesome loitering from the tol-
erable kind. But though most police are decent and well-intentioned, many are not, and
giving them dictatorial powers over the streets inevitably means that many law-abiding
people taking part in innocent activities will be coerced, inconvenienced or even hauled
off tojail.
Chapman, supra note 34. In addition, violent retaliation against Chicago officials may
be an unexpected consequence of the new gang-loitering ordinance. See Shu Shin
Luh, Office explosion may be gang work, Cm-. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at 19 ("An explo-
sion that broke two windowpanes in Alderman Ray Frias' office late Monday night
may be tied to gang retaliation .... Frias said his opposition to gang loitering and his
efforts to evict gang members from the neighborhood have angered gangs. He has
received threatening phone calls about plans to bomb or shoot up his office, and his
windows have been broken several times with bottles and metal objects, he said.").
514 Morales, 527 U.S. at 67 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
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The question, then, is whether the Court would have better
served its objectives by employing the road mapping strategy.
On first cut, incorporating a constitutional road map into
the Dickerson opinion might have made sense. After all, Miranda
itself had encouraged legislators "in the exercise of their crea-
tive rule-making capacities" and, conversely, disavowed the no-
tion "that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to
any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the in-
terrogation process. '1 5 And while the Court's strict adherence
to Miranda may have impeded political alternatives during the
intervening decades,516 the States were perched for reform ef-
forts with a favorable ruling in Dickerson.17 Some jurisdictions
were already experimenting with videotaping schemes,518 but
large-scale change in the practice of custodial interrogation
seemed to require a loosening of Miranda's mandatory status. A
well-placed road map might have done the trick, allowing the
Court to strike down 3501 while simultaneously reaffirming that
it had not created a "constitutional straitjacket" 51 9 out of the
Fifth Amendment.
Certainly, the Court had sufficient experience and (alleged)
competence to justify the use of the road mapping strategy.
5,5 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. See also id. at 490.
", See Brief of CriminalJustice Legal Foundation, supra note 202, at 23-24:
The original Miranda opinion invited legislative participation but under conditions no re-
sponsible legislator could support. The invitation to construct alternatives came with the
implied threat to strike them down ex post facto if the Court found they did not provide
equally effective protection for the suspect. Invalidation of a standard practice is a disaster,
requiring an already overburdened system to retry and possibly set free thousands of con-
victed criminals. Miranda's invitation gave legislatures a choice between a procedure the
Court had endorsed and a stroll through a minefield. While a state might add additional
procedures on top of Miranda, no responsible legislature or executive could risk experi-
menting with a substitute under such conditions.
... See Brief of South Carolina et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at
14-16, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 271989 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2000) (No. 99-5525)
("If 3501 is upheld as establishing standards for determining the admissibility of con-
fessions obtained without the Miranda warnings in federal cases, the effect of such a
decision will be to permit the States to craft standards of their own.").
51' See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (requiring electronic
recording of custodial interrogation under the Alaska Constitution); State v. Scales,
518 N.W.2d 587, 591-93 (Minn. 1994) (same per the court's supervisory power).
-'9 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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The case involved a judicially sheltered privilege520 and, in par-
ticular, the Supreme Court' self-crafted confession rules. Ques-
tions relating to custodial interrogation regularly face each level
of the judiciary-often in cases with exceptionally high stakes
for suspects, defendants, victims, community members, and the
criminal justice system in general. And after 32 years of
Miranda, the Court could feel confident that the major issues
concerning custodial interrogation had already been explored
by itself or the lower courts. A constitutional road map in Dick-
erson would not have been, in other words, a leap into un-
charted terrain.
In fact, the road mapping strategy might have provided an
ideal means for extracting the Court from comprehensive over-
sight of confession law. If they had any inkling to retreat from
their present position, the Justices could have suggested as
much with appropriate dicta while still demonstrating institu-
tional authority through the invalidation of 3501. One way to
keep the debate alive, then, would be to reiterate Miranda's invi-
tation to the political branches and at that point offer a road
map for legislative consumption. Without such guidance or at
least some encouragement, the only apparent option is a politi-
cal nonstarter-an Article V amendment to the Constitution.
On the other hand, a number of persuasive arguments could
be made against a road mapping approach in Dickerson. In
3501, the Justices were confronted with a rather stale law that,
for the most part, sat idle in the U.S. Code for three decades.
... Cf Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) (holding that "a state trial
judge has the constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger
that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify"); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that prosecutors may not comment on a de-
fendant's invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (the privilege "reflects many of our fundamental
values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;... our fear that
self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the gov-
ernment... in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load,' ... our dis-
trust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent"').
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Aside from occasional rumblings,52' there was no massive politi-
cal movement to change American confession law nor any indi-
cation that Congress would reenact 3501 in the event of an
adverse ruling by the Dickerson Court. Moreover, the constitu-
tional defect of 3501 was not a small glitch in statutory language
or some element that might be severed from the larger congres-
sional scheme. Instead, the entire force and function of the
law-abrogating a Court decision by turning back the clock-
seemed fundamentally obnoxious to the Supreme Court's role
in a post-Marbuy5 22 world.
Pragmatic considerations also weighed against the use of a
constitutional road map in Dickerson. The most promising al-
ternative to Miranda-videotaping confessions-creates a whole
host of issues that the Court may not have been prepared to an-
swer or even raise: When should the videotaping commence-
immediately after a suspect is taken into custody or just when he
is ready to talk? Must Miranda warnings still be given prior to
questioning, or does the videotape itself guarantee a voluntary
confession consistent with the Constitution? How can the
courts be sure that promises, threats, or violence did not pre-
cede or follow the taped events? Will the camera focus only on
the suspect, or will the gestures of interrogating officers also be
recorded? These and other issues were only compounded by
the Court's limited expertise on scientific advancements and its
inability to gather evidence on both the potential and limits of
modem police technology.
Another practical concern was Miranda's effects on law en-
forcement, the courts, and the public. Far from impeding the
police, some argue that Miranda has provided substantial bene-
fits to law enforcement.523 It offered a clear, simple set of ad-
" See, e.g., CONG. TESTIMONY (May 13, 1999) (statement of Edwin Meese III),
available at 1999 WL 16947871 (former U.S. Attorney General discussing Reagan
DOJ's investigation into overturning Miranda).
" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
'2 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner, supra note 179, at 31-33, 43-44; Reply Brief for
United States, supra note 179, at 16-17; Brief of Griffin B. Bell et al., as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 2, 6-13, 26-29, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 122087
(U.S. Jan. 27, 2000) (No. 99-5525); CONG. TESTIMONY (Mar. 15, 1995) (statement of
Prof. Carol S. Steiker), available at 1995 WL 108463. Consider also the experience of
author and former prosecutor Scott Turow:
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monitions that must be given prior to custodial interrogation. 524
If a confession is obtained after a suspect's waiver of rights, offi-
cers know with near certainty that the statement will be admissi-
ble at trial. While claims of involuntariness are still possible,
"cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument
that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the
fact that law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of
Miranda are rare."'25
In contrast, the voluntariness test-informed by the "totality
of the circumstances" of each case and subject to ajudge's own
predispositions-seems likely to introduce confusion among po-
lice on the limits of interrogation techniques. Generations of
law enforcement have been trained on Miranda and guided by
its rules, becoming almost second nature to officers on the beat.
Large-scale change to law enforcement expectations may lead,
in turn, to more unconstitutional (but possibly reasonable) po-
lice conduct in the vacuum left by Miranda.526 Because confes-
sion law "has become reasonably clear and law enforcement
practices have adjusted," Chief Justice Warren Burger claimed
To whatever degree Miranda ever impeded law enforcement, its effect abated a long time
ago. I have been practicing criminal law for nearly 22 years now, eight years as a federal
prosecutor and 14 years in private practice. In that time, I have been involved in exactly
one case where the result was changed after a confession was declared inadmissible under
Miranda, and that matter involved ajuvenile who, in addition to not being told his rights,
did not enjoy the benefit of a number of other safeguards applied in Illinois to the ques-
tioning of minors. Nor is my experience idiosyncratic. After a couple of hours of com-
puter research, I could not find a single reported decision in Illinois in the last 12 months
in which a confession was suppressed or a conviction reversed because of a Miranda viola-
tion.
Scott Turow, Miranda Rule Makes Little Difference, PiAIN DEAL.R (01ev.),June 30, 2000,
at B13.
1 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986) ("[a]s we have stressed on nu-
merous occasions, '[o]ne of the principal advantages' of Miranda is the ease and clar-
ity of its application"); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 432 (1984) (noting "the
simplicity and clarity" of Miranda); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 664 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that Miranda
"'afforded police and courts clear guidance on the manner in which to conduct a cus-
todial investigation'"); Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1324 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
in chambers) ("[R]igidity [is the strength of the Miranda decision.").
'2' Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 433 n.20.
'2 See Brief of Griffin B. Bell et al., supra note 523, at 28 ("A retreat from Miranda
could disrupt decades of settled police practice and introduce new opportunity for
police to make mistakes-mistakes that may render the evidence they gather inadmis-
sible.").
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some twenty years ago, "I would neither overrule Miranda, dis-
parage it, nor extend it at this late date. 527
Efficiency gains from the Court's confession rules have ac-
crued to prosecutors and trial judges as well. State attorneys can
predict with a degree of certainty whether a given confession
will be admissible at trial: If the defendant received his Miranda
warnings and waived them, the statement can be introduced
without reservation. But if the officer failed to give the required
admonitions or continued to interrogate after a suspect invoked
his rights, the confession will be excluded from the state's case-
in-chief.5 28 Given that the standard is fairly straightforward to
litigate, prosecutors can factor the likely results into their charg-
ing and plea bargaining decisions while also recognizing when
to press investigators for more untainted evidence. The trial
court's task in assessing confessions is also facilitated by
Miranda. Rather than having to determine and analyze all fac-
tors surrounding custodial interrogation, judges need only ask
whether a suspect received and waived his constitutional rights.
In this way, trial courts avoid elongated hearings on the circum-
stances and psychology of confession and instead focus on a dis-
crete factual question.
Miranda may have produced a similar reliance interest in
members of the public. As noted earlier, I do have some con-
cerns with explicit use of "our national culture ''52 as a bell-
wether of constitutional cases, particularly when other
justifications for a decision are either nonexistent or flimsy.
Nevertheless, the expectations of the general population and
the consequences from altering those beliefs are always sub rosa
considerations for the Court. Thanks to the fame of the origi-
nal decision and its subsequent pervasiveness in popular cul-
ture, Miranda warnings have become ingrained in public
consciousness; the memorable mantra may be the only bit of
'2 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, CJ., concurring in the
judgment).
128 But see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (articulating a "public safety"
exception that allows admission of un-Mirandized statements in the prosecution's case-
in-chief).
" Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). See text accompany-
ing notes 255-56, supra.
1232 [Vol. 90
2000] CONSTITUTIONAL ROAD MAPS 1233
constitutional law known to those in custody. Many Americans,
in fact, are likely to view Miranda warnings as constitutional
rights in themselves rather than mere prophylactics, establish-
ing boundaries between law enforcement and private individu-
als and setting a tone of respect and fairness in the most
coercive of police-citizen interactions. As such, a decision re-
nouncing Miranda and its required warnings might well be
viewed as a misappropriation of constitutional rights, possibly
undermining public confidence and the perceived legitimacy of
the Court.5ss
All of these arguments, both for and against the road map-
ping strategy, might have weighed on the Supreme Court in
crafting Dickerson. But my sense of the Court, both from the
seven votes behind the majority opinion and the identity of its
author,5" is one of satisfaction with current doctrine and an un-
'" See Brief of Griffin B. Bell et al., supra note 523, at 28 ("A retreat from these
warnings might lead many to believe that they had lost underlying rights, and it
would surely undermine public confidence in the security of basic legal protec-
tions."). But see Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2347 (ScaliaJ., dissenting):
I am not convinced by petitioner's argument that Miranda should be preserved because the
decision occupies a special place in the "public's consciousness." As far as I am aware, the
public is not under the illusion that we are infallible. I see little harm in admitting that we
made a mistake in taking away from the people the ability to decide for themselves what
protections (beyond those required by the Constitution) are reasonably affordable in the
criminal investigatory process. And I see much to be gained by reaffirming for the people
the wonderful reality that they govern themselves....
See also Brief of Former U.S. Attorneys General, supra note 183, at 17-18; Brief of Ari-
zona Voices for Victims et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 13-14,
Dickerson v. United States, 2000 WL 271994 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2000) (No. 99-5525);
CONG. Trs O M , (May 13, 1999) (statement of Maricopa County Attorney Richard
M. Romley), available at 1999 WL 16947865.
," See Linda Greenhouse, Court used Miranda ruling to assert constitutional role, Prrr.
PosT-GAzETrT,July 2, 2000, atA14 ("In a real sense, the surprisingly lopsided decision
last week said more about the Court itself than about Miranda or about defendants'
rights."); Robert S. Greenberger, Supreme Court Reaffirms Miranda Rule, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2000, at A2 ("The decision is a strong reaffirmation of Miranda, given its
wider-than-expected 7-2 decision and its author, Chief Justice William Rehnquist.");
David Savage, Supreme Court Reaffirms '66 Miranda Ruling, L.A. TIMEs, June 27, 2000, at
Al ("By a lopsided 7-2 vote, the Court reaffirmed the Miranda v. Arizona ruling of
1966, the most well-known criminal law decision of the liberal Court led by ChiefJus-
tice Earl Warren. And most surprisingly, the announcement came from a conserva-
tive Arizonan and longtime critic of the Miranda decision, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist."); Biskupic, Rehnquist shifts, supra note 228 ("[Both civil libertarians and
police groups] agreed on one point: what ajolt it was to hear conservative ChiefJus-
willingness to spur political action that might upset the status
quo. Some contend that a young Associate Justice Rehnquist
would have voted with Justices Scalia and Thomas to uphold
3501, but an older ChiefJustice Rehnquist has undertaken a po-
sition of leadership on the Court and was reluctant to wipe out
32 years of Mirandajurisprudence in one-fell swoop. 2
More importantly, the Supreme Court seems perfectly con-
tent with the effects of current doctrine on law enforcement
and the public. A few years ago, Carol Steiker applied Meir
Dan-Cohen's metaphor of "acoustic separation""3 to the crimi-
nal procedure jurisprudence of the post-Warren Court.534 To
paraphrase Professor Steiker, the Justices have essentially estab-
lished two sets of Miranda rules, one for popular edification and
the other for law enforcement. The public seems well aware of
the conduct rules governing custodial interrogation: Police must
read a suspect his constitutional rights per Miranda. The aver-
age citizen, however, is generally oblivious to a variety of decision
rules that limit the consequences of Miranda violations. These
tice William Rehnquist endorse a decision so identified with the liberal Court led by
Earl Warren three decades ago. 'We weren't surprised that he wrote the opinion. We
were surprised at what he said,' explained University of Utah law professor Paul Cas-
sell [.").
532 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Your Sort-Of Right to Remain Silent, NAT'L L.J., July 17,
2000, at A18; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court decides to keep Miranda ruling intact,
MILWAuKEEJ. & SENINEL, June 27, 2000, at A15 ("Rehnquist, despite his record as an
early and tenacious critic of [Miranda], evidently did not want its repudiation to be an
imprint of his own tenure.").
[Rehnquist] has never been known for changing his mind, and there is no reason to think
that he has changed his basic view of the decision. What quite clearly gave him pause was
not some newfound affection for Miranda, but the possible consequences to the Court of
overturning it at this point, after dozens of decisions had applied Miranda to state-court
convictions and to state prisoners' federal petitions for habeas corpus. As the ChiefJustice
noted in his opinion, the only possible source of the Court's authority to apply Miranda
came from the decision's status as a direct interpretation of the Constitution. To decide
now that Congress had legislatively overruled Miranda 32 years ago-a colossal "never
mind"-would have made the Court look ineffectual if not fatuous. A close student of the
Court's history, on which he has published three well-received books, Rehnquist may well
have been dismayed by the prospect that a decision to overturn Miranda might go down in
the public mind as the main legacy of his tenure as ChiefJustice.
Greenhouse, Court used Miranda ruling, supra note 531.
3 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
134 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 McH. L. REv. 2466 (1996).
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"inclusionary rules," as Steiker calls them,s allow the use of un-
Mirandized statements for purposes of impeachment,56 permit
the admission of evidence derived from Miranda violations,5 7
and dispense with Miranda warnings altogether under a "public
safety" exception.5s
But while the citizenry may be unaware of decisions cutting
back on Miranda's practical effects, the police have access to
these inclusionary rules through training and frequent contact
with prosecutors and trial courts. The resulting disparity in
knowledge between law enforcement and the public may, in
fact, produce an optimal state of affairs-at least from the
Court's perspective.53 9 After Dickerson, the typical American is
led to believe that Miranda remains a bulwark against police
misconduct. Yet the police know better, that Miranda was never
as exacting as popularly assumed and that unwarned statements
or their fruits are frequently admissible at trial. The Court
could then have it both ways: Average citizens are reassured
that their constitutional rights remain intact, while law en-
forcement agents can continue extracting confessions consis-
tent with a scaled-back version of Miranda. Chief Justice
Rehnquist "can live with Miranda," Professor Kamisar contends,
"and he is confident that the police can do so as well-now that
it has been downsized in various ways. ''5"
Certainly, there is much to dislike about the Chief Justice's
opinion in Dickerson.54' He seemed less than persuasive, for ex-
's Id. at 2469.
"6 See Harris v. NewYork, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
117 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974).
'm See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
... Professor Steiker, however, finds troublesome the resulting "acoustic separa-
tion" and suggests a number of negative consequences. Steiker, supra note 534, at
2540-51.
... Kamisar, Your Sort-Of Righ supra note 532. See also Editorial, Miranda Rules: The
Court Stands Fast on Suspects' Rights, Prrr. POST-GAZ=tTE, June 28, 2000, at A16
("[S]ome-though not all-police have learned to live with Miranda. Thanks to
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and the other six justices in the majority, they won't have to
unlearn that lesson.").
5" See, e.g., Editorial, Miranda Survives, PLAiN D AL.R (Clev.),June 30, 2000, at B12
(arguing that Dickerson offered "a less-than-ringing defense of the way in which the
Miranda warning has come to be part of constitutional law," that "the ruling and its
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ample, in justifying prophylactic constitutional rules. For what
it's worth, I sensed a certain amount of pain in the opinion,42 as
though Rehnquist didn't really believe what he was saying but
nonetheless felt obligated to write for the Court as its steward.
Even so, if the Supreme Court was satisfied with the status quo
and not interested in hearing political alternatives to Miranda,
the ChiefJustice's opinion served its purposes.543 While a consti-
tutional road map might have provoked a legislative response,
Dickerson has all but ended the debate.4
reasoning leave questions sure to fire law school debates for years to come as to
whether this Court has done the right thing in the right way," and that the Dickerson
majority "declined to be. . . straightforward" and wrote an opinion lacking "clarity");
Editorial, Decisions Show Court's Tippy Balance, NEWSDAY, July 2, 2000, at B3
("Rehnquist, a long time critic of the Miranda rule, in effect threw up his hands and
acknowledged that it has 'become part of our national culture."'); Greenhouse,
Miranda ruling intact, supra note 532 ("Both in his courtroom announcement and in
his written opinion, Rehnquist made only passing reference to a series of opinions
throughout the 1970s, '80s and '90s suggesting that Miranda was not itself embedded
directly in the Constitution but was rather just a 'prophylactic' effort to protect the
underlying Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.");
Krauthammer, supra note 61 ("[The current Court] cobbled together an opinion that
simply says: Well, we made the rule many years ago, it seems to work and we are not
about to overturn precedent. Q.E.D.").
542 See, e.g., Editorial, Miranda Survives, supra note 541 ("Rehnquist arrived at a ma-
jority opinion that read more like a meandering apologia than a clear endorse-
ment.").
" Whether a disinclination toward hearing political alternatives can serve as a
constitutionally legitimate motivation for judicial decisionmaking and opinion writing
is a distinct question-and one that I reserve for another day.
14 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, 'Golden middle' ends conflicts, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2000,
at A17 (arguing that compromise on custodial interrogation is "unlikely ... in the
prevailing confrontational culture"); David Broder, Supreme Court: Activism Overruled,
WASH. PosT, July 5, 2000, at A21 ("[A] look at last week's final round of decisions
from the Supreme Court's current term tells us that radical change is not likely to
emanate from the judicial branch of government no matter who is president ....
Miranda is 34 years old .... Could a differently constituted Supreme Court reverse it?
Certainly. Is it likely? Not unless precedent loses its force in the minds ofjudges and
is replaced by an appetite for controversy."); Opinion, Correct ruling on Miranda, KAN.
Cny STAR, July 10, 2000, at B4 (arguing that Dickerson "should put to rest future legal
attacks on Mirandd'); Krauthammer, supra note 61 ("In the best of all possible worlds,
the Court would overturn Miranda and Congress would reinstate it as a statute. That
won't happen. Instead, we get to live with a delicious contradiction: We keep
Miranda; we enjoy Scalia. Who says God doesn't smile upon the United States of
America?"); Greenhouse, Court used Miranda ruling, supra note 531 ("'The Court is
telling Congress: You can't overturn our good decisions, and you can't overturn our
bad decisions. You can't overturn our decisions-period,' said Louis Friedman, a
constitutional law professor at Hofstra Law School."); Editorial, Miranda Survives a
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Scare CHu. TRUB.,July 1, 2000, at 20 ("[t]hanks to Monday's Supreme Court decision,
[Miranda] will remain firmly in place"); Editorial, Miranda Rules, supra note 540
("Ironically, by pressing the Court to reconsider Miranda, opponents have produced
not a repudiation of the rule but a more secure enshrinement of Miranda in Ameri-
can constitutional law."); Matt Flores & Adolfo Pesquera, Few stay silent on Miranda,
SAN ANToNIo EXPRESS-NEws, June 28, 2000, at B1 ("'I think [the Justices] found a
constitutional basis for Miranda, and I'm not going to second-guess the Supreme
Court on this,' said U.S. Rep. Charlie Gonzalez of San Antonio. 'I respect their deci-
sion."'); Savage, Supreme Court Reaffirms Miranda, supra note 531 ("UC Berkeley law
professor Charles D. Weisselberg said that Rehnquist's opinion 'erases all the doubts.
It makes clear Miranda is the law of the land .... I hope it will tell officers that they
must comply with Miranda."'); Greenhouse, Miranda ruling intact, supra note 532
("Yale Kamisar, a University of Michigan law school professor and staunch defender
of the Miranda decision, said that as a result of Monday's ruling, Miranda warnings
would become even more deeply ingrained in the criminal justice system. Kamisar
added that Rehnquist's authorship of the majority opinion should mean 'it will be re-
ceived better by the country and by the police. After all, this is the guy who over the
years has been more pro-police than anyone on the Supreme Court."'); Biskupic,
Rehnquist shifts, supra note 228 ("Mincing no words Monday, Rehnquist said Congress
cannot overrule Miranda."); Kent Scheidegger, Troubling gray area remains, USA
TODAY, June 27, 2000, at A14 ("Although the Court has said Congress can come up
with alternatives, any statute would be merely a proposal, until the Court decided
whether it was 'adequate.' If Congress guessed wrong, all confessions obtained under
the new statute would be thrown out. No responsible legislator could take such a
risk. As a result, we are stuck with this piecemeal process of deciding the rules after
the fact ...."); Editorial, As Miranda fight raged, others reduced crime, USA TODAY, June
27, 2000, at A14 ("On Monday, the Supreme Court [ruled] that a lower court's star-
tling 'discovery' of the law last year under prodding by legal and political ideologues
was wrong: Congress can't overturn constitutional rights without amending the Con-
stitution."); Edward Walsh, High Court Upholds Miranda Rights, WASH. PoST, June 27,
2000, at Al ("'Now Miranda is stronger than it ever was, which is the last thing people
like [Prof. Paul] Cassell wanted,' [Prof. Yale] Kamisar said. 'I would think that if a
President [George W.] Bush got elected and appointed three new justices, they would
have a much harder time overturning Miranda than if this case had never reached the
Court. You gave it your best shot and you lost by a much bigger vote than anybody
expected."'); Brooke A. Masters, A Court Ruling's Clear Message, WASH. POST, June 27,
2000, at A6 ("[T]he 7 to 2 vote makes it clear that the warnings are here to stay, law
enforcement officials said. 'Very often, police officers can say, maybe next year there
will be another decision or maybe in a couple of years it will be different,' said Elliot
Spector, an instructor with the Center for Police and Security Training in Connecti-
cut. 'Butjudging from what the Court said, Miranda is going to be with us forever."')
Editorial, Decision's Effects all to the Good, SUN-SENqNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 29,
2000, at A30 ("The so-called 'Miranda warning' has become a part of the law-
enforcement culture, not to mention the TV and movie culture .... This won't
change in the years to come.... The lopsided vote [in Dickerson] coupled with the
imprimatur of the ChiefJustice will likely head off further challenges in the years to
come."). But see Jeff Barker & Brent Whiting, State officials' reactions mixed toward
Miranda, AiZ. REpUB, June 27, 2000, at A8:
It's likely, however, that there will be further attempts to alter Miranda, either by Congress
or in the courts. "One of the first things that will be litigated is a [possible] good-faith ex-
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CONCLUSION
Did the opinions in Morales and Dickerson achieve optimal
interbranch dialogue? Assuming the unconstitutionality of both
the gang-loitering ordinance and 3501, the answer depends on
the Supreme Court's ultimate goal in each case. As noted in the
introduction, the Court itself is not, strictly speaking, a being
capable of having an intent. In fact, it seems impossible to know
the actual purpose of a single Justice (absent a tell-all book by a
journalist or former law clerk).5 But opinions do exude goals,
at least from the reader's standpoint, that might then inform
546legislative responses. In this sense, an opinion can have an
"intent," perceived by the political branches and the public yet
not necessarily consistent with the individual goals of each Jus-
tice.
Specifically, an opinion striking down legislation can seek to
encourage a political response, it can attempt to discourage re-
actions by the political branches, or it can have no dialogic aspi-
rations whatsoever. Constitutional road maps offer only one
means of provoking dialogue, with a variety of less aggressive
ception," said Paul Cassell, the University of Utah law professor who had asked the High
Court to overturn Miranda. "If a police officer is acting in good faith but makes some mis-
take in complying with the Miranda procedures, then the confession could still come into
evidence." [SenatorJon] Kyl said Congress may take action, too, but would need time first
to digest the decision. "A good-faith exception combined with some other things seems to
me to be a logical approach," Kyl said.
See also Greenberger, supra note 531 ("Mr. Cassell said the battle isn't over. 'We will
continue to look at alternatives to Miranda,' he said, particularly the notion of video-
taping confessions to show they were made voluntarily."); Biskupic, Rehnquist shifts,
supra note 228 (noting that Prof. Cassell "said he would continue his quest"); Jack
Torry, Gun control a bigger issue than overall crime control, Prrr. POST-GAzETTE, Oct. 1,
2000, at A19 ("[Gov. George W. Bush] has supported weakening the Miranda warning
.... After the Supreme Court in June reaffirmed the earlier ruling, Bush said, 'Vol-
untary confessions should be allowed without a Miranda reading."').
'4 See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 427; EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED
CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWrrNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1998). As Gerald Rosenberg notes, "the concern that greeted the publica-
tion of [these] two books purporting to offer an inside view of the Supreme Court is
testimony to the unwillingness ofJustices to publicly explore their motivations for de-
cisions." Gerald N. Rosenberg, Incentives, Reputation, and the Glorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 637, 640 (2000).
546 Cf Schauer, Incentives, supra note 379, at 636 ("[absent] candid self-revelation
about motives [of the Justices], we are left with external indicia"). Professor Schauer
laments the lack of "a more realistic analysis ofjudicial incentives and judicial behav-
ior" in the legal literature and notes that "the reluctance to engage in critical inquiry
into judicial motivation exists" in the social science literature as well. Id. at 615.
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strategies available to the Court. Conversely, the Justices can
fine-tune deterrence of political responses through an opinion's
rhetoric. If the Court's apparent "intentions" are manifested by
its opinion, 47 as has been assumed throughout this article, the
issue of interbranch dialogue in Morales and Dickerson might
then be distilled to a single question: Could the Court have
achieved the same political encouragement or discouragement
with a more passive strategy?
Despite striking down the Chicago law, Morales and, in par-
ticular, Justice O'Connor's concurrence stimulated further po-
litical debate and eventually inspired the enactment of a new
gang-loitering ordinance. In fact, the decision could hearten
community policing advocates on any number of fronts,548 from
civil injunctions5 49 to youth curfews. 5  Far from stifling local ex-
117 In other words, I have assumed that the Court intends an opinion's dialogic
message as perceived by political actors, commentators, and the general public. Cf
United States v. Beltran-Garcia, 179 F.3d 1200, 1205 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Common
sense supports the conclusion that a person intends the consequences of his ac-
tions.").
"" See, e.g., Savage, High Court Rejects Ban, supra note 502 ("'There might be some-
thing to extract from the [Morales] opinion that could be used to draft an ordinance
that is permissible,' [Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney Brent Riggs)
said."); Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, Council OKs bill aimed at loitering, BALT. SUN, Oct. 12,
1999, at BI ("The Annapolis city council narrowly passed last night a bill that allows
police officers to arrest loiterers suspected of sidewalk drug activity in public housing
communities."). But see Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, Withdrawal of loitering bill urged; Foes say
ruling by Supreme Court invalidates it, BAIT. SuN, June 11, 1999, at B1 ("The American
Civil Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People called for an Annapolis alderman to withdraw his anti-loitering bill yesterday,
saying the Supreme Court's decision yesterday that a Chicago loitering law is uncon-
stitutional would invalidate the proposed Maryland law, too."); Stephanie Grace &
Vicki Hyman, Parish Rethinks Loitering Statutes, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 15,
1999, at Al ("Less than a week after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled Chicago's anti-
gang loitering law unconstitutional, attorneys forJefferson Parish and Kenner are re-
evaluating their own loitering measures, and officials in Jefferson are considering tak-
ing their law off the books altogether."); Savage, High Court Rejects Ban, supra note 502
("The Supreme Court struck down a Chicago anti-loitering law Thursday that author-
ized police to sweep the streets of those who look like gang members, disappointing
Los Angeles area prosecutors who had hoped for a new weapon in their war against
street gangs.").
... See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal.4th 1090 (1997) (upholding civil
injunction against alleged street gang members). See also David McLemore, San Anto-
nio sets up safety zones to shut down gangs, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 29, 1999, at A49:
Armed with a 1997 state law, Bexar County District Attorney Susan Reed obtained a civil in-
junction July 7 to have 36 documented members of the Klik and the Klan, two of the city's
most violent street gangs, barred from associating with fellow gang members to plan or
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perimentation, the Morales road map may someday be seen as
stimulating new approaches to crime and grime in urban Amer-
ica. Of course, other, less assertive judicial strategies might have
reached the same end; the Court might have encouraged legis-
lative alternatives in a sentence or two, for instance, without ex-
pressly providing options itself. But it is also possible that
nothing short of a constitutional road map could have provoked
new legislation from the Chicago City Counsel. As such, it
seems hard to second-guess the Morales road map as being too
aggressive. If the goal was interbranch-dialogue-qua-political-
reaction, the Court clearly achieved this through the O'Connor
concurrence.
In contrast, the Dickerson Court made clear that its Miranda
jurisprudence has "constitutional underpinnings"5 1 which law-
makers "may not supersede legislatively."5 2  Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion offered just a passing reference to
Miranda's invitation for reform efforts and even then only to
support the invalidation of 3501.sss Dickerson provided no en-
couragement, let alone a road map, for legislators interested in
crafting a new confession law consistent with the Constitution.
In retrospect, the Court probably could have achieved the same
result without appearing to foreclose all political solutions. The
commit criminal activity within two "safety zones" encompassing the Culebra Park subdivi-
sion .... A decision earlier this year by the U.S. Supreme Court makes Bexar County
prosecutors feel more secure in the constitutionality of their efforts. In a 6-3 decision, the
Supreme Court struck down a Chicago anti-gang loitering statute as too vague to meet
constitutional standards. In a concurring opinion, howeverJustice Sandra Day O'Connor
said it might meet constitutional muster if the statute distinguished gang members from
nongang members in the community. "The California law that Bexar County used as a
model does just that," said Assistant District Attorney Steve Fry, who will prosecute the civil
litigation. So far, the California law has passed all appellate challenges, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court refused to hear an appeal on constitutional grounds.
..0 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (up-
holding juvenile curfew); Schleifer v. Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998)
(same); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Nunez v. San Diego, 114
F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking down juvenile curfew). See also Pratt v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Il1. 1994) (striking down public housing sweeps);
Rob D. Kaiser, Eviction Ordinance, Suit Would Gang Up on Thugs, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 27,
1999, at 1 (detailing efforts in Cicero, Illinois to "evict people from the western sub-
urb if they are identified as gang members," to file "a class action lawsuit against gang
members for violating the civil rights of town residents," and to "give the town the
right to tow the cars of evicted gang members if they return to the 'gang-free zone"').
- Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2334 n.5.
-11 Id. at 2336.
... Id. at 2334.
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majority opinion might have emphasized that reforms must be
"at least as effective" 4 as Miranda at informing suspects of their
rights and securing an opportunity to exercise those rights, for
example, and that 3501 was wholly inadequate on these
grounds. But if thwarting legislative responses was the very ob-
jective, the ChiefJustice's opinion will almost certainly serve this
goal and, conversely, the road mapping strategy would have
been blatantly counterproductive. Assuming as much, Dickerson
cannot be faulted for its lack of a road map if the Court truly
wanted to dissuade legislative alternatives to Miranda.
Stepping back for a moment, I am not convinced that con-
stitutional road maps are inevitably superior or inferior to other
dialogic strategies, or that they will, in fact, increase interbranch
dialogue in particular cases. With perfect hindsight, one can
point to past opinions as illustrating the appropriate use or non-
use of this strategy; the road map in Miller v. California, for in-
stance, can be contrasted with the indefinite charge of the de-
segregation decisions. Morales and Dickerson present closer calls,
however, as it remains unclear whether a road map was neces-
sary to spur political action in the former case or whether rhe-
torical discouragement was crucial to avoiding legislative
responses in the latter case. With the post-decision debates in
an embryonic stage, only time can provide a better understand-
ing of the political implications. But by isolating the road map-
ping strategy, its manifestation in Morales and absence in
Dickerson, and the resulting consequences for the political
branches, this article has highlighted an important feature of
judicial decisionmaking sometimes overlooked by criminal pro-
cedure scholarship-the vehicle for a particular decision can be
as important as the outcome itself.
... Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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APPENDIX A: CHICAGo's ORIGINAL GANG LoITERING-ORDINANCE
PREAMBLE:
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities across the na-
tion, has been experiencing an increasing murder rate as well as an
increase in violent and drug related crimes; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that the continuing
increase in criminal street gang activity in the City is largely responsi-
ble for this unacceptable situation; and
WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the City, the
burgeoning presence of street gang members in public places has in-
timidated many law abiding citizens; and
WHEREAS, One of the methods by which criminal street gangs
establish control over identifiable areas is by loitering in those areas
and intimidating others from entering those areas; and
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs avoid arrest by
committing no offense punishable under existing laws when they
know the police are present, while maintaining control over identifi-
able areas by continued loitering; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that loitering in
public places by criminal street gang members creates a justifiable
fear for the safety of persons and property in the area because of the
violence, drug-dealing and vandalism often associated with such activ-
ity; and
WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in discouraging all per-
sons from loitering in public places with criminal gang members; and
WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to preserve the city's
streets and other public places so that the public may use such places
without fear[.]
TEXT:
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he rea-
sonably believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any
public place with one or more other persons, he shall order all such
persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any per-




(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of
this section that no person who was observed loitering was in fact a
member of a criminal street gang.
(c) As used in this Section:
(1) "Loiter" means to remain in one place with no apparent pur-
pose.
(2) "Criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization, asso-
ciation in fact or group of three or more persons, whether formal or
informal, having as one of its substantial activities the commission of
one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraph (3), and
whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged
in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
(3) "Criminal gang activity" means the commission, attempted
commission, or solicitation of the following offenses, provided that
the offenses are committed by two or more persons, or by an individ-
ual at the direction of, or in association with, any criminal street gang,
with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in any criminal
conduct by gang members: The following sections of the Criminal
Code of 1961: 9-1 (murder), 9-3.3 (drug-induced homicide), 10-1
(kidnapping), 10-4 (forcible detention), subsection (a) (13) of Section
12-2 (aggravated assault-discharging firearm), 12-4 (aggravated bat-
tery), 12-4.1 (heinous battery), 12-4.2 (aggravated battery with a fire-
arm), 12-4.3 (aggravated battery of a child), 12-4.6 (aggravated battery
of a senior citizen), 12-6 (intimidation), 12-6.1 (compelling organiza-
tion membership of persons), 12-11 (home invasion), 12-14 (aggra-
vated criminal sexual assault), 18-1 (robbery), 18-2 (armed robbery),
19-1 (burglary), 19-3 (residential burglary), 19-5 (criminal fortifica-
tion of a residence or building), 20-1 (arson), 20-1.1 (aggravated ar-
son), 20-2 (possession of explosives or explosive or incendiary
devices), subsections (a) (6), (a) (7), (a) (9) or (a) (12) of Section 24-1
(unlawful use of weapons), 24-1.1 (unlawful use or possession of
weapons by felons or persons in the custody of the Department of
Corrections facilities), 24-1.2 (aggravated discharge of a firearm), sub-
section (d) of Section 25-1 (mob action-violence), 33-1 (bribery),
33A-2 (armed violence); Sections 5, 5.1, 7 or 9 of the Cannabis Con-
trol Act where the offense is a felony (manufacture or delivery of can-
nabis, cannabis trafficking, calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy
and related offenses); or Sections 401, 401.1, 405, 406.1, 407 or 407.1
of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (illegal manufacture or de-
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livery of a controlled substance, controlled substance trafficking, cal-
culated criminal drug conspiracy and related offenses).
(4) "Pattern of criminal gang activity" means two or more acts of
criminal gang activity of which at least two such acts were committed
within five years of each other and at least one such act occurred after
the effective date of this section.
(5) "Public place" means the public way and any other location
open to the public, whether publicly or privately owned.
(d) Any person who violates this Section is subject to a fine of not
less than $100.00 and not more than $500.00 for each offense, or im-
prisonment for not more than six months, or both.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (added June 17, 1992; repealed
Feb. 16, 2000).
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APPENDIX B: CHICAGO'S REENACTED GANG-LOITERING
ORDINANCE
PREAMBLE:
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities across the na-
tion, faces alarmingly high rates of murder and other violent crimes,
and of drug offenses; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that criminal street
gang activity in the City is largely responsible for this unacceptable
situation; and
WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the City, the
burgeoning presence of street gang members in public places has in-
timidated many law-abiding citizens; and
WHEREAS, One of the methods by which criminal street gangs
establish control over identifiable areas is by loitering in those areas
and intimidating others from entering those areas; and
WHEREAS, Criminal street gangs establish control over identifi-
able areas in order to control narcotics sales and other illegal activities
in those areas, and to intimidate law-abiding residents; and
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs avoid arrest by
committing no offense punishable under existing laws when they
know police are present, while maintaining control over identifiable
areas by continued loitering; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that loitering in
public places by criminal street gang members creates a justifiable
fear for the safety of persons and property in the area because of the
violence, including unacceptably high rates of drive-by shootings,
drug-dealing and vandalism often associated with such activity; and
WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in discouraging all per-
sons from loitering in public places with criminal street gang mem-
bers because persons who are not gang members in those
circumstances are at risk from drive-by shootings and other gang-
related violence, and at risk to be recruited by gangs; and
WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to preserve the City's
streets and other public places so that the public may use such places
without fear; and
WHEREAS, The use of public places to facilitate trafficking in
narcotics and controlled substances has become an increasing prob-
lem in certain areas of the City; and
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WHEREAS, Persons frequently loiter in public places in the
course of engaging in trafficking in narcotics and controlled sub-
stances; and
WHEREAS, When police officers observe individuals engaging in
loitering and other suspicious activity they are often unable to make
an arrest, even though the persons engaged in that behavior will re-
sume trafficking in narcotics and controlled substances as soon as the
police depart; and
WHEREAS, Loitering by individuals in areas where loitering is
frequently associated with trafficking in narcotics and controlled sub-
stances intimidates law-abiding citizens, diminishes the value of
nearby property and has the potential to destabilize communities and
attract violence; and
WHEREAS, Current laws are inadequate to deal with problems
posed by gang loitering and loitering as a means to facilitate traffick-
ing in narcotics and controlled substances, principally because con-
ventional laws generally depend upon the willingness of civilians to
testify against gang members and drug dealers, and many civilians are
understandably reluctant to put themselves in harm's way by provid-
ing such testimony[.]
TEXT:
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a member of a criminal
street gang engaged in gang loitering with one or more other persons
in any public place designated for the enforcement of this Section
under subsection (b), the police officer shall, subject to all applicable
procedures promulgated by the Superintendent of Police: (i) inform
all such persons that they are engaged in gang loitering within an
area in which loitering by groups containing criminal street gang
members is prohibited; (ii) order all such persons to disperse and
remove themselves from within sight and hearing of the place at
which the order was issued; and (iii) inform those persons that they
will be subject to arrest if they fail to obey the order promptly or en-
gage in further gang loitering within sight or hearing of the place at
which the order was issued during the next three hours.
(b) The Superintendent of Police shall by written directive desig-
nate areas of the City in which the Superintendent has determined
that enforcement of this Section is necessary because gang loitering
has enabled criminal street gangs to establish control over identifiable
areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal il-
legal activities. Prior to making a determination under this subsec-
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tion, the Superintendent shall consult as he or she deems appropriate
with persons who are knowledgeable about the effects of gang activity
in areas in which the ordinance may be enforced. Such persons may
include, but need not be limited to, members of the Department of
Police with special training or experience related to criminal street
gangs; other personnel of that Department with particular knowledge
of gang activities in the proposed designated area; elected and ap-
pointed officials of the area; community-based organizations; and par-
ticipants in the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy who are familiar
with the area. The Superintendent shall develop and implement pro-
cedures for the periodic review and update of designations made un-
der this subsection.
(c) The Superintendent shall by written directive promulgate
procedures to prevent the enforcement of this Section against per-
sons who are engaged in collective advocacy activities that are pro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois.
(d) As used in this Section:
(1) "Gang loitering" means remaining in any one place under
circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that
the purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable a criminal street
gang to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimidate others
from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities.
(2) "Criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization, asso-
ciation in fact or group of three or more persons, whether formal or
informal, having as one of its substantial activities the commission of
one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraph (3), and
whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged
in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
(3) "Criminal gang activity" means the commission, attempted
commission, or solicitation of the following offenses, provided that
the offenses are committed by two or more persons, or by an individ-
ual at the direction of, or in association with, any criminal street gang,
with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in any criminal
conduct by gang members: The following sections of the Criminal
Code of 1961: 9-1 (murder), 9-3.3 (drug-induced homicide), 10-1
(kidnapping), 10-4 (forcible detention), subsection (a) (13) of Section
12-2 (aggravated assault-discharging firearm), 12-4 (aggravated bat-
tery), 124.1 (heinous battery), 124.2 (aggravated battery with a fire-
arm), 124.3 (aggravated battery of a child), 12-4.6 (aggravated battery
of a senior citizen), 12-6 (intimidation), 12-6.1 (compelling organiza-
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tion membership of persons), 12-11 (home invasion), 12-14 (aggra-
vated criminal sexual assault), 18-1 (robbery), 18-2 (armed robbery),
19-1 (burglary), 19-3 (residential burglary), 19-5 (criminal fortifica-
tion of a residence or building), 20-1 (arson), 20-1.1 (aggravated ar-
son), 20-2 (possession of explosives or explosive or incendiary
devices), subsections (a) (6), (a) (7), (a) (9) or (a) (12) of Section 24-1
(unlawful use of weapons), 24-1.1 (unlawful use or possession of
weapons by felons or persons in the custody of the Department of
Corrections facilities), 24-1.2 (aggravated discharge of a firearm), sub-
section (d) of Section 25-1 (mob action-violence), 33-1 (bribery),
33A-2 (armed violence); Sections 5, 5.1, 7 or 9 of the Cannabis Con-
trol Act where the offense is a felony (manufacture or delivery of can-
nabis, cannabis trafficking, calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy
and related offenses); or Sections 401, 401.1, 405, 406.1, 407 or 407.1
of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (illegal manufacture or de-
livery of a controlled substance, controlled substance trafficking, cal-
culated criminal drug conspiracy and related offenses).
(4) "Pattern of criminal gang activity" means two or more acts of
criminal gang activity of which at least two such acts were committed
within five years of each other.
(5) "Public place" means the public way and any other location
open to the public, whether publicly or privately owned.
(e) Any person who fails to obey promptly an order issued under
subsection (a), or who engages in further gang loitering within sight
or hearing of the place at which such an order was issued during the
three hour period following the time the order was issued, is subject
to a fine of not less than $100 and not more than $500 for each of-
fense, or imprisonment for not more than six months for each of-
fense, or both. A second or subsequent offense shall be punishable by
a mandatory minimum sentence of not less than 5 days imprison-
ment. In addition to or instead of the above penalties, any person
who violates this section may be required to perform up to 120 hours
of community service pursuant to Section 14120 of this Code.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (added Feb. 16,2000).
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CONSTITUTIONAL ROAD MAPS
APPENDIX C: CONGRESS' CONFESSION STATUTE
TEXT:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or
by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e)
hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before
such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of
the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If
the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it
shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury
to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall in-
struct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it
deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall
take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving
of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and
arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made
after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant
knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which
he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or
not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to
make any statement and that any such statement could be used
against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised
prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5)
whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel
when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors
to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on
the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a
defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other de-
tention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-
enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay
in bringing such person before a magistrate or other officer empow-
ered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the
United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is
found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the
weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confes-
sion was made or given by such person within six hours immediately
following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limi-
20001 1249
1250 ERIKLUNA [Vol. 90
tation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which
the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate or other of-
ficer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be
reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance
to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or other officer.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in
evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any person to
any other person without interrogation by anyone, or at any time at
which the person who made or gave such confession was not under
arrest or other detention.
(e) As used in this section, the term "confession" means any con-
fession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating
statement made or given orally or in writing.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
